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ABSTRACT 
The thesis addresses three major questions arising 
from the decision of the Government of India to set up an 
indigenous aircraft industry in the public sector. Firstly, 
the rationale behind such a decision. Secondly, the decision-
making and execution of the various aircraft manufacturing 
programs undertaken in the country. And finally, following 
from the above, has the aeronautical industry in India been 
able to make any significant progress towards the proclaimed 
goals of self sufficiency and self reliance? 
The creation of an aeronautical industry in India was 
the direct result of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 
1956 which emphasised indigenous manufacture of aircraft in 
order to expand the technological and industrial base of 
the country as well as to lessen dependence on foreign 
suppliers. While short term import of combat aircraft was 
considered inevitable, the manufacturing policy envisaged 
the licenced production of aircraft in technical collaboration 
with foreign manufacturers in the initial stages. This 
would be followed by the creation of design, development and 
manufacturing facilities which would be geared towards 
fulfilling the requirements of the user agency, i.e. the 
Indian Air Force (lAF). 
Implementation of this policy was exceptionally swift. 
Within a period of six years beginning from 1956, the 
Government of India had taken steps to manufacture as many 
as six different types of aircraft. Of these, two, the 
HF-24 Marut and the HJT-16 Kiran were to be designed 
indigenously, and two, the Gnat and the HS-748 to be 
manufactured under licence from UK. Further, it was also 
decided to manufacture the MiG-21 fighter and Al-III 
helicopter under licence from the Soviet Union and France 
respectively. These projects however encountered serious 
problems at various stages of implementation. Firstly, the 
country lacked the trained manpower required for the 
execution of the manufacturing programs. Secondly, there 
were serious lapses in project planning and management. 
Even in cases where project reports were prepared with the 
help of overseas consultants, these were subject to arbitrary 
changes by decision-makers both at the Ministry of Defence 
and at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). This resulted 
in considerable delays as well as low productivity. Further, 
there were considerable losses in terms of redundancy of 
parts and raw materials due to poor coordination between 
various sectors of the decision-making machinery. Finally, 
after more than 25 years of manufacturing experience, the 
country has not been able to evolve a cohesive aircraft 
procurement and manufacturing policy. As a consequence, 
not only is the industry facing a considerable problem of 
idle capacity in the near future but has also not been able 
to keep abreast of contemporary technology. 
HAL is now undertaking a second round of transfer of 
technology from the West - a situation reminiscent of the 
late 1950s. After two decades of attempting to design and 
develop its own combat aircraft, it has finally decided to 
license manufacture the Anglo-French Jaguar and the MiG-23. 
Thus, despite rhetoric to the contrary, a combination of 
poor planning and bad management have ensured that the 
aircraft industry in India is nowhere near the twin goals 
of self reliance and self sufficiency it had set for itself 
a quarter of a century ago. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The period from 1954 onwards was of major significance 
for the aeronautical industry in India. This was also the 
time when the Second Five Year Plan was being formulated. 
The First Five Year Plan (1951-56) had neither attempted 
fundamental changes in the economy nor tried to initiate 
process of rapid growth. It was, as was officially admitted 
'essentially a plan of preparation for laying the foundation 
for more rapid development in the future'.^ On the other 
hand, the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61) had been drafted 
with an intention to achieve certain goals, especially in 
the industrial sector. It was made quite clear that basic 
industries like mining, iron and steel and machine tools 
would have immediate priority 'in order to provide for a 
2 
constant increase of the country's "self-equipment"'. 
The Industrial Policy Resolution adopted by Parliament 
in 1956 stated that the manufacture of aircraft would be 
the responsibility of the public sector,^ and the rationale 
for indigenous manufacture of aircraft was clearly stated 
by the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in a speech in 4 Parliament on 21 March 1956: 
^ India. Planning Commission, The First Five Year Plan, 
New Delhi, 1953. 
^ For further elaboration refer: Charles Bettelheim, India 
Independent (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1968), pp.246-247. 
^ Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, History of the Indian Air 
Force (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p.198. 
^ Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1953-57, Volume III (New Delhi 
Publications Division, Government of India, 1958), pp.39-40, 
41. 
The more technical armies and navies 
and air forces get, the more important 
becomes the industrial and technological 
base of the country. You import ... 
an aircraft ... and you may even teach 
somebody to use it, but that is a very 
superficial type of defence because you 
have not got the technological background 
for it ... If somebody from whom you 
bought it refuses to supply a part of it, 
it becomes useless, so that in spite of 
your independence you become dependent on 
others, and very greatly so ... The veal 
strength of a country develops by 
industrial growth^ which implies the capacity 
to make weapons of war for the army, the 
navy or the air force ... (emphasis added) 
The overriding importance attached to the twin concepts of 
indigenous defence production and self reliance was further 
elaborated by Nehru in reply to a debate in Parliament 
23 June 1962, when he stated:^ 
... I believe, as a practical proposition, 
that it is better to have a second-rate 
thing made in our own country than to rely 
on the first-rate thing which we have to 
import and which may stop functioning for 
lack of spare parts or something else. 
Thus, the policy of the Government of India with 
regard to equipping the lAF had been clearly defined by 
1956. Apart from the outright purchase of aircraft from 
overseas, facilities for indigenous production would be 
set up by following a policy of: 
(a) licensed production of aircraft within the country in 
technical collaboration with overseas manufacturers. 
(b) creating design, development and production facilities 
of the required type of aircraft. 
^ Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 2957-63, Volume IV (New Delhi 
Publications Division, Government of India, 1964), p.447. 
The lAF had no public reaction to this proposition. 
To an extent, HAL had already acquired experience with 
the assembly of combat aircraft in its manufacture of 
Vampire jets under licence. But the uncertainties associated 
with the total reliance on UK suppliers for the Vampire 
powerplants clearly gave an added incentive to HAL to try 
and set up engine manufacturing facilities. Consequently, 
when an agreement to manufacture the Gnat was signed with 
Folland Aircraft (UK) in 1956, the Government also invited 
a technical team from Bristol Siddeley Ltd (UK), manufacturers 
of the Orpheus engine, to visit India and submit a project 
report for its indigenous manufacture. This resulted in 
the signing of an agreement in 1956 for the licence 
manufacture of the Orpheus engine.^ 
In addition, to licence manufacture of the Gnat, an 
Air Staff Requirement had been formulated for a multi-role 
combat aircraft suitable for both high-level intercept and 
low-level ground attack missions. There was also the 
requirement to design, develop and manufacture a basic jet 
trainer to replace the Harvard and the Vampire T. Mk 55. 
Despite the fact that the HAL design team possessed neither 
the capacity nor the experience"^ to take up these projects 
simultaneously, both were accepted for execution. This, 
it would appear was done more for 'political' and symbolic 
reasons rather than as a result of a careful assessment of 
^ Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, refer n.3, p.198. 
^ The only aircraft that had ever been designed by HAL was 
the piston engined primary trainer, the HT-2 which made its 
first flight on 5 August 1951. 
HAL'S ability to execute the two projects. The result was 
that Dr Kurt Tank and his Assistant Engineer Mittelhuber 
accompanied by a team of West German design engineers were 
invited to take charge of the design development of the 
combat aircraft, later designated the HF-24. Arriving in 
India in August 1956 Dr Tank 'spent his first few months ... 
creating, from scratch, a respectable design department 
o 
and prototype shop'. Meanwhile, Dr V.M. Ghatage and 
Raj Mahindra assumed responsibility for the basic jet 
trainer, the HJT-15. Work also began on the design of a 
turbojet the HJE-2500, which was intended eventually to 9 
supplant the Viper engine in the trainer. 
With regard to the communications and logistic support 
component it was decided to replace the aging fleet of 
C-47 Dakota aircraft with the Avro-748 (later known as 
the HS-748). The aircraft was expected to meet both civil 
and military requirements and a licence agreements to 
manufacture the aircraft and its powerplant, the Rolls Royce 
Dart-7 engine, were signed in 1959. The aircraft was to 
be progrcD?-r-"1"y built at the Aircraft Maintenance Depot 
(AMD), Kanpur while the engines were to be manufactured by 
HAL, B a n g a l o r e . W h i l e helicopters had initially been 
acquired by the lAF as early as 1954, their utilisation 
was limited to VIP transportation and casualty evacuation 
^ William Green et.al. (ed), The Indian Aiv Force and its 
Aircraft (London: Ducimus Books Ltd., 1982), p.30. 
^ ibid. Ghatage and Mahindra had recently returned from the US 
and UK respectively. 
Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, refer n.3, p.199. 
tasks. However, in the late 1950s the increasing 
involvement of the Indian Army in the security needs of 
the northern borders resulted in the evaluation of various 
medium transport helicopters. Negotiations for an initial 
batch of 10 Mi-4s were finalised in Moscow in October 1960 
and a further 16 were ordered in early 1962.^^ However, 
the lAF selected the Sud Aviation (France) Alouette III 
as its standard light utility helicopter and signed a 
contract on 4 June 1962 for its purchase and manufacture 
12 
under licence. 
The late 1950s also witnessed the acquisition of F.86 
Sabre day fighters by Pakistan from the US. Soon afterwards, 
India decided to opt for the manufacture of the MiG-21 and 
a licence agreement was signed with the Soviet Union in 
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August 1962. The aircraft was to be built by a new 
company that was set up for the purpose in August 1963, 
Aeronautics (India) Limited. 
Thus, with a period of six years beginning from 1956 
the Government of India had taken measures to manufacture 
as many as six different types of aircraft. Of these two 
were to be designed indigenously, two to be manufactured 
under licence from UK and one each from France and the 
Soviet Union. Apart from Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL), 
^^ William Green et.al., refer n.8, p.50. 
^^ ibid., p.51. 
^^ Committee on Public Undertakings (1967-68): Eighth 
Report (Fourth Lok Sabha), p.8. 
Bangalore, by 1963 two new companies had been established 
in order to undertake this task. However, a year later, 
in October 1964, the three were amalgamated. 
... with a view to conserving resources 
in a field where technical talent was 
limited and to enable the activities of 
aircraft manufacturing units to be 
planned and coordinated in the most 
efficient and coordinated manner, 
Given this background of the development of the 
aircraft industry in India the present study will attempt 
to examine the following aspects: 
1. An assessment of the selection process. Given the 
fact that licence manufacture was decided on as a 
measure to diversify sources of supply as well as 
achieve a satisfactory level of self reliance, were 
the aircraft that were ultimately manufactured, 
selected for their technical and operational 
superiority/suitability or were political 
considerations the prime motivating factor? Or 
did the particular aircraft happen to be the only 
one of its type that was available for manufacture 
under licence? 
2. Were the licence agreements with vendors from various 
countries comprehensive enough to ensure suitable 
technical and material help in the creation of 
assembly lines and manufacturing facilities? 
^^ Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, refer n.3, p.199. 
3. With regard to the indigenous design and development 
projects, had the Government undertaken any pre-planning 
exercise to determine India's capability in terms of 
technical manpower and resources to execute these 
programs successfully? 
4. Im.plementation of the various manufacturing programs. 
This involves a detailed examination of the problems 
encountered in the actual assembly and manufacture of 
aircraft. Here again the emphasis will be on the 
organisational efficiency viewed in terms of running 
an efficient aircraft industry and will encompass the 
decision making machinery at the Ministry of Defence 
and the execution of such decisions by HAL. Is there 
any evidence of a comprehensive planning and coordination 
process that would ensure efficient utilisation of 
manufacturing facilities, mianpov^ er and materials? 
5. The costs of self reliance. The domestic manufacture 
of aircraft has involved a fairly substantial financial 
outlay, for what have been rather limited production 
runs of each aircraft type. This would deny HAL any 
benefits that normally accrue from the economies of 
scale as aircraft production was primarily geared 
tov/ards m.eeting the requirements of the lAF. Also, 
an attempt will be made to explore the argument that 
aircraft manufacture in India is cheaper because of 
its lov; labour costs. 
Consequent on the above point, has the creation of the 
aircraft industry and the substantive costs incurred 
therein, had any beneficial effects in terms of 
spinoffs? Has it helped the development of ancillary 
industries in the small scale sector? Have there been 
any tangible benefits in terms of acquisition of 
advanced technology which have then helped modernise 
various sectors of Indian industry? These can be 
fairly wide ranging, from alloy and special steel 
technology on the one hand to advanced electronics on 
the other. A further question that shall be examined 
is whether such technology could aei. have been acquired 
if India had not decided to set up an indigenous 
aircraft industry. Also, has the creation of this high 
technology sector led to integrated industrial planning 
and development incorporating various other sections of 
Indian industry. 
Finally, has India been able to achieve the goal of 
self reliance that formed the rationale behind the 
development of the aircraft industry or, has overt 
dependence, i.e. a purchaser-supplier relationship with 
various countries been replaced by a not so obvious 
dependence in terms of raw materials, components and 
spare parts? If the latter is true, have any real 
benefits accrued? As a corollary to this question a 
comparative evaluation of Indian experience with 
different collaborators UK, France and the Soviet Union 
will be made and an attempt made to point out the 
long term advantages or disadvantages that helped 
(or hindered) HAL's drive towards self sufficiency. 
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the various 
aircraft manufacturing programs undertaken by Hindustan 
Aeronautics Limited (HAL), it should be pointed out that 
one of the major problems that confronts a researcher 
working on any aspect of Indian defence is that of paucity 
of primary sources. This includes the defence production 
sector for the simple reason that all relevant industries 
are under the administrative control of the Ministry of 
Defence, and as a consequence, beyond the purview of some 
of the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. For example, 
the 'Indian Aeronautical Industry' (i.e. HAL) is exempted 
from disclosing any purchases over Rs 10,000 ($1,000) that 
it makes from other public sector companies.^^ Further, 
over the years, there has been virtually no public debate 
on defence planning or the defence production sector. In 
this context it would be relevant to state that HAL is the 
largest company functioning under the Ministry of Defence, 
with a workforce of over 40,000. A major contributing 
factor in this regard has been the fact that no level of 
the defence production decision-making process is open to 
any form of scrutiny by the public or, to a large extent, 
by the Parliament. Reasons of National Security are the 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1979-80 , p.59. 
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blanket excuse that has inevitably been used by the 
Government in its refusal to disclose any information that 
might open it to criticism.^^ 
However, given the parliamentary system of government 
in India, some information is published in unclassified form 
by the office of the Com-ptrollev and Auditor General of India 
in the form of an annual report. Although not available 
to the public, this report is provided to the members of the 
Fublio Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament. A mere 
statement of facts, this report does document various issues 
which are then taken up on a selective basis by the PAC for 
further enquiry. It is for this reason that this study 
relies primarily on the reports of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General and those of the PAC. Although the HAL 
itself does publish an annual report because of legal 
obligations, a careful perusal reveals that they have tended 
to become singularly uninformative over the last two decades. 
So far as secondary sources are concerned, apart from 
the standard professional journals like Air International, 
International Defense Review and Flight International, the 
singularly consistent and most helpful source of reliable 
information has been Milavnews, a 'confidential' monthly 
newsletter published by Aviation Advisory Services, Stapleton 
Airfield, nr Romford, Essex, England. 
^^ For a good study of the ineffective role of the Parliament 
in matters related to defence problems, see Cecil B. Jones Jr., 
How the Indian Lok Sabha Handles defense Matters - An 
Institutional Study, The American University, 1975, PhD thesis 
(Unpublished). 
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CHAPTER I 
INDO-BRITISH PROJECTS 
A. GNAT/AJEET 
Development of the single-seat lightweight Gnat 
fighter/interceptor was started by the (then) Folland " 
Aircraft Ltd. (U.K.) as a private venture in 1951. The 
first Gnat Mkl prototype powered by a Bristol Siddeley 
Orpheus (B Or.l) turbojet flew on 18 July 1955. The 
aircraft apparently did not meet the requirements of the 
Royal Air Force and was never introduced into service, 
though 6 Gnat Mkl aircraft were subsequently ordered by 
the Ministry of Aviation (U.K.).^ India, on the other hand 
undertook negotiations directly with Folland Aircraft and 
Bristol Siddeley Aero-Engines in 1956 to produce the 
aircraft and its powerplant, the Orpheus turbojet. A 
2 
licence agreement was signed in September 1956 and it also 
covered the supply of 25 aircraft plus 15 sets of components." 
At the time of signing the agreement, the aircraft 
and engine were still under development. The first prototype 
Gnat Mkl which flew in 1955 had been powered by the original 
version of the Orpheus engine (B Or.l) developing 3,285 lb 
thrust. The Orpheus 701 (B Or.2) powerplant which equipped 
the definitive versions of the Gnat was type-tested in 
November 1956, at a rating of 4,520 lb thrust, later improved 
^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1963-64, p. 14 4. .>32-. 
^ Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1957, 15728C. 
^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1966-67, p.158. 
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4 to 4,700 lb. The lAF also knew that the manufacturers 
had not developed the Gnat completely^ but chose it on the 
grounds that it was basically a good air defence aircraft 
that needed 'a certain amount of development'.^ 
Licence for the manufacture of the Gnat Mkl was 
assigned to the (then) Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL) 
and construction of factory buildings was completed by 
1959."^ The first Gnat assembled in India from British 
supplied kits flew for the first time on 18 November, 1959. 
Also, most of the jigs and tools required for the 
manufacture of this aircraft were reported to have been 
g 
fabricated indigenously by HAL. 
By 1960-61, the first two phases of progressive 
manufacture i.e. from kits and sub-assemblies, had been 
completed but the program suffered a setback in production 9 
of the aircraft from raw materials. These problems contined 
to increase and a year later, in 1961-62, HAL admitted that 
it faced 'certain difficulties' in producing the aircraft 
as a result of which there had been a 'considerable' delay 
in the production s c h e d u l e . T h e snags encountered at this 
^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1964-65, p.476. 
^ Public Accounts Committee (1980-81) Thirty Third Report 
(Seventh Lok Sabha), para 1.29. 
^ ibid., para 1.30. 
SIPRI. Arms Trade with the Third \lorld (Stockholm: Almqvist 
& Wiksell, 1971), p.751. 
^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1975-76, pp.102-103. 
^ HAL Annual Report 1960-61, p.5. 
^^HAL Annual Report 1961-62, p.7. 
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stage were apparently a consequence of developmental problems 
with the Gnat Mkl itself rather than of HAL's inability to 
absorb manufacturing techniques. This was clarified in 
1962-63 when HAL announced that although a 'large' number of 
aircraft had been produced, deliveries had been held up 
because of technical difficulties beyond its control. It 
was further added that steps were being taken in conjunction 
with Folland Aircraft Ltd. to overcome them.^^ This 
certainly proved to be a time consuming process since 
although the first Gnat built fully at HAL flew on 21 May, 
1962, it was not handed over to the lAF till over a year 
later.^^ 
Manufacture of the aircraft had stabilised by 1963-64 
when it was announced that production was 'progressing 
13 
satisfactorily'. The engine was also being progressively 
manufactured from sub-assemblies and the first Orpheus 701 
produced from imported 'raw materials' and components was 14 
completed by late 196 3. At this stage, however, only the 
airframe was being fabricated in India from imported 'raw 
materials' and it was only in 1965-66 that HAL signed 
agreements for the licence manufacture accessories like 
avionics, wheels, brakes, undercarriage and hydraulic 
equipment with various British companies including Bendix, 
Dunlop and Dowty Rotol.^^ 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1962-63, p.11. 
^^ Jane's All the IfJovld's Aircraft 1975-76, p.102. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 196Z-64, p.4. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1962-6Z, p,14. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1965-66, p.12. 
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Also, as the aircraft entered squadron service with 
the lAF, the inherent weaknesses in the original design 
effort became more apparent. For example, during the 1965 
Indo-Pakistan war, when the Gnat was used operationally 
for the first time, considerable difficulties were encountered 
with the 30mm Aden cannon as a result of which there was an 
inordinately high incidence of gun stoppages.^^ Other 
failures included those of brake seals and the VHF Radio 
Transmitter (RT) sets^^ but the most serious problems lay 
in a very critical area of aircraft performance i.e. failures 
associated with the flying control system and the hydraulic 
18 
system of the aircraft. In evidence before the Fuhlio 
Aoaounts Committee in 1980, the Chairman of HAL admitted to 
the serious deficiency that the Gnat suffered in this field, 
adding: 
... all the brains in the country 
and the scientists' organisations 
with the half of the original design 
of the aircraft, have been trying to 
cure it. The flying record of the 
GNAT shows that we had a number of 
fatal accidents, where we lost some 
experienced pilots which costs even 
more if we take into account the cost 
of training together with the cost of 
an aircraft, apart (sic) from the 
human aspect of it. 
Air Headquarters, in evidence before the same Committee, 
elaborated on the matter and disclosed that the flying control 
^^ PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Report, para 1.28. 
ibid. , para 1.56. 
^^ ibid., para 1.28. 
^^ ibid. 
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system in the Gnat was a serious problem compared to an 
? 0 aircraft of the same generation - the Hunter: 
Both have been in the Air Force with 
the same number of squadrons. If 
the yardstick of serious malfunctioning 
is taken as the number of fatal accidents 
then over the same period of 18 years of 
operation, of the two aircraft, we lost 
4 pilots in Hunters and 19 in Gnats! 
Problems with the Longitudinal Control System (LCS) 
of the Gnat Mkl resulted in the formation of a Study Group 
headed by Air Commodore J.J. Bouche which submitted its 
21 
report in April 1972. During the course of its enquiry, 
the Study Group found that investigations into aircraft 
accidents involving the LCS had been unsatisfactory because 
of the lack of qualified investigators. Further, the 
findings of a large number of technical defect reports 22 
were not available either at HAL or at Air Headquarters. 
The net result of the various shortcomings in the Gnat 
was that it suffered from a very high accident rate. For 
example (according to available information), during the 
period 1965-1973, it was only in 1967-68 that the annual 
number of 'serious accidents' was less than 50. The 2 3 accident rates for the remaining years are as under: 
20 ibid., para 1.33. 
21 ibid., para 1.34. The findings of this report were never 
made public. 
ibid., para 1.35. 
2 3 ibid., para 1.32. 
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Year No. of Accidents 
1965 66 
1966 50 
1969 61 
1970 50 
1971 51 
1972 53 
1973 59 
Overall, from the time of its induction into the lAF 
in 1958-59 to 15 November, 1980, the Gnat had met with as 
24 
many as 613 major accidents and a further 624 'incidents'. 
Regardless of its high accident rate, the lAF 'did not 
lose faith or confidence' in the aircraft but 'only wanted 25 
deficiencies removed'. In fact, by 1972, the aircraft 
was considered to have a good export potential because of 
its low initial and operating costs, simplicity of design 
and high transonic performance. Two Gnat Mkl aircraft were 
displayed at the Farnborough Air Show (U.K.) in September 
1972^^ and the export price was then quoted at about Rs 2.3 2 7 million ($300,000). While no export orders were received, 
2 8 manufacture of the aircraft continued till 31 January, 1974 
29 a total of 215 Gnat Mkis being manufactured by HAL. 
^^ ibid. 
2 5 
ibid., para 1.31. 
^^ Milavnews, September 1972, p.15. 
Milavnews, August 1972 , p. 14. 
^^ Jane's All the VJovld's Aircraft 1974-75 , p.104. 
^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1975-76, p.103. 
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Gnat Mkll/Ajeet: 
After examining the Report of the Bouche Committee 
(April 1972) as well as conducting various feasibility 
studies, HAL proposed to develop an improved version of 
the Gnat. This proposal was approved by the Government in 
September 1972 and the new version, designated as Mkll, was 
to be developed at an estimated cost of Rs 9.9 million 
(foreign exchange: Rs 2.6 million). Development work was 
to be carried out in four stages over a period of three 
years and deliveries were expected to commence two years 
later i.e. by 1976-77.^° 
Broad parameters of the development effort were defined 
in the Air Staff Requirement (ASR)22 issued in May 1972. 
At about the same time it was also decided to undertake 
a retromodification program in order to extend the useful 
life of the existing fleet of Gnat Mkl aircraft. An ASR 
to remove the defects and make improvements in the Mkl 
aircraft was issued by Air Headquarters in November 1972. 
This was also expected 'to help the development' of the 
Mkll aircraft.^^ While the development work got underway, 
in July 1973, the Ministry of Defence sanctioned the 
manufacture of about 70 Gnat Mkll at a unit cost of Rs 5.127 
million^^ involving a total outlay of Rs 360.4 million.^^ 
^^ Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India: 
1978-79. Vnion Government (Defence Services), para 6, p.5. 
^^ ibid., pp.5-6. 
^^ PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Report, para 1.81. 
^^ ibid., para 1.25. 
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Three months later, in October 1973, the Ministry of Defence 
sanctioned a retromodification program involving about 130 
aircraft at an estimated cost of Rs 209.04 million. For 
this work, the Mkl aircraft were to be made available to 
the HAL in a phased manner from 1974-75 onwards.^^ Thus, 
the retromodification program was expected to help in the 
development of the Mkll version, which was to conform to 
the 'standard of preparation' to be specified after 
completion of the development work which comprised four 
stages. These were:^^ 
Stage Work 
II 
III 
IV 
Planned Schedule/Actual 
For Completion Completion 
(from time of sanction) 
Planned 
Improvements to the 
Navigation and 
Communication Systems 
Improvements to the 
Hydraulics Systems 
Improvements to the 
Longitudinal 
Control System 
Improvements to the 
Fuel System 
(introduction of 
internal wing fuel 
tanks) 
8 months 
By May 19 7 3 
18 months 
By March 1974 
36 months 
By September 
1975 
3 months 
By September 
1975 
Actual 
January 1973 
April 1976* 
September 197^ 
October 1979 
April 1976 
This delay was due to additional tasks beyond 
the original proposal. 
^^ ibid., para 1.64. 
^^ ibid., para 1.36. 
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However, even before the entire development program 
for the Gnat Mkll could be completed. Air Headquarters 
issued a revised ASR-4 in June, 1974 which was also to be 
applicable to the retromodification program.^^ The revised 
ASR was apparently a clearer definition of the lAF 
requirements for the Gnat Mkll. In evidence before the 
Public Accounts Committee in 1980, the Secretary of the 
Department of Defence Production explained: 
The difference between ASR 22/1972 
and ASR 4/1974 was not substantial 
to require any revamping of the project. 
It may however be added that the original 
proposal of HAL was not based on any ASR. 
3 8 He further went on to add: 
Some equipment were available later, 
and it was thought it would be better 
to use them and improve performance ... 
these improvements were considered and 
thought of between 1972 and 1974. 
In fact, there was no difference between the two ASRs except 
regarding the radius of action and the weapons load that 
3 9 
the aircraft was to carry. Renamed the Ajeet, the aircraft 
was to be produced primarily for the tactical ground attack 
role, unlike the Gnat which had been designed as an 
interceptor. 
Initially, two Gnat Mkis were converted for flight 
testing of the Ajeet's hydraulic and avionics systems while 
a Gnat airframe was subjected to static tests. The first 
ibid., para 1.38. 
ibid. , para 1.40. 
^^ ibid., para 1.41. 
^^ ibid., para 1.43. 
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prototype Ajeet, a Gnat Mkl with less than the full range 
or modifications, first flew on 6 March, 1975 and a second 
prototype joined the flight test program on 5 November that 
40 
year. The modification program had, by this stage, been 
delayed considerably and the various changes to be 
incorporated in the Ajeet were in different stages of 
installation and evaluation: 
1. Stage I: Navigation and Communication Systems: 
Improvements in these areas, according to the original HAL 
proposal would appear to have been minor in nature. They 
were planned for completion on one of the Gnat Mkl aircraft 
and the work was completed by January 197 3 - four months 
ahead of schedule. Nonetheless, the ASR of 1974 laid down 
certain specific requirements and changes to be incorporated 
in this area: 
(a) Due to the change over from the interception to 
the ground attack role, the Ferranti (U.K.) Airpass 
interception radar was to be deleted. 
(b) Installation of IFF Mk-10 (BAT) - identification 
equipment. 
(c) The TA/RA-22 VHF communications set, an item 
manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (a sister 
concern under the Ministry of Defence) under licence 
from Bendix (USA), had proved to have a very high 
^^ H.P. Mama, 'Ajeet - the lAF's New Ground Attack Fighter', 
International Defense Review 6/1977, p.1088. 
^^ PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Report, para 1.89. 
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42 failure rate. It was therefore decided to replace 
the set by an imported V/UHF communications system 
manufactured by Collins (USA) as well as incorporate 
a standby VHF set (AH-3). 
(d) Replacement of the Ferranti Mk8 gunsight of 
the Gnat by the Ferranti ISIS 195 (Integrated Strike 
and Interception System) two-axis rate gyro gunsight 
which would be licence-manufactured by HAL's Lucknow 
Division. 
These modifications required a complete re-installation 
and a new wiring system for the avionics. The task could 
thus not be completed on a Gnat aircraft but had to be 
incorporated on one of the Ajeet prototypes. Improvements 
connected with this stage could thus be completed only by 
April 1976. 
2. Stage II: Hydraulics System: Work in this area was 
connected with the longitudinal stability of the aircraft 
(see Stage III below) and was completed by September 1974. 
This was six months behind schedule and the primary reason 
for the delay was the incorporation of an Abex engine-driven 
4 3 
variable delivery hydraulic pump instead of the earlier 
constant delivery unit. 
3. Stage III: Longitudinal Control System (LCS): 
Development work relating to improvements in the LCS with 
the modified Hobson actuator unit was completed 'in all 
42 ibid., para 1.57. 
4 3 ibid., para 1.39. 
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44 respects' by October 1979 - nearly four years later than 
scheduled. The unit used in the Gnat had been designed 
and supplied by a British firm, Claudel Hobson, which had 
since been taken over by Lucas Aerospace (UK). As the 
HAL 'did not have the competence to undertake development 
45 
of powered flying controls to improve longitudinal control', 
it was decided to entrust the development of the actuator 
unit to Lucas Aerospace. 
Design of the modified Hobson actuator unit encountered 
serious problems despite sustained efforts by the design 
engineers of Lucas Aerospace. According to the Chairman of 
HAL:^^ 
They made many trials; they gave us many 
options; they gave us many prototypes and 
made many improvements. 
... So, we tried to persuade them and 
pressurise them to give us in absolute 
state of the art, [a] modern flying 
control with all the possible safety 
factors built into it. Admittedly, in 
getting these developments carried out, 
Lucas took longer than anticipated. 
4. Stage IV; Fuel System: It had been originally planned 
to improve the fuel system by manufacturing a new wing with 
an integrally sealed tank and converting a Gnat Mkl as an 
Ajeet prototype using this wing. This was done according to 
schedule and the first converted Ajeet prototype flew in 
March 1975. However, the ASR of 1974 spelt out certain 
44 ^^ ibid. 
^^ ibid., para 1.46, 
^^ ibid., para 1.50, 
23 
refiner;ents to be carried out in connection with the fuel 
syster., including the introduction of an SPE 6210F Mkl fuel 
booster purrip. As a result, an additional time of seven 
months was taken to meet the requirements of the ASR of 
1974/"^ 
It is interesting to note that while the ASR of June 
1974 affected all the four stages of development, it was 
more than a year later, in September 19 75, that HAL approved. 
... a proposal to take up further work 
required concurrently with the work 
sanc-ioned earlier with a view to 
minimising expenditure. 
vrnile developm.ent work on the Ajeet apparently made progress, 
it zook the Ministry of Defence another year to sanction 
an additional am.ount of Rs 5.4 m.illion (foreign exchange: 
Rs 1 m.illion) - this was done in July 1976. Development 
vrork was com.pleted in 'alr-.csz all respects' (emphasis added) 
by early 1976 and the 'standard of preparation' of the 
firsz and second production batch of aircraft was specified 
49 
by Air Headquarters in February 1976 and July 1976. In 
m.aking preparations for mianufacture of the Ajeet, HA.L had 
earlier avrarded a £120,000 contract to Automiotive Products 
Ltd. (UK) for the supply of aileron power control units, 
landing gear retraction jacks, filters, flow restrictors, 50 foot brake pumips ana various types or valves. 
48 
"" ' ibid. , para 1.39. 
r : = para 6, p. 6. 
49 .... loic. 
Zefe-me 5/1975 , p. 766. 
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In March 1977, three years after having accepted the 
ASR of 1974, HAL expressed its 'inability' to comply with 
some vital requirements of the Ajeet as specified in the 
ASR. In the same month. Air Headquarters informed the 
Ministry of Defence that if HAL was unable to ensure 
aircraft performance 'close' to the ASR, it might be 
compelled to 'review' the entire acquisition program for 
the Ajeet.^^ Interestingly, by May 1977, within two months 
of presumably intense bureaucratic activity, views of the 
Air Headquarters underwent a radical change. In proposing 
a further development expenditure of Rs 4.05 million. Air 
Headquarters stated that while there were 'serious short-
comings' in the Ajeet, it was not planned to drop the 
project altogether, but it might become necessary to reduce 
the number of aircraft produced. Accordingly, in July 1977, 
the Ministry of Defence increased the development expenditure 
for the aircraft to Rs 19.35 million (foreign exchange: 
n 2 
Rs 4.4 million)^ - compared to the original estimate of 
Rs 9.9 million (foreign exchange: Rs 2.6 million). 
Although manufacture of the Ajeet actually began on 
a small scale in 1976-77, the aircraft could not be delivered 
to the lAF due to a 'number of problems relating to 
development and production'.^^ It was only in March 1978, 
that about 20 aircraft were delivered. Of these six were 
51 PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Re-port, para 1.44. 
52 
ibid., para 1.45. 
^^ EAL Annual Report 1976-77, p.6. 
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allotted to the Ajeet handling flight while the rest were 
handed back to HAL for storage and incorporation of 
54 
additional modifications. This was because, although 
theoretically these aircraft conformed to the 'standard of 
preparation' laid down by the lAF, substantial concessions 
had to be made while accepting aircraft for the handling 
flight. These included:^^ 
1. Installation of the (old) Hobson tailplane 
actuator unit, HU type-145 in place of the modified 
HU type-1003 which was still under development. 
2. Non-compliance of the camouflage painting scheme. 
3. The aircraft were accepted without full night 
flying facilities. 
4. A few 'minor' concessions to enable the use of 
Category 'B' (used) components, as Category 'A' (new) 
components were not available. 
No aircraft were delivered to the lAF in 1978-79 because 
of the non-availability of the modified Hobson actuator 
units.^^ It is thus clear that the initial delivery of 
the Ajeet aircraft to the lAF was for purely ceremonial 
purposes rather than an effective contribution to its 
operational capability. Apart from the concessions mentioned 
earlier, initial lAF handling flights experienced several 
maintenance problems which included 
^^ PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Report, para 1.83. 
^^ ibid., para 1.54. 
^^ ibid., para 1.53. 
ibid. , para 1.57. 
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1. Fuel leaks from the integral fuel tanks in the 
wings: nine modifications had to be incorporated to 
rectify the problem. 
2. Brake seal failures. 
3. R/T failure: this was overcome by replacing the 
indigenously manufactured TA/RA22 VHF communications 
sets by V/UHF systems manufactured by Collins (USA). 
By October 1978, Air Headquarters had made it clear 
that it was considering a reduction in the number of 
5 8 
aircraft to be manufactured. Production orders were 
reportedly reduced from the then planned total of 115 to 
80 aircraft.^^ At the same time a Specialist Committee had 
been set up by the lAF to study the question of 
... extended development efforts due 
to shortfall in radius of action and 
the design deficiency in the 
development of modified power control 
unit and the need to try the various 
armament stores.60 
In other words, while the transition from the interceptor 
role of the Gnat to the ground attack tasks of the Ajeet 
had been an integral part of the ASR of 1974, the delay in 
development effort had made it impossible for weapons trials 
to be carried out. Accordingly on recommendations of the 
Specialist Conmittee of the lAF, a further sum of Rs 12.65 
million was sanctioned for further development work.^^ 
ibid., para 1.56. 
^^ Aiv International, Vol.21, No.3, September 1981, p.105; 
also Flight International, 12 June, 1982, p.1555. 
PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Report, para 1.81. 
^^ ibid. 
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This work had not been completed till December 1979 when 
the aircraft was inducted into squadron service - nearly 
6 2 20 months after the formation of the handling flight. 
By the end of 1980, HAL had been able to overcome the 
following problems 
1. Radius of action: Against the radius of action 
of 108 nautical miles specified in the ASR of 
1974, HAL had been able to achieve a range of 
93 nautical miles in the first instance. 
Subsequently, with the installation of 2 x 33 
gallon drop tanks, the Ajeet was able to acquire 
an additional range of 10 nautical miles. While 
the aircraft now had a range of 103 nautical 
miles 'with certain restrictions', it now had 
only two underwing hard points for weapons 
carriage, instead of four originally planned. 
2. Carriage of Rocket Pods: As a result of the 
limitations imposed by the installation of drop 
tanks, the aircraft could not be cleared for the 
installation of four pods of 19 x 68 mm rockets. 
Instead, it had been cleared for two pods of 
16 X 57 mm rockets and trials were being carried 
out for the use of two pods of 32 x 7 rmn rockets. 
3. Night flying capability: Development work had 
been completed. 
^^ ibid., para 107. 
^^ ibid., para 1.56 and para 1.59 
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4. High rate of gun stoppages: Efficiency was 
being confirmed through intensive gun firing 
trials. 
5. Invertor failures: The problem had been 
resolved by the introduction of an indigenously 
developed invertor. 
Thus, by the end of 1980, while two Gnat squadrons 
(Nos.9 and 18) had been re-equipped with the Ajeet, HAL 
had only been 'able to acquire all the items for modifying 
the aircraft for carriage and delivery of 57 mm rockets. 
'A limited number of aircraft were expected to be modified 
by June 1981, and the balance in due course. The 
aircraft had finally been cleared for operational 
6 4 service, more than four years behind schedule. 
The Retromodification Program: 
As mentioned earlier, in October 1973, the Ministry 
of Defence had sanctioned the retromodification of about 
150 Gnat Mkl aircraft in a phased manner from 1974-75 
onwards. However, due to the delay in development of 
the Gnat Mkll/Ajeet, in November 1977, the number of 
aircraft to be retromodified was reduced to about 100.^^ 
This was because, given the number of Mkl aircraft 
available, the remaining airframe fatigue life was very 
limited. Also a substantial number of aircraft had 
ibid. , para 1.58. 
^^ ibid., para 1.67. 
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suffered from wastage.^^ In other words they had been 
written off, a fact not altogether surprising, given 
the high accident rate for the Gnat. 
By July 1979, only seven Gnat Mkis had been 
retromodified and test flown. Even then, the delivery of 
these aircraft had been held up to facilitate the 
installation of the modified Hobson actuator unit which 
was still under development. Work on another three 
aircraft had not been completed 'for want of certain 
components to be supplied by the Air Force/foreign 
s u p p l i e r B y November 1979 it had been decided to 
abandon the proposal for retromodifying the remaining 
90 aircraft. The reason for this decision, according 
6 8 to the Department of Defence Production was that: 
During the extended period of development, 
one of the likely adversaries of India 
had acquired a large number of very high 
performance (supersonic) aircraft and 
quick reaction surface-to-air missiles ... 
it was felt that the Mkll aircraft would 
not be a viable weapons system well beyond 
the mid 80s because of its low survivability 
in such an environment. As such it was felt 
that the strength of the Mkll force should 
be limited to four squadrons. Therefore, 
the initial order for Mkll aircraft was 
curtailed ... and retromodification program 
was reduced ... 
As for the 10 Gnat MkIs which were in the process 
of retromodification, it was only by late 1980 that 'all 
^^ ibid., para 1.72. 
^^ ibid., para 1.68. 
^^ ibid., para 1.70. 
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components' required for the work had been received. 
Nine aircraft had been test flown after retromodification 
and accepted by the lAF while the remaining one aircraft 
was in the final stage of acceptance.^^ Given the delay 
in retromodifying the first 10 Gnat Mkis, it was clear 
that even if the work had not been restricted to this 
number, there would not have been enough Mkl aircraft in 
lAF inventory with enough airframe fatigue life remaining, 
to make the retromodification program worthwhile. 
Thus, after the cancellation of the retromodification 
program and a substantial reduction in the number of 
Ajeet aircraft required, the manufacturing program finally 
came to an end in March 1982 after the manufacture of 
20 aircraft. Also, as a result of this cancellation 
and short-closure of orders, there was a substantial 
amount of redundancy in components and materials required 
for manufacture. Details are as under 
Million of Rupees 
Cost of Redundancy: Cost of surplus 
Production/ items: Development 
Retromodification Program 
Raw Materials 2.1 0.139 
Standard Parts 0.8 
Castings and Forgings 0.05 
Proprietory Items 3.3 0.792 
Hobson Units 5.08 0.037 
Modification Kits 1.04 
Parts 0.73 
Components 6.984 
19.964 0.968 
^^ ibid., para 1.73. 
Flight International, 12 June, 1982 , p.1555. 
PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Report, para 1.78. 
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While the surplus items relating to the development 
program, valued at nearly Rs 1 million had to be written 
off as a net loss, some of the materials acquired for 
the retromodification and manufacture programs, it was 
later realised, could be used in other programs. HAL 
later decided that of the surplus materials (valued at 
Rs 2 0 million approximately), bought out components and 
parts could be used for the development/production program 
of the Ajeet Trainer aircraft while the raw materials 
could be used for materials worth Rs 9.5 million, about 
Rs 10.5 million had to be written off as losses in 
connection with the Ajeet manufacturing program. 
Ajeet Trainer: 
In 1975, while engaged in the development of the 
Ajeet, HAL also initiated studies for the design of a 
2-seat trainer version and it was considered possible 
72 
to develop the aircraft within three years of sanction. 
Formal sanction was received in February 1976*^^ and the 
aircraft was said to have been intended to be the long 
term replacement for the 12 Hunter T.66s and a similar 
number of single seat Hunters at the lAF's Operational 
Conversion Unit, as well as other operational trainers 
•1 74 at squadron level. 
72 Milavnews, November 1975, p.14. 
H.P. Mama, 'Ajeet - the lAF' s New Ground Attack Fighter', 
International Defense Review, 6/1977, p.1090. 
Milavnews, May 1977 , pp.12-13. 
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By late 1976, design of the tandem 2-seat trainer 
had been finalised and it was also reported in Western 
sources that two prototypes were to be built with the 
first one scheduled to fly in July 1978."^^ A fuselage 
mockup of the trainer had been completed by early 1977 
and the design indicated that the aircraft would offer 
somewhat more room than the earlier 2-seat Gnat trainer 
(developed in UK and then in use with the RAF) there being 
sufficient room to instal Martin Baker GF4 ejection seats 
(common with the Ajeet) in place of the Folland/Saab 
Type 2G lightweight seats of previous Gnats. But this 
was accomplished by the deletion of some of the fuel tanks -
resulting in reduced endurance. The aircraft was to have 
a performance in some respects 'fairly close' to that 
of the H.S. Hawk, particularly in Mach number and rate 
of climb, at a considerably lower cost. In terms of life 
cycle costs, the Ajeet trainer was to be 'an unbeatable 
• . 77 bargain . 
Low speed tunnel tests were carried out at the 
National Aeronautical Laboratory, Bangalore, while high 
speed trials had to be conducted at establishments in UK. 
By mid-1977, the first flight of the two trainer prototypes 
7 8 
to be built, had reportedly been rescheduled to late 1978. 
Milavnews, October 1976 , p.14. 
Milavnews, January 1977 , p. 12. 
H.P. Mama, 'Ajeet - the lAF' s New Ground Attack Fighter'. 
Refer n.73. 
78 Milavnews, May 1977, p.13. 
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There was no comment about the aircraft by the Ministry 
of Defence even in 1978, except for the mention that 
7 9 
development work had 'progressed'. This suggests that 
development of the aircraft had encountered significant 
problems. 
It was only four years later, in 1982, that the 
first prototype could be completed. The first of the two 
prototypes came off the assembly line in September 1982 
and carried out its first high speed taxiing trials on 8 0 the fifteenth of that month, followed by its first flight 
81 on 11 October. Development of the aircraft was expected 
8 2 to be completed by 1984 and an initial lAF order for 
8 3 
12 2-seat Ajeet trainers had been announced. However, 
the only prototype Ajeet trainer crashed in December 1982 
while on a systemstest flight - within three months of 
its manufacture. By mid-1983, according to Indian media 
reports, the entire program was in jeopardy as the 
Ministry of Defence was said to have instructed HAL 'to 
stop all production activity and tooling for the Ajeet 
t r a i n e r A l t h o u g h the Ministry of Defence later attempted 
Ministry of Defence Report 19 77-78 , p.62. 
Statesman, 17 September, 1982. 
^^ Indian Express, 12 October, 1982. 
82 
N.N. Sachitanand in Hindu (Madras), International Edition, 
29 July, 1978. 
Indian Express, 22 September, 1982. 
^^ Indian Express, 9 May 1983. 
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to deny this report, it is significant to note that its 
clarification only mentioned the fact that 'work on the 
project' was being carried on and did not elaborate on 
8 5 
the production plans for the aircraft. 
Thus, while the small size, low weight and quick 
reaction capability of the Gnat were the main factors in 
the lAF's decision to acquire and manufacture the aircraft, 
the decision seems to have been a hasty one. The aircraft 
did not satisfy Royal Air Force (RAF) requirements as 
an interceptor in the late 1950s, and the lAF made no 
attempt to co-ordinate its evaluation effort with that 
of the RAF, preferring to deal with the manufacturers 
86 directly. 
The RAF itself did not reject the aircraft altogether. 
A development order for 14 Gnat trainers was issued in 
1958 and the first prototype flew for the first time on 
31 August 1959 with the development series Gnat T Mkl 
entering service with the RAF in February 1962. Delivery 
of the production models began in November 1962, barely 
four years after the decision to develop the trainer 
version. A total of 91 aircraft were delivered to the 
RAF Flying Training Command, replacing the Vampire T Mkll 
8 7 
at Advanced Flying Training Schools (AFTS). 
ibid., 11 May 1983. 
^^ PAC (1980-81) Thirty Third Report, paras 1.30 and 1.31. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1967-68 , p.165. 
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Also, the Gnat trainer had already incorporated 
certain modifications which were to be included by HAL 
in the Gnat Mkll and Ajeet trainer nearly 15 years later. 
The Gnat T.MkI was fitted with wet wings and could carry 
about 450 litres (almost 100 gal) of fuel as compared 
to the 500 litre (110 gal) capacity of the Ajeet wings. 
As a result the aircraft also had the provision for four 
underwing attachments. Despite increases in tailplane and 
fin area, a larger wing and other modifications and 
8 8 
improvements, the Gnat trainer could hardly be described 
as a simple aircraft. According to an experienced RAF 
instructor 
... the Gnat ... could hardly lay claim to 
simplicity. On the contrary, it was a 
demandingly complex little aeroplane, an 
engineering nightmare. The longitudinal 
control system in particular ... was the 
source of much difficulty... 
Some respected and experienced pilots never 
really mastered it; a few in the early 
days died trying. Most, who had only the 
fleeting association with the Gnat that the 
AFTS course brought, passed on to greater 
things still pondering the witchcraft of 
manual control in a dark and gusty circuit. 
Crosswind landings in manual control from 
the back seat gave rise to the original 
legend of the legless blindfolded epileptic 
one-armed paperhanger. Similarly, the 
mysteries of the fuel system were still 
being unravelled as the aeroplane passed out of RAF service. 
HAL on the other hand, did not incorporate any major 
modifications in the design of the aircraft and confined 
^^ H.P. Mama, 'Ajeet - the lAF's New Ground Attack Fighter', 
International Defense Review 6/1977, p.1089. 
O Q 
Sqn. Ldr. Roy Gamlin in Flight International, 3 January, 
1981, p.32. 
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its changes to minor improvements in cooperation with 
the lAF. Despite the inordinately high accident rate 
of the Gnat Mkl, it is clear that HAL lacked the design 
capability necessary to improve the aircraft. It was only 
after observing the accident rate of the Gnat for more 
than six years operational service with the lAF, and more 
than a decade after having initiated progressive manufacture, 
that HAL could formulate proposals to improve its flight 
safety. This too was not a very comprehensive proposal 
because of the lack of any documentation on previous 
accidents and related causes - one of the major findings 
of the Bouche Committee (April 1972) 
Even on grounds of alleged simplicity of manufacture, 
HAL, it would appear, was not very efficient. While it 
could be that bureaucratic inefficiency was responsible 
for such a situation, the fact remains that the Accessories 
Complex at Lucknow began production nearly 10 years after 
the various pieces of equipment had begun to be used in 
domestic manufacture - five years after the licence 
agreements were signed. 
The Ajeet itself was a result of an attempt by HAL 
to introduce modifications to improve the flying qualities 
of the Gnat Mkl. This process itself began at a time when 
the production run of the Gnat was nearing completion. 
Thus, even by 19 72, HAL had not been able to formulate 
proposals for a definitive Mkll variant which would be 
a substantial improvement on the Mkl. On the other hand, 
the modifications suggested seemed to be a combination of 
37 
the changes introduced by the RAF in its Gnat trainer 
(i.e. a wet wing) and marginal improvements in its 
communication and navigation systems. No other design 
changes were sought, and the only major modification 
suggested was that of the Hobson tailplane actuator unit, 
i.e. improvements in the Longitudinal Control System. 
This again reflected the total dependence of HAL on 
Lucas Aerospace (UK), the manufacturers of the unit. 
Consequently, while HAL claimed to have completed 
development work on the Gnat Mkll/Ajeet 'in almost all 
respects' by 1976, a few months later in March 1977 it 
had to concede its inability to comply with some vital 
requirements as specified in the AST of 1974. This nearly 
led to the cancellation of the project. But, in what 
could only be described as bureaucratic pressure to keep 
the program going, in May 1977 Air Headquarters changed 
its stand and recommended further expenditure on 
development of the Ajeet. This again did not appear to 
have had any beneficial effect so far as the operational 
capability of the lAF is concerned. By the time the 
Hobson unit had finally been cleared for unrestricted 
operation in October 1979, lAF requirement for the aircraft 
had ceased to exist because of changes in its threat 
environment. Nor was it only the Hobson unit that created 
problems for the Ajeet. HAL had not been able to provide 
the required range of 108 nautical miles in the first 
instance, the aircraft having a range of about 93 nautical 
miles. Subsequent increase in the range to 103 nautical 
miles by use of drop tanks not only imposed certain 
38 
restrictions on the aircraft but also reduced the number 
of hard points available for carrying stores from four to 
two - thereby minimising its effectiveness as a weapons 
delivery platform. 
Consequently, it would appear that HAL had no precise 
idea of the real nature of the development effort 
required. As a result, not only did the cost of 
development of the Ajeet go up from Rs 9.9 million to 
Rs 32 million, but there was also a delay of seven years 
in the completion of the project. This led to cancellation 
of orders for the aircraft as well as redundancy in 
materials and parts required in its manufacture; and by 
the time the aircraft finally joined lAF inventory in 
1979-80, a decision had already been taken to phase out 
the Gnat^^ as part of a policy to replace all subsonic 
91 
aircraft with supersonic planes. 
The Ajeet Trainer aircraft too demonstrated the 
inherent lack of design and development expertise at HAL. 
Sanctioned in 1976, development was expected to be completed 
within two years, i.e. by 1978. In fact it took more 
than six years for the first prototype to be completed. 
The first production aircraft was scheduled for delivery 
by 1984, but then again this was contingent on the 
assumption that no serious difficulties would be encountered 
in its development. The situation has altered somewhat 
Times of India, 7 June, 1980. 
^^ Eaonomio Times, 15 April/ 1982. 
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after the crash of the only prototype that was built. 
With flying characteristics more or less similar to that 
of the Gnat Trainer used by the RAF in the 1960s and 
70s, it would seem unlikely that the Ajeet Trainer could 
be used for advanced flying and weapons training in the 
92 
late 1980s and 1990s. 
Viewed in this context, the initial lAF order for 
12 trainers appears quite adequate although, given past 
experience, bureaucratic pressures could possibly result 
in an extended production run. Also, given the lack of 
success in exporting the Gnat/Ajeet, the export potential 
of the trainer version would also seem to be quite marginal. 
It would thus be reasonable to conclude that the 
Gnat/Ajeet/Trainer manufacturing program, while appearing 
to have been reasonably successful, did not actually turn 
out to be so. The significant losses, both human and 
material, suffered by the lAF because of deficiencies in 
the flight performance of the Gnat, do not sustain the 
argument about the simplicity and cost effectiveness of 
the aircraft. Attempts at improving these qualities and 
incorporating them in an improved version - the Ajeet, 
turned out to be a classic example of too little and too 
late. 
^^ Consequently, it would appear to be highly probable 
that replacement aircraft for the Hunter OCUs would have 
to be imported. 
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B. HS(AVRO) 748 
The HS(Avro) 748 is the only transport aircraft to 
have been manufactured in India. It also happens to be 
the only aircraft which in the initial stages of its 
manufacturing program was the direct responsibility of 
the lAF. 
On 20 May 1959, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff proposed 
that the Government should agree 'in principle' to replace 
the C-47 Dakota fleet (then consisting of approximately 
100 aircraft), from 1960 by a total of 181 transport 
aircraft to meet Air Force requirements over the next 
10 years. Of these, 29 were to be the passenger carrier 
version which included the Executive/VIP type (16) for the 
Communications Flight and Navigator/Signaller trainer 
variant (13). Two weeks, later on 4 June 1959, the Ministry 
of Defence prepared a paper on the subject which was 
submitted to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) 
at its meeting on 9 June 1959. The DCC, while maintaining 
that it was 'desirable' to consider indigenous manufacture 
of a suitable transport aircraft, decided to appoint a 
committee under the Chief of Air Staff. The committee 
was expected to 
... consider the various offers from 
foreign manufacturers which had 
been received in the Ministry and to 
decide upon the suitable aircraft to 
replace the Dakota fleet in the Indian 
Airlines and the Indian Air Force.W 
'^^Puhlia Aaoounts Committee (1972-73) Eighty Seoond Report 
(Fifth Lok Sahha), para 2.55. 
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Within a fortnight this committee had apparently 
considered all the submissions and had decided to recommend 
indigenous manufacture of the HS-748. This proposal was 
considered by the DCC at its meeting on 26 June 1959 
and accepted. The entire process, which began with the 
proposal to replace the Dakotas to the time when it was 
decided to manufacture the HS-748, was thus completed in a 
record time of five weeks. But, there seems to have been 
a deliberate and successful attempt at misinterpretation 
of the suitability of the HS-748 for all the requirements 
of the lAF. This is because the paper which was put up 
to the DCC at its meeting on 26 June 1959, actually mentioned 
94 the suitability of the HS-748 in the following words: 
T^ hilc the Avro 748 would meet the 
Air Force requirements for their 
VIP and communication aircraft for 
which there is the requirement of 
29 aircraft over a period of ten 
years. 
In other words, there was no discussion of the 
suitability of the aircraft in the military freighter and 
transport roles for which there existed requirements of 
56 and 95 aircraft respectively.^^ This, in any case, would 
have been impossible to evaluate since the aircraft itself 
was at the stage of prototype construction and the first 
prototype flew only on 24 June 1960,^^a year after it had 
ibid. 
^^Commlttee on Public Undertakings (1967-68) Eighth Report 
(Fourth Lok Sahha), para 134. 
96 Jane's All the \Jorld's Aircraft 1963-64 , p.134. 
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been decided to manufacture it. The decision would thus 
appear to have been made on the basis of the requirement 
of 29 aircraft with no consideration being given to the 
requirements of the (then) Indian Airlines Corporation 
(lAC), contrary to the guidelines given to the Chief of 
Air Staff Committee. 
This contention is further substantiated by information 
from other sources. When the concept of indigenous 
manufacture of transport aircraft for the lAF and the lAC 
had been discussed in 1959, lAC had made its preference 
for the Fokker F.27 (Friendship) aircraft quite clear and 
had stated that the HS-748 Series I aircraft did not suit 
97 98 
its requirements. According to a former Chief of Air Staff 
who was also a member of the Chief of Air Staff Committee, 
the Committee had decided that the HS-7 4 8 was a totally 
unknown design and was favourably inclined towards the 
Fokker F.27 as it was a proven aircraft. The then Chief of 
Air Staff, Air Marshal S. Mukherji, however, decided that 
the HS-74 8 would be the best plane for the lAF, that it 
should be manufactured indigenously, and that lAC requirements 
did not matter. Pressure, it would appear, was exerted 
by the then Defence Minister Krishna Menon on behalf of 
Hawker Siddeley Aviation Limited (HSAL), the manufacturers 
of the aircraft. The ground for this assumption is that 
the then Managing Director of HSAL, Sir Roy Dobson, needed 
^^ CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, paras 137-138. 
^^ Interview with the (late) Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lai 
at Air Headquarters, New Delhi on 5 February/ 1981. 
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a 'patron' for the aircraft as it would be in direct 
competition with Fokker. He arrived in India in April/May 
1959 (about the same time as the lAF formally proposed the 
replacement of its Dakota fleet) and Krishna Menon, who 
had known him earlier, according to the former Air Chief, 
is said to have made a 'promise' to favour the HS-748. 
As regards other alternatives, it should be added 
that at about the same time, Lockheed Aircraft (USA) had 
put forward a proposal to help India design and develop 
a transport aircraft suited to Indian conditions. It 
would be powered by two Rolls Royce Dart turboprop engines 
(the same as those in the HS-748), and the design of the 
aircraft would be owned by India. The company had also 
offered to help set up a factory in India as well as to 
assist in worldwide sales of the aircraft. 
Rejection of the Lockheed offer was later justified 
in Parliament by Krishna Menon on grounds that it had come 
at a rather late stage and the company had wanted 9 0 days 
to submit their report. As the question had been under 
consideration for a 'long time' and an early decision was 
necessary, the government had decided not to wait for 
9 9 
another three months. This was clearly a falsification 
of facts since the decision to manufacture the HS-748 had 
been taken barely five weeks after the initial proposal 
to acquire a new transport aircraft. In any case an 
agreement for the licence manufacture of the HS-748 was 
q Q 
Times, 9 August, 1959. 
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signed in July 1959 and that for the Rolls Royce Dart 6 
.ACKjl tCf 
engines in December 1959 . A feature unique toJ(j;his 
aircraft was that only the engines were to be manufactured 
by HAL at Bangalore; the aircraft itself was to be built 
at the Aircraft Maintenance Depot (AMD) at Kanpur. 
The project itself encountered several problems right 
from the time the agreement was signed in July 1959. 
Since it was still in the design stage, HSAL was not in a 
position to give an itemised price list for various 
components, but undertook to make it available within a 
year i.e. by July 1960. The only commitment that the 
company made was that unit cost of the aircraft would not 
exceed £158,000 at June 1959 price levels, subject to 
102 
escalation based on the UK wage index. 'Some sort of 
price list' which in effect was only for sub-assemblies 
was provided by HSAL in November 1960 but was not accepted 
by the Ministry of Defence. It was only four years later, ^^^ 
in 1964, that an acceptable price list was finally forthcoming. 
As far as tooling up for production was concerned, 
in 195 9, HSAL had quoted a figure of 1.9 million man hours 
for jigs and tools based on a production rate of five aircraft 
per month. Since the proposed production rate was subsequently 
CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, para 135. 
Times, 31 December, 1959. 
^^^ PAC (1972-73) Eighty Second Report, para 251. 
ibid., para 2.48. 
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reduced to three aircraft per month, the new estimate 
was 1.725 million man hours (man hours of direct labour 
were assessed by HSAL as 1 UK man hour = 2 Indian man hours, 
at an hourly wage of Rs 4). Based on this estimate, and 
including Rs 1 million as the cost of raw material for 
the manufacture of jigs and tools, the total cost of 
104 
manufacturing tools was estimated at Rs 8 million. 
AMD, Kanpur assessed 1 UK man hour as being equal to 
1^5 Indian man hours and the man hour rate at Rs 3.60. 
Based on this, Rs 5.65 million was sanctioned for the 
manufacture of 3igs, fixtures and tooling. 
By mid-1960, the first set of jigs had been set up 
at the AMD - at a time when the lAF requirement for the 
HS-748 stood at 180 aircraft. HSAL had, by this time, 
developed a Series II version of the HS-748 powered by 
RR Dart 7 Mk5 31 engines. This version was evaluated by 
the lAF and it was decided to switch production to the 
Series II from the fifth aircraft onwards. Initial 
orders for the HS-748 were placed after considerable delays 
as shown below: 
CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, para 148. 
ibid., para 149. 
ibid., para 133. 
ibid. , para 135. 
108 PAC (1972-72) Eighty Second Report, para 2.54 
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No. of Aircraft Ordered 
1 August 3, 1959 
3 April 28, 1961 
3 June 15, 1962 
3 September 11, 1962 
6 September 5, 1963 
In fact, after the first seven aircraft had been 
ordered in 1962, the Ministry of Defence considered the 
possibility of having the remaining aircraft modified as 
navigator/signaller trainers. But it had little choice 
in the matter as HSAL had yet to finalise the design of 
109 
this version. On the other hand, there is evidence to 
suggest that the Ministry of Defence was forced by HSAL to 
order aircraft numbers 8 to 16. According to the Secretary 110 of the Department of Defence Production: 
... we did not need even one aircraft 
of this normal version, but HSAL 
insisted that we must buy, otherwise 
they would not be able to give us for 
quite some time a design for modification 
(for the VIP/Executive version) and the 
subsequent aircraft. 
Due to the drastic reduction in lAF orders for the 
aircraft and its unsuitability for lAC requirements, it was 
decided to re-assess the requirements for production 
facilities. The Executive Director of HSAL visited Kanpur 
in July 19 6 4 and recommended that in view of the small 
number of aircraft to be manufactured it would not be 
ibid., para 2.58. 
ibid., para 2.59. . . ^ ^ ' 
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economical to undertake tooling to manufacture the entire 
aircraft, so that work should be restricted to the fuselage 
stage only with the wing sets to be imported from UK. In 
October 1964 management of the Kanpur factory was transferred 
to HAL and the recommendation about reduced tooling was 
accepted three months later i.e. in January 1965.^^^ 
The tooling process itself encountered serious problems, 
including the lack of trained personnel and an overall 
underestimation of the extent of work required. By 
December 1966, the expenditure on tooling amounted to 
Rs 19.6 million as against the original estimate of 
11? 
Rs 5.65 million. This included a sum of Rs 5.249 million 
on jigs and tools which were not likely to be utilised 
because of the decision to reduce the manufacturing effort. 
Even fuselage tools worth Rs 1.302 million were rendered 
useless because of the decision to manufacture the Series II 
version instead of Series The entire effort seems 
to have suffered because of mismanagement. This becomes 
apparent keeping in view the fact that the first of the 
four HS-748 Series I aircraft assembled at Kanpur flew on 
1 November 1961, but the second not until 13 March 1963. 
The first Series II aircraft flew a year later, on 
28 January 1964 .^ '^^  It would thus appear that the first 
^^^ CPU (1967-68) Eighth Re-port, para 151. 
^^^ ibid., para 150. 
^^^ ibid., para 152. 
^^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1966-67, p.81. 
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few aircraft were not manufactured but merely assembled at 
Kanpur since jigs and tools for manufacturing purposes 
were still being installed . Also, it was only after the 
management of the AMD, Kanpur^was taken over by HAL that 
it was formally admitted that no detailed plans or estimates 
had been drawn up before the Ministry of Defence undertook 
the project. According to the Secretary of the Department 
of Defence Production, a team of lAF officers had been 
sent to UK and after the collaboration agreement was signed, 
in consultation with HSAL, they 'prepared a quick plan 
and the implementation was on the basis of that plan'.^^^ 
The project as a whole was reviewed in 1962 and a 
Special Committee appointed to enquire into its progress 
is reported to have made some adverse comments. According 
to the London Times, it was realised that the HS-748 would 
not be suitable for high altitude airfields and the Committee 
recommended that the DHC-4 Caribou, manufactured by De 
Havilland, Canada^should be manufactured instead.^^^ In 
June 196 3, the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet decided 
that only 29 aircraft for communication and training purposes 
should be manufactured, and that a decision on the Military 
Freighter (MF) version should be taken only after flight 
trials of the HS-748MF and the DHC-4 Caribou. These trials 
were completed only in 1964 and the HS-748 was found 
unsuitable.^^^ 
^^^ CFU (1967-68) Eighth Report, para 141 
^^^ 7 June 1963. 
^^^ Public Accounts Committee (1968-69) Forty Seventh Report 
(Fourth Lok Sahha), p.22. 
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Confronted with a drastic reduction in the number of 
aircraft to be manufactured, HAL/Ministry of Defence increased 
pressure on the lAC to order the HS-748. Consequently, 
a letter of intent for 15 aircraft (nine passenger and 
six freighter versions) was placed on HAL. But, after 
trials on its freighter routes in the Eastern region in 
April 1965 with the Series II version, the Letter of Intent 
for six freighter aircraft was withdrawn. The order for 
nine passenger aircraft was finally confirmed in Septmber 
1965. In evidence before the Committee on Fuhlic Undertakings 
of Parliament, the Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism 
and Civil Aviation justified the orders as follows: 
... it was naturally felt, in view of 
the fact that it is a very expensive 
business to manufacture aircraft and 
the plane was being manufactured in 
India under licence, that the Indian 
Airlines should also use the plane. 
... there was no escape from using that 
plane ... regardless of the fact that 
it might be a little more e x p e n s i v e . 
The first HS-74 8 was deliverd to the lAC on 28 June 
1967^^^ and, in the same month, another five aircraft were 
ordered,^^^ bringing lAC orders to a total of 14. Deliveries 
1 22 
were completed by 1970 and the lAC order made it clear 
^^^ Committee on Public Undertakings (1972-73) Twenty Eighth 
Report (Fifth Lok Sabha) , para 2.38. 
119 
ibid., para 2.7. 
HAL Annual Report 1966-67, p.13. 
^^^ CPU (1972-73) Twenty Eighth Report, para 2.3 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1969-70 , p.12. 
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that the economics of manufacturing the HS-748 involved 
a substantial loss to HAL if the selling price of the 
123 
aircraft was to be the same as that charged by HSAL. 
While the lAF was required to pay an amount equivalent 
to 5 per cent of the cost of manufacture (later raised 
to Ih per cent)^^"^ as profit to HAL, the price to be 
paid by lAC was computed at Rs 8.97 million per aircraft. 
Since the unit cost of production of the HS-748 was 
estimated at Rs 10.33 million, the Civil Aviation 
Department had to subsidise HAL to the extent of Rs 1.35 125 
million for every aircraft delivered to the lAC. 
This subsidy later had to be further increased when 
10 additional aircraft were ordered in April 1970 at a 
unit cost of Rs 9.27 million.^^^ Cost of production was 127 now estimated at Rs 13.18 million - involving a subsidy 
of Rs 3.91 million per aircraft. 
Operationally, the HS-748 came under heavy criticism 
by pilots of the Indian Airlines (lA, as the lAC was 
now known). A Technical Committee was appointed by the 
12 8 Government in January 1971 to examine complaints 
^^^ EkL Annual Report 1967-68 , p.32. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1968-69, p.49. 
^^^ CPU (1972-75) Twenty Eighth Report, para 2.17. 
ibid., para 2.18. 
ibid., para 2.19. 
^^^ ibid., para 2.31. 
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about shortcomings in the climb performance of HAL-built 
HS-748S as well as its performance at high ambient 
temperatures (above 45° C). In its Report submitted 
in August 1971, the Committee pointed out that certain 
aircraft were 'slightly below form, but the average 
129 
mean of the fleet were of the required standard'. 
However, the Task Force which was set up to examine the 
Report of the Technical Committee in its Report submitted 130 
on 7 November 1971, made two recommendations. 
1. Regarding production models delivered to lA, 
it recommended that HAL and the Directorate of 
Aircraft Inspection, Civil Aviation Department, 
should not, in the future, accept shortfalls 
below the standards prescribed by the Director 
General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). It further 
recommended that in respect to these flight tests, 
HAL should adopt procedures already in practice 
with HSAL. 
2. Performance of inservice aircraft was declared 
safe by the Task Force but it recommended 
certain procedures regarding engine power checks. 
While the Indian Airlines tried to implement these 
recommendations, in actual practice 'considerable 
difficulties (were) experienced in obtaining the desired 
^^^ ibid., para 2.35. 
ibid., para 2.32. 
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performance^^^ The matter was taken up with HSAL, 
Rolls Royce and HAL which declared that modifications 
would be required to make the aircraft safe for flying 
under high temperature conditions. In March 1972, 
lA informed HAL that it would like 12 aircraft to be 
132 
so modified - at a unit cost of Rs 40,000. 
A recently completed HS-748 was flown to UK for 
perfomance evaluation by HSAL at Woodford and was 
reportedly found to be u-pjto specifications. But, before 
its return to India for further tropical trials its 
water/methanol system was modified.^^^ As a result of 
these problems, not only did the lA have to restrict 
operations of the aircraft, but it also had to reduce the 
permissible maximum gross take-off weight from 44,4 95 lbs 
to 40,500 Ibs.^^^ At the same time, after having awarded 
a Certificate of Airworthiness to three of the 10 aircraft 
ordered in 1970, the DGCA apparently refused certification 
for a further batch of four which were ready for delivery.^^^ 
Finally, on 23 March 1973, the Minister for Tourism and 
Civil Aviation informed Parliament that the performance 
of the HS-748 would be evaluated by a group of experts 
^^^ ibid., para 2.33. 
^^^ ibid., para 2.39. 
^^^ Milavnews, May 1973, p.15. 
^^^ Milavnews, April 1973, p.14. 
^^^ Milavnews, March 1973, p.14. 
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led by Satish Dhawan, Director of the Indian Institute 
of Science, Bangalore.^^^ 
As for the supply of HS-748s to the lAF, the 
16 Executive/VIP versions were delivered in the second 
half of the 1960s. Further orders for an unspecified 
137 number of aircraft were placed in 1968-69 and deliveries 
of the Navigator/Signaller trainer types were expected 
13 8 
to begin in 1970. These, however, suffered from 
manufacturing delays due to non availability of 
indigenously manufactured audio control equipment and 
to some extent, initial difficulties experienced in 
ground and flight clearance of navigator trainer •] -D q 
installations. This was also a period of uncertainty 
so far as the future of the manufacturing program itself 
was concerned, because lAF's requirement for a suitable 
Military Freighter (MF) variant had still not been met. 
In 1968-69, for example, HAL announced that it was 
exploring the possibility of manufacturing 'some successor 
140 aircraft . 
As early as 1965, after rejecting the MF version 
of the HS-748, the lAF had also tested the Breguet 941 
(France) and the Caribou Mkll (the prototype DHC-5D 
^^^ CPU (1972-73) Twenth Eighth Report, para 2.43. 
HAL Annual Report 1968-69 , p.15. 
^^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1970-71, p.116. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1970-71, p.9. 
HAL Annual Report 1968-69, p.15. 
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Buffal^o)and concluded that the latter aircraft came 
close to meeting its requirements, but negotiations 
about its manufacture could not be held since the 
141 
aircraft had not reached production status. Meanwhile, 
in May 1966, HAL concluded a supplementary licence 
agreement with HSAL which provided for the manufacture 
of the MF variant of the HS-748. But no decision to 
manufacture any military freighter aircraft was taken 
for the next three years and it was only in 1969, after 
detailed negotiations with De Havilland Canada that the 
proposal to manufacture the DHC-5D was given up. More 
than a year later, in December 197 0, the Government 
finally decided to 'explore the possibility' of developing 
and manufacturing the HS-748MF. In June 1971, HAL 
placed a contract with HSAL for the supply of modification 
kits and related technical data at a cost of Rs 3.35 million. 
It would appear that this was a decision taken at 
the administrative level without taking into account any 
specifications that would be required by the lAF. This 
is because it was HSAL which was to supply the technical 
data for modifying the HS-748, an aircraft which had 
earlier been rejected as being unsuitable as a military 
freighter. Accordingly, Air Headquarters issued detailed 
specificatons only in February 1972 after the modifications 
^^^ PAC (1968-69) Forty Seventh Report, p.34. 
^^^ Re-port of the Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India: 1975-75. Union Government (Defence Services) 
Hereafter referred to as C (S AG Report: 19 7 4- 7 5 . 
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on the aircraft had already been carried out. Flight 
trials were carried out during the period March-June 
14 3 
1972 and what followed was a unique mix%re of 
bureaucratic pressure and inter-services difference of 
opinion. 
In July 1972, after the first phase of trials had 
been completed; the Army expressed its reservations 
regarding the suitability of the aircraft. Air Headquarters 
on the other hand, insisted that the trials had been 
successful and justified its decision taken in March 1972 
for orders to be placed on HAL. In fact, it had finalised 
plans for induction of the aircraft into squadron service 144 
by 1975-76 in June 1972, a month before the Army 
registered its complaint. However, in order to appease 
the Army,Air Headquarters agreed to further trials with 
a modified HS-748 with a para dropping door on the 
starboard side. In the meanwhile, HAL was insisting 
that the Government place firm orders to 'minimise the 145 
consequences of a break in production'. 
The entire issue was reviewed at 'high level' in 
the Ministry of Defence in August-September 1972, and 
it was agreed that the HS-748MF was the 'only viable 146 alternative'. It was also decided that: 
143 ... , ibia., p.12. 
144 _ ibid. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1971-72, p.14. 
^^^ C i AG Report: 1974-75, para 7, p.12. 
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1. Initially, 48 HS-748MFs would be ordered to meet 
immediate requirements. 
2. A Standing Group representing the Army, the lAF, 
the R & D Organisation and HAL would co-ordinate 
flight trials and produce improvements suggested 
by the Army. 
3. An Army-IAF Study Group would undertake a one year 
study to decide further orders for this aircraft 
should be placed, or whether some other aircraft 
should be inducted to satisfy long term requirements. 
In October 1972, the Government authorised HAL to 
place a Letter of Intent on HSAL for 40 sets of parts 
and, in April 197 3, formally sanctioned the manufacture 
of 48 aircraft at a unit cost of Rs 14.97 million. The 
decision was justified on the grounds that it 
... took into account the imperative 
need for timely replacement of 
unserviceable/uneconomical aircraft 
as also the need to prevent a break _ ^^^ 
in production at the manufacturing unit... 
What followed was a complicated series of events in which 
decisions were made, reversed and reversed again. During 
the period March-iMay 197 3 , foreign exchange worth Rs 107.3 
million was provided to HAL which ordered items worth 
Rs 17.4 million and initiated price negotiations with 
HSAL. No further orders could be placed because in July 
197 3, HSAL announced a 'steep increase' in prices and 
ibid., pp.12-13 
57 
Air Headquarters revived the alternative proposal for 
manufacturing the DHC-5D Buffal^/o under licence from 
De Havilland Canada. In August 1973, Air Headquarters 
issued 'revised and comprehensive' specifications for a 
military transport aircraft required for induction into 
service by 1974-75. This move received further support 
in October 197 3 when the Army-IAF Study Group reported 
that the HS-748MF would not meet all requirements of 
the Army and that an aircraft similar to the DHC-5D 
148 
Buffalio should be considered. 
Negotiations with HSAL on prices had, however, been 
continuing and were finalised in November 1973, with 
the offer being valid till December. In November, Air 
Headquarters too changed its views and placed a formal 
order for 48 HS-748MFs on HAL. But in December the 
Government instructed HAL to suspend procurement of 
supplies pending fresh review of the entire program. 
It would appear that at least two factors contributed 
to this decision. Firstly, the move by Indian Airlines 
to ground all HS-748s which had flown more than 5,000 
hours, following the discovery of fatigue cracks in 
ailerons and hinges of several aircraft which had logged 
around 8,000 flying h o u r s . T h e lAF too grounded its 
148 . . ^ , . ibid., p.13. 
ibid. 
iHlavnsws, September 197 3, p.11. 
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fleet as a precautionary measure.^^^ Secondly, the 
Dhawan Committee which had been appointed in May 197 3 
to enquire into the safety and performance of the 
1 S2 
aircraft had not yet submitted its report. 
After another round of negotiations with De Havilland 
Canada, the proposal to manufacture the DHC-5D Buffal/o^^^ 
was dropped again, reportedly on grounds that adequate 154 
credits were not forthcoming. In February 1974 it 
was decided to reduce the order for the HS-748MF from 
48 to 30 aircraft and the decision was conveyed to HAL 
in March. Revised quotes received from HSAL valid till 
April (later extended to May) 1974 reflected an increase 
of 14.6 per cent over the prices negotiated in November 
1973. During April-May 1974, Air Headquarters again 
expressed its misgivings about the HS-748MF, stating 
that it would 'not agree to a firm order being placed' 
and that it would 'have to evaluate afresh and assess 
the several options available'. Meanwhile, HSAL's offer 
^ 155 lapsed. 
In June 19 74, HAL conveyed to the Government its 
concern about the delay in the project since the original 
proposal of 1969 and the uncertainty encountered since 
^^^ Milavnews, October 197 3, p.14. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 19 7 3-74, p.12. 
^^^ C Si AG Report: 1974-75 , para 7, p.13. 
^^^ International Defense Review 5/1975, p.766. 
^^^ ibid., p.14. 
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the Government sanctions of Defember 1972 and April 1973. 
It maintained:^^^ 
1. Continued increase in costs would adversely affect 
viability of the project apart from delaying 
delivery by 12-15 months. 
2. Break in production because of lack of orders 
had resulted in a 'go slow' by workers, adding 
Rs 2.7 million per aircraft to the cost of aircraft 
manufactured for the lAF. 
3. Even if a decision was taken by September 1974, 
gross idle time in the manufacturing unit, 
i.e. Kanpur division, would amount to 1.6 million 
man hours, equivalent to Rs 26.5 million. 
This was because under the terms of the original agreement, 
HAL was to have produced 100 aircraft of which 70 were 
to have been from parts supplied by HSAL. Up to May 
1973 only 43 had been completed and since then assembly 
was continuing at a rate of not more than 2-3 aircraft 
per year.^^"^ In any event, HAL again acquired fresh 
quotations from HSAL (representing an increase of 30.6 
per cent over 1973 prices) valid till September 1974, 
^ 1 158 
which lapsed because no decision was taken. 
It was December 1974 before the period of inaction 
ended. A 'high level' meeting held that month accepted 
ibid. 
Milavnews, June 1974 , p.15. 
^^^ C & AG Re-port: 1974-75 , para 7, p.15 
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that the 1972 decision (to manufacture the MF version) 
had been taken 'on merit' and 'after due deliberation 
and concurrence of all concerned'. It was further 
stressed that the decision 'was a sound one and should 
be implemented'. Consequently, it was decided to place 
159 
an order for 30 HS-748MF. 
Once again the exercise of inviting quotations from 
HSAL was carried out in February 1975 and in June that 
year, a contract for the manufacture of 10 HS-748MFs 
was finally concluded. As a result of the inaction 
over a period of two years, the contracted base price 
was 35 per cent higher than that offered in November 
1973 and was subject to further escalation. In January 
1976, the Government finally authorised: 
1. Manufacture of 10 HS-748MFs at a unit cost of 
Rs 22.9 million. 
2. Modification of 17 existing HS-748 trainer aircraft 
at an estimated cost of Rs 20.7 million. 
3. Purchase of three of the seven unsold aircraft 
manufactured (for Indian Airlines) by HAL 
(1971-72 and 1972-73) after modifications - which 
would cost another Rs 47.55 million. 
By February 1976, the unit cost of manufacture of the 
10 HS-748MFS was estimated at Rs 28.84 million as 
compared to Rs 14.97 million in April 1973 and Rs 22.9 
ibid. 
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million sanctioned a month earlier. In effect, the 
delay in arriving at a decision resulted in an extra 
expenditure of Rs 138.7 million for 10 aircraft besides 
delay in induction of the aircraft into squadron services.^^^ 
The Dhawan Committee, which finally submitted its 
report in 1975, cleared the performance of the HS-748. 
It concluded that the aircraft was 'continuing to meet 
current international standards of airworthiness and 
16 2 
safety'. The report, however, had no effect on the 
situation of the aircraft in India. Indian Airlines 
had already refused to take delivery of the last seven 
of the 24 aircraft it had ordered. HSAL was, at one 
stage, reported to be willing to buy back the seven 
aircraft but its proposed price of about Rs 11.2 million 
per aircraft would have resulted in an overall loss of 
up to Rs 30 million.^^^ In any case, as mentioned above, 
three of the HS-748s were refurbished and transferred 
to the lAF and some of the remaining four were reportedly 
acquired by DGCA for Radio and Navigation Aid caliberation T 164 work. 
During the period 1972-76, capacity utilisation 
of the Kanpur division was very marginal as the Government 
attempted to find customers for the aircraft. According 
to HAL:^^^ 
^^^ ibid., p.16. 
^^^ Milavnews, December 1975, p.17. 
^^^ Milavnews, June 1975, p.14. 
^^^ Milavnews, August 1976, p.11. 
^^^ HAL Annual Repovt 1976-77, p.6. 
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Quest for utilisation of the 
available capacity at Kanpur 
Division has been engaging 
attention for the last few years. 
The management has been pursuing 
with the concerned authorities 
in government to obtain additional 
orders to make use of available 
resources ... also ... for an 
early decision on a new project ... 
Possibly as a result of pressure from HAL a repeat 
order for 10 HS-748MFs was placed in early 1978 -
enough to keep the Kanpur Division busy till 1980-82.^^^ 
This, however, did not obviate the need for the sanction 
of a new project. This was conceded by HAL itself in 
1978:"^ 
... if orders for ... (the new 
project) ... are not finalised 
early, the dimensions of idleness 
will assume serious proportions in 
1980-81 and increasingly thereafter. 
While the lAF presumably had no further requirement 
for the MF version of the HS-74 8, a rear loading variant 
was also suggested to fulfil the longstanding requirement 
for a Medium Tactical Transport Aircraft (METAC) to 
replace the obsolescent fleet of Douglas C-47s and C-119Gs 
But, cost escalation reportedly raised the price of the 
proposed HS-748 Rear Loading Tactical Transport (RLTT) 
to the same level as the DHC-5D Buffalo, the aircraft 
favoured by the lAF.^^^ No decision was forthcoming 
even by 1979 although it was clear that one was long 
^^^ Milavnews, May 1978, p.15. 
EAL Annual Report 1977-78 , p.6. 
^^^ Milavnews, May 1978, p.15. 
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overdue. By now contenders reportedly included the 
DHC-5D Buffalo, HS-748 (RLTT), Aeritalia G.222 and the 
An-32 from the Soviet Union.^^^ By late 1979, plans 
for the procurement of the An-32 were reportedly finalised 
during the Moscow visit of Defence Secretary Dave. It 
was then planned to manufacture the aircraft at HAL's 
Kanpur division.^^^ However, in 1980, it was announced 
that the An-32 would not be built in India but would 
be purchased directly from the Soviet Union.^^^ 
Meanwhile, HAL was expected to terminate production 
17 2 of the HS-748 in 1982-83 after having manufactured 
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89 aircraft, including 72 for the lAF. But it would 
appear that the future of the HS-748 manufacture is still 
an open question. This is because while the Coastguarder 
version of the aircraft had earlier been rejected because 174 
the economics of its operation had been 'rather discouraging', 
later reports claim that the aircraft is still one of 
the contenders for service with the Indian Coast Guard, 175 although a decision has yet to be taken. 
^^^ Milavnews, March 1979, p.13. 
Milavnews, November 1979 , p. 17. 
Milavnews, September 1980 , p. 19. Quoting Minister of 
State for Defence Production, C.P.N. Singh. 
Minister of State for Defence Production, C.P.N. Singh's 
statement in Parliament, reported in Times of India, 19 June 
1980 . 
Milavnews, July 1980 , p.17. 
Times of India, 29 May 1980 . 
Pushpindar Singh in Asian Defenoe Journal, 10/82, p. 29. 
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In short, the manufacturing record for the HS-748 
has been a total failure. To begin with, the decision 
to manufacture the aircraft itself was highly questionable. 
The aircraft was at the prototype construction stage 
so its performance could not be evaluated. Also, there 
is enough evidence to prove that there was a substantial 
body of opinion that did not favour its manufacture in 
India. Nonetheless, it was decided to manufacture the 
HS-748 - probably one of the quickest decisions made 
by the Ministry of Defence in the context of defence 
production in India. 
Even then, the installation of manufacturing equipment 
proceeded in an ad hoc manner. Although the total lAF 
requirement had been given as 180 aircraft, this was 
scaled down to 27 soon afterwards. At the same time, 
no project report was prepared and the whole program 
proceeded on the basis of instructions received from HSAL. 
This is not to say that such a course of action was ftot 
inevitable. The Aircraft Manufacturing Depot at Kanpur 
had no experience whatsoever in aircraft manufacture. 
But, in the process in 196 3, HSAL managed to sell nine 
more passenger aircraft than the lAF actually required. 
Despite the lAF's reduction in orders and its 
preference for the DHC Caribou for military freighter 
requirements, the decision to manufacture the aircraft 
was not reversed. On the other hand, pressure was 
exerted on the (then) Indian Airlines Corporation (lAC) 
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to order aircraft for its passenger and freight carrying 
requirements - an order which was eventually placed, 
albeit very reluctantly. The very fact that HAL (which 
had taken over management of the AMD) had to be 
subsidised for the aircraft supplied to the lAC made 
it evident that the manufacture of the HS-748 was highly 
uneconomical, to say the least. Nonetheless, HAL had 
no such problems so far as the aircraft supplied to the 
lAF were concerned - it merely billed the lAF on a cost-
plus-profit basis. 
The question of acquiring an aircraft to meet the 
Military Freighter and paradropping requirements of 
the lAF was re-opened in the second half of the 1960s 
despite the fact that an agreement to develop a MF 
variant of the HS-748 had been signed with HSAL in 1966. 
This would indicate not only a continued pj^ference of 
the lAF for the Caribou II (a development of the Caribou • 
and later called the DHC-5D Buffalo) but also an attempt 
by HAL to pressurise the lAF to opt for the HS-748MF -
a variant which had not been developed till then. The 
result was that no decision was taken on this matter 
for the next three years while negotiations with De 
Havilland Canada for the licence manufacture of the 
DHC-5D Buffalo continued. 
While these negotiations were finally terminated 
in 1969, another year passed before the Ministry of Defence 
decided to 'explore the possibility' of manufacturing the 
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HS-748MF - a decision taken without considering 
requirements of the user services i.e. the lAF and the 
Indian Army. The result was five years of bureaucratic 
and inter-services infighting during which time no action 
could be taken as decisions were reversed soon after they 
had been made - a bad reflection not only on the quality 
of the decision making process but also on the aircraft 
under consideration. 
The aircraft also came under severe criticism by 
its only civilian operator - Indian Airlines. Serious 
complaints about the aircraft began to emerge within a 
few years of its induction into service, culminating 
in the appointment of the Dhawan Committee in 1973 to 
enquire into specific allegations about performance and 
safety aspects of the HS-748. Although the Committee 
eventually cleared the aircraft the damage had already 
become clear. Indian Airlines initially suspended 
acceptance of the last seven of the aircraft it had 
ordered and eventually refused to take delivery of them 
at all. 
The unwillingness of both the civilian and service 
users of the HS-748 to place further orders for it 
inevitably affected the economics of manufacture. As 
already mentioned, it cost more to build an HS-748 in 
India than to buy one from UK. By 1975, HAL had suffered 
a further loss of Rs 26.5 million - representing man hours 
lost due to lack of work. 
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By December 197 4 the period of inaction appeared 
to have come to an end when it was finally decided that 
the lAF would acquire 30 HS-748MFs. Actually, the 
manufacture of only 10 HS-748MFs was sanctioned in 1976 
although it was also decided to modify a further 17 of 
the existing trainer versions as well as three of the 
aircraft which had originally manufactured for Indian 
Airlines. This would also indicate that the lAF had 
originally acquired more trainer versions of the HS-748 
than it actually required. In any case, a further 10 
HS-748MFS were ordered in 1978, possibly as a result 
of bureaucratic pressure, since the lAF was already in 
the process of evaluating successor aircraft . Manufacture 
of the last batch of the MFs was scheduled to end in 1982 
but there is no indication so far as to whether production 
of the aircraft itself would be terminated since the 
Coastguarder version is reported to be under evaluation. 
The manufacturing history of the HS-748 is thus a 
classic example of an aircraft being selected for licence 
manufacture without being evaluated for suitability. 
Once production began, user agencies were coerced into 
placing orders and the result was one of the most inefficient 
production runs in the history of aircraft manufacture in 
India. 
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CHAPTER II 
INDO-SOVIET COOPERATION: 
THE MIG-21 PROJECT 
Various reasons have been given for the acquisition 
and manufacture of MiG-21 aircraft by India. These range 
from the position that they were acquired as a reaction to 
the US supply of a squadron of F-104 Starfighters to 
Pakistan in August 1961^ and the subsequent unwillingness 
of Western countries to provide the lAF with aircraft of 
similar performance, to the argument that the Soviet supply 
of MiG-21s was acceptable to India because they were cheap 
and readily available, while the bureaucracy in India was 
dissatisfied with British collaboration in the manufacture 
2 
of a powerplant for the Indian designed HF-24. Another 
variation of the previous argument is that although the 
MiG-21 possessed no 'obvious advantage' over the Lightning 
(UK), Mirage III (France) and the F-104 (US), these aircraft 
were not available to India and 'manufacturing rights and 
rupee payment seemed to have decided the issue 
However, these explanations would seem to be incomplete 
when viewed in terms of the requirements of the lAF. The 
questions that arise are: 
^ For example, see K. Subrahmanyam in Times of India, 
24 November 1971. 
^ Raju G.C. Thomas, The Defence of India: A Budgetary 
Perspective of Strategy and Politics (New Delhi: Macmillan, 
1971), pp.188-190. 
^ Maj. Gen. Sukhwant Singh, Indians Vars Since Independence: 
Defence of the Western Border, Volume II (New Delhi: Vikas, 
1981), p.295. 
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1. Did the lAF have a requirement for this type of 
aircraft? 
2. What were the alternative types available, if any? 
3. Given the then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon's 
emphasis on creating a domestic defence production 
base, was the MiG-21 the only type of aircraft 
available for indigenous manufacture? 
To acquire a proper perspective on the background 
events that eventually led to the acquisition and 
subsequent manufacture of MiG-21 aircraft in India, it 
is necessary to note that the Soviet Union had shown its 
potential as a future supplier of military equipment as 
early as 1956. This was when the lAF had decided to 
purchase Canberra bombers from UK in preference to the 
4 I1-28S offered by the Soviet Union. 
In January 1961, it was reported that the Soviet 
Trade Commissioner in India, N.P. Shizyaev, had told a 
news conference in Calcutta on 9 January 1961,^ that the 
Soviet Union had offered 'jet planes' to India for rupee 
payment and that his government was prepared to supply 
any number of 'jets' which were of the latest 'type'. 
He was further quoted as having disclosed that negotiations 
in this respect had just been concluded in Moscow and the 
Government of India's reply was now awaited. 
Over a year later, while addressing a news conference, 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave reasons for the 
^ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1957, 15428:C 
^ Asian Recorder, 1961, 3761:INI:H. 
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Indian proposal to buy MiGs as well as to manufacture 
the aircraft in India with Soviet assistance.^ The MiG 
was a 'stout and simple' aircraft he said, 'not sophisticated 
and complicated'. It would be easy to manufacture, cheaper 
than other comparable aircraft, and could be paid for in 
rupees. While production could start within two or three 
yqf^s, in the meantime it would be necessary to purchase 
some aircraft to bring the lAF u^to strength. While 
reiterating that no final decision to buy the aircraft had 
been taken, he said that Britain and the United States 
had made enquiries about the proposal, but there had been 
no pressure. A few days later, while speaking in Parliament 
in June 1962,^ Nehru elaborated on the background of the 
Indian interest in the MiG-21. A team of Indian engineers 
had gone to the Soviet Union to buy a few jet engines 
as well as to seek Soviet help to modify these for 
installation in the indigenously designed HF-24. While it 
was subsequently found that the engine could not be modified 
for use with the HF-24, the team had become interested in 
the MiG-21, made enquiries and submitted a report to the 
Indian government. Later, while replying to the foreign 
affairs debate in Parliament, he said he favoured the 
acquisition of guided missiles rather than costly aircraft 
g 
which would be outdated in a few years. 
^ Times, 14 June 1962. 
Times, 21 June 1962 . 
^ An Indian request for Sidewinder Air-to-Air missiles had 
been turned down by the US in 1961 although they were 
supplied to Pakistan along with the F-104s. Times, 5 July 
1962. 
71 
Britain and the United States meanwhile made joint 
9 
efforts to persuade India to buy Western aircraft. The 
Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan Sandys, visited 
New Delhi in June 1962, with a counter offer to supply 
Lightning fighters. Nehru confirmed that the Indian 
proposal to buy and manufacture MiGs in India had been 
discussed in his meeting with Sandys and that he had made 
it clear that India had made no final decision on the 
matter. What the Sandys mission did achieve was an 
Indian promise to re-examine the entire question. 
Accordingly, an lAF evaluation team led by Air Vice 
Marshal Harjinder Singh^^ visited Britain ostensibly to 
evaluate the Lightning. This could have been a purely 
formal exercise as Nehru had already made it clear on 
earlier occasions that India had compared the MiGs with 
similar Western aircraft and favoured the former because 
it was 'meant for rougher work ... easier to manufacture, 
not so sophisticated'.^^ Soon after the return of the lAF 
evaluation team, it was reported that a Soviet offer to 
supply MiGs and provide for their later manufacture in 
India had been accepted 'in principle'.^^ The deciding 
Times, 14 June 1962. These were reported to include 
US willingness to be a partner to any financial arrangements 
that would make the purchase of Western aircraft possible 
as well as providing the RAF with American aircraft if 
British production was diverted to India. 
Times, 18 June 1962. 
^^ Times, 13 July 1962. 
^^ Times, 5 July 1962. 
^^ Times, 23 July 1962 quoting a report in the Indian Express 
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factor,it was reported in the Times,"^as not the price 
14 
but the complexity of Lightning aircraft. 
In the last week of July 1962, an Indian delegation 
led by Dr S. Bhagwantam, Scientific Adviser to the Ministry 
of Defence, left for the Soviet Union to negotiate for 
the licence manufacture of the MiGs in India,^^ 
returning to India in the second week of August for 
consultations.^^ It would thus appear that the main reason 
for the Indian acquisition of MiGs besides those of 
ruggedness and simplicity of operation,was not the 
acquisition of F-104s by Pakistan. Although this would 
undoubtedly have been a factor, the threat from Pakistan 
in Indian perception, would have increased ever since the 
supply of F-86 Sabres by the United States in the late 
1950s. Neither would the unit cost have played any 
decisive role, since the Anglo-American offer had been 
made after considering India's foreign exchange difficulties 
The prime factors influencing this decision would be as 
follows: 
1. The decision to induct supersonic aircraft 
into the lAF. 
2. Failure to find a suitable powerplant for 
the indigenously designed HF-24 in order to 
give it supersonic capability. 
14 Times, 30 July 1962. 
^^ ibid. 
^^ Times, 18 August 1962. 
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3. A decision to indigenously manufacture the 
aircraft that was selected for the lAF. 
Thus, while the offer of the supply of Lightning 
aircraft was attractive in terms of unit cost, there is 
no evidence to suggest that Britain offered licence 
manufacturing facilities for this type in India. Also, 
at this stage India had started acquiring military equipment 
from countries other than its traditional supplier - UK. 
Consequently, a combination of political, economic and 
technical factors and a policy of indigenous manufacture 
of combat aircraft were instrumental in the decision to 
manufacture the MiG-21. 
By the middle of August 1962, the official decision 
had been made and on 17 August Dr S. Bhagwantam returned 
to Moscow where an agreement was signed on 2 9 August.^^ 
However, this agreement was somewhat incomplete and not 
a comprehensive accord. Within a fortnight there were 
18 
reports of new doubts at the service and technical levels 
about the merits of the variant of the MiG-21 that the 
Soviets were offering. It was not the performance of the 
aircraft that was being questioned (although doubts in 
this context had already been expressed) but the type of 
equipment that the Soviets were willing to provide in the 
aircraft. For it was reported that the Soviet Union was 
Committee on Publia Undertakings (1967-68): Eighth Report 
(Fourth Lok Sabha), p.8. 
18 Times, 13 September 1962. 
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not willing to sell the latest in its inventory and 
that the alternative equipment offered 'was not good enough 
to make the aircraft fully useful to India'. 
That these problems took some time to be solved is 
also indicated by further reports quoting Indian officials 
that the Soviet Union had let it be known that MiGs would 
not be available after all while Soviet diplomatic circles 
maintained that the aircraft contracted for would be 
delivered on schedule and that the Government of India 
19 
had been reassured on this count. However, these 
reassurances could also have been necessary because of 
the conflict with China in October-November since in a 
speech on 9 November 196 2, Nehru said that he had no doubt 
whatever that the Soviet Union would fulfil her commitment 
to supply MiG aircraft by December, adding that he had 
been assured that 'all promises of aid would be honoured 
by the Soviet Union'. He felt that the war between India 
and China had placed the Soviet Union in a 'great fix'. 
'Despite this they have helped us in the past and I have 
no doubt they will keep their word of giving us the planes 20 they have promised by December'. 
The same expectation was repeated by the Defence Minister 
21 
Y.B. Chavan in Parliament on 4 December. There had been 
'some little difficulty' Nehru added in reply to criticism 
19 T%mes, 3 November 1962. 
20 Times, 12 November 1962; Asian Reoovder, 1962, 4925:INI:A, 
21 Times, 5 December 1962. 
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that the deal might be in jeopardy because of the Sino-
Indian border war, but this had 'nothing to do with China' 
but was due to 'the world situation becoming rather 
critical because of what happened in the Caribbean ... (the) 
... main thing...' was that the Soviet Union would build 
a plant in India for the manufacture of the aircraft. 
As regards delivery 'a few MiGs are to come in December, 
a few next year, and a few in 1964', mainly for training 
22 
purposes. 
The fact that the significance of the MiG agreement 
lay in its provision for indigenous manufacture under 
licence over a period of time and not in its immediate 
ability to strengthen the Air Force was emphasised by 
both India and the Soviet Union. Addressing a press 
conference later in December, Nehru stated that he expected 
the initial batch of aircraft to be delivered 'fairly soon' 
as they were 'supposed to have been shipped by the end 
of 1962 or may be January 1963'. Adding that the MiGs 
would be few in number he said 'they are really meant to 23 help us to manufacture in this country this type of plane'. 
2 2 
ibid. Also Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1962, 19194:A. 
Nehru's answer was in reply to questions by Opposition members 
drew attention to a statement by Duncan Sandys made in 
i^e British House of Commons the previous day after his return 
from India and Pakistan that 'the Soviet Union did not feel 
it could supply the MiG aircraft at the moment' since India 
was involved in a dispute with a Communist power. The Indian 
Ambassador to Washington had, in a television interview, 
stated that he did not think India would be receiving any 
military aid from the Soviet Union. 
2 3 Hindu, 1 January 1962. 
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The same view was put forward by the Minister for Defence 
and Economic Coordination, T.T. Krishnamachari, who at a 
press conference in Wellington (New Zealand) insisted that 
it was entirely incorrect to say that the Soviet Union 
was committed to help India's defence program. 
In fact we are committed to buy plans 
and designs of a Russian MiG fighter and 
Russia is holding us to that commitment ... 
there is no suggestion that the Russians 
intend giving military aid.24 
The Soviet Union too made it amply clear that the 
MiG deal was not an agreement for the supply of arms, as 
a consequence of the Sino-Indian border conflict. The 
Soviet news agency Tass published a clarification on 
23 February, 1963 concerning reports in the foreign press 
about 'so-called Soviet deliveries of war material in 
large quantities to India'. 
In reality, the USSR will help India 
draw up plans and then build a factory 
for manufacturing fighter planes in the 
framework of Agreements on technical 
co-operation. 
These agreements, it went on to say, also provided for 
the Soviet Union to furnish 12 MiG-21 airplanes, including 
25 
six for delivery in 1963 and the rest in 1964. 
Despite Chavan's assertion in Parliament on 15 April, 
196 3 that the manufacture of the MiGs would commence 2 6 in about 18 months to two years, the actual progress from 
^^ Quoted in Hindu, 23 April 1963. 
^^ Asian Recorder 1963, INI:5127:E. 
^^ Asian Recorder 1963, INI:5235:M. 
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the project planning to the manufacture stage required 
over five years. A preliminary project report was prepared 
with the help of a team of Soviet technicians and submitted 
27 
to the government in September 196 3. Even at this early 
stage, domestic politics had an important role to play 
with the economics of manufacture having a secondary role -
a factor which has had its impact on the economic viability 
of the project even to this date. 
A number of sites were surveyed and Nasik (Maharashtra) 
was found to be the most suitable for the airframe factory. 
As regards the engine factory, the emphasis was on a 
location having a temperate climate and the choice narrowed 
down to two: Koraput (Orissa) situated at an altitude 
of 3,000 ft and a distance of 1,500 km (900 miles) by 
road or 600 miles by air from Nasik. It was not well 
serviced either by road or by rail links and it was clear 
that engines manufactured here would take a week to reach 
Nasik by rail, a problem that would increase when overhauls 
began. The other site considered was near the industrial 
/ 2 8 belt at Pune (Poona), close to Nasik. Soviet experts' 
advice was that the presence of industry near Pune would 
shorten the time required for construction of the factory 
and mastering engine production techniques by a period of 
about 6-8 months. If, on the other hand, the intention 
was to establish an industrial centre to manufacture 
CFU (1967-68) Eighth Report, p.8. 
28 ibid., para 28 , 33 . SejL 'vx. 3>S". 
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engines with considerable expansion of production in 
2 9 
the future, only then would Koraput be a viable alternative. 
However, the government had decided on Koraput 
even before the submission of the preliminary project 
report. As early as April 1963, the Deputy Minister for 
Defence, D.R. Chavan, had made an announcement in 
Parliament to this e f f e c t . T h e manufacture of AA-3 
missiles and associated electronics seems to have been 31 
only under consideration and the announcement in August, 
196 3 of the formation of a state owned company - Aeronautics 
India Limited - also mentioned the (initial) construction 32 
of two factories, at Nasik and Koraput. It was a few 
weeks after the submission of the project report that 
the decision to set up a guided missile and electronics 
factory at Hyderabad was announced, on October 18, 1963. 
The earlier optimism about the commencement of manufacture 
still prevailed and the factories were expected to go into 
production by 1965.^^ 
By early 1964, construction of buildings at Koraput 
and Nasik had been sanctioned and the contracts entrusted 
to the Orissa and Maharashtra governments. While it was 
29 
ibid., para 32. 
^^ Asian Recorder 1963, INI:5235:M. 
^^ ibid. Statement of the Minister for Defence Production, 
K. Raghuramaiah. 
^^ Times, 19 August 1963. 
33 Asian Recorder 1962, INI:5532:F. 
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realised that under normal circumstances it would take 
3-4 years for works and shops to be commissioned, this 
project planned to commence production simultaneously with 
the construction of buildings. Aeronautics India Limited, 
meanwhile, was a company that existed only on paper, since 
the MiG project was assigned to it only on March 30, 1964. 
The reason given by the Ministry of Defence for these 
steps was one of speedier implementation of the project.^^ 
Although the project reports submitted a year earlier 
were in accordance with the agreement of August 1962, the 
preliminary nature of the agreement itself soon became 
obvious, and this had to be followed up by a second 
agreement which was signed on September 11, 1964 during 
the visit of the Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan to Moscow. 
According to Chavan, the original agreement was 'based on 
certain presumptions which in experience were found to be 
rather imcomplete'. For it had originally been considered 
that India could manufacture its own jigs and tools, which 
was later found to be beyond its capability.^^ Under the 
CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, paras 38-39 . 
^^ ibid., para 40. That the entire civil works program 
involved bureaucratic as well as centre-state politics 
was clear when, in reply to a Calling Attention notice in 
the Rajya Sabha, the Minister of State for Defence told 
the House on March 19, 1968 of representations having been 
received from the Orissa government who said they would have 
difficulty in keeping the State Engineering cadre employed 
if work on Koraput was taken over by Hindustan Aeronautics 
Limited (HAL) (as the company was now known), para 60. 
^^ Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol.XXXIV, 22 September. 
1964, Cols.3038, 3040. 
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supplementary agreements, the Soviet Union agreed not 
only to provide machinery, jigs and tools but also to 
provide Soviet technical teams to assist in preparing 
detailed working project and production schedules. 
Arrangements for the supply of major assemblies, sub-
assemblies and raw materials were finalised, and the 
Soviet Union also agreed to provide addtional 38 MiG-21s 
(besides the 12 aircraft already contracted for) , in 
order to enable the lAF to re-equip three of its fighter 
squadrons. The Soviet Union also agreed to provide loans 
amounting to $142 million (at 2% interest to be repayed 
over 10 years) covering technical assistance and machinery 
for the manufacturing units. 
Accordingly, another Soviet team came to Nasik in 
1965 to assist Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in the 
preparation of 'Working Project Details', completing its 
3 8 report by early 1966. The production program of the 
39 MiG complex was finalised by June 1966 as follows: 
A. KORAPUT: 
(i) Delivery of first engine after tesing: 
May 1968. 
(ii) Manufacture from major assemblies: 
September 1968. 
(iii) from imported components: April 1970. 
(iv) from raw materials: January 1971. 
Statement by Cahvan in Parliament, reproduced in 
Asian Recorder 1964, INI:6090:A. Also Thomas F. Brady 
in the New York Times, 22 September 1964. 
^^ CFU (1967-68) Eighth Report, para 26. 
^^ ibid., paras 63, 66. 
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B. NASIK: 
(i) erection from fully equipped 
assemblies: January 1967. 
(ii) assembly from detailed sub-
assemblies: April-May 1968. 
(iii) indigenous production from raw 
materials: July 1970. 
C. HYDERABAD: 
(i) production from fully equipped assemblies 
(i.e. testing): no date given, 
(ii) production from sub-assemblies and testing: 
no date given. 
By early 1968, the Nasik and Hyderabad divisions had 
completed Phase I of their respective production schedules 
and Hyderabad had also completed about 30% of the work 
associated with the (final) Phase II. In other words, HAL 
contribution at this stage was limited to testing of the 
avionics equipment at Hyderabad and limited assembly work 
at the Nasik factory. Although Nasik had become an earning 
40 division in 1966—67 and sales had increased by Rs 90 million 
in 1967-68, there was only a marginal effect on profits 
41 
as HAL effort in assembly was rather limited. Production 
at the Koraput factory was already behind schedule because 
of delay in finalising contracts for the supply of test 
equipment and the first engine was delivered after testing 
only in December 1968. As a result, the rest of the 
production program was already considered to be 6-7 months 42 behind schedule. 
HAL Annual Report, 1966-67, p.12. 
41 
HAL Annual Report, 1967-68, p.6. 
^^ CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, para 64. 
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The economic viability of the project itself was 
not given any consideration at the project. Estimates 
of cost of production from sub-assemblies, details, raw 
materials and profitability had not been worked out for 
any of the three MiG factories nor had they been included 
in the project report. Supplies to the lAF were to be 
on a 'cost plus profit' basis and in early 1968 it was 
disclosed that the quantum of profit had not been decided 
since HAL had 'not been able to make any reasonably 
accurate estimate of production costs and financial 
4 3 
results of the factories so far'. In any case, financial 
estimates even of the imports of plants and other machinery 
had increased substantially in rupee terms because of its 44 
devaluation in June 1966. There was a large increase 
in the amount of deferred credits because of imports and, 
as a result, an increase of nearly 200 per cent on interest 
in 1967-68 - Rs 31.7 million as compared to Rs 10.7 million 
in the previous year.^^ To further complicate the problem 
of economics of manufacture, no breakup value was available 
for imported components issued for the aircraft manufactured 46 from sub-assemblies. 
The performance of the MiG manufacturing program of 
HAL came under rather severe criticism by the Public 
Accounts Committee of the Parliament and a report released 
^^ ibid., para 68. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1965-66, p.10. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1967-68 , p.6. 
^^ ibid., p.24. 
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in 1968 included the following comments: 
The Committee does not agree that 
distance between airframe and engine 
factories does not make any difference 
to defence production ... The entire 
program and schedule of construction 
is affected by distance ... (and) ... 
has its own financial, functional and 
time consuming disadvantages ... 
... hope that unless strategic 
considerations are overwhelming. 
Government will pay due attention to 
economic considerations in the future ... 
There is, however, need for expeditious 
completion of railway link and provision 
of prompt and extensive post and telegraph 
facilities ... (at Koraput) . 
... surprised to note that an essential 
item like the cost of production was 
omitted from the Project Report with the 
result that HAL, which took over the 
project at a later stage had no idea 
about the cost of production of this 
aircraft ... recommend that ... (this) ... 
should be worked out without delay ...^8 
Although originally scheduled to go into production 
by the end of 1965, the first MiG-21FL was delivered to 
the lAF only in January 1967. This, too, was part of an 
4 9 
initial batch of 60 aircraft that were assembled from 
kits. The pricing policy as announced in 1968 amounted 
to an ad hoc profit of Rs 100,000 per aircraft regardless 
CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, paras 35-37. 
ibid., para 69. Although in a formal sense, HAL had not 
been associated in the negotiations (having been formed in 
1964), which were conducted on a government-to-government 
basis, the Ministry of Defence had appointed project teams 
from its own officers. The leaders of these project teams 
eventually became General Managers of the three factories. 
CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, para 174. 
^^ Thomas F. Brady in the I^ew York Times, 22 September 1969 
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of the cost of production.^^ The next year this was 
further elaborated on as HAL manufacture progressed to 
production from sub-assemblies. A profit margin of 
Rs 150,000 per aircraft and Rs 2,000 on each missile 
assembled besides a 15 per cent profit on HAL effort in 
the supply of 'group sets of spares' was finalised.^^ 
Government approval for creation of overhaul facilities 
was also obtained and in September 1968 the Soviets offered 
52 
a new variant of the MiG-21FL, the MiG-21M under licence. 
It would thus be seen that the progress towards 
indigenous manufacture of the MiG-21FL so far had been 
somewhat erratic. Various factors contributed to this state 
of affairs, including delays in deliveries of tooling and 
raw materials from the Soviet Union,^^ the documentation 54 
and technical literature into English. On the Indian 
side there was a shortage of suitably qualified personnel 
not only at the managerial and supervisory level (despite 
secondment of officers to HAL both from the government and 
the l A F ) b u t also of apprentices.^^Due to the inordinate 
delays in the manufacturing schedule,HAL by now was only 
at the stage of beginning to set up overhaul facilities for 
HAL Annual Report 1967-68 , p.24. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1968-69, p.49. 
^^ PAC (1981-82):Sixty Sixth Report (Seventh Lok Sabha), para 13 
53 
54 
HAL Annual Report 1968-69, p.9. 
HAL Annual Report 1965-66, p.10. 
55 ibid. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1966-67, p.9. 
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the aircraft already in lAF inventory. These were finally 
completed by 1972-7 3 at the Koraput and Hyderabad divisions 
but those at Nasik were still not yet commissioned because 
of delays in supplies from the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the first indigenously manufactured MiG-21FL 
5 8 
could be delivered to the lAF only by October 1970. 
Even at this stage, capacity utilisation at the various 
manufacturing divisions was fairly low, either due to 
inability of HAL to find qualified personnel or to Soviet 
unwillingness to provide any detailed design or type C Q 
approval data. By 1969-70, the electronics division at 
Hyderabad was already suffering from a serious shortfall 
of work, to the extent that HAL sought government approval 
to manufacture TV sets.^^ It also took up a project to 
fabricate some industrial prototypes of transistorised 
gear controllers for Vijayanta tanks. Agreements were 
signed in January 1971 with Tesla (Czechoslovakia) and 
Selenia (Italy) for the manufacture under licence of 
Precision Approach Radars and Surveillance Radars and a 
Special Projects Team set up at Bharat Electronics Ltd. 
HAL Annual Report 1972-73, p.10. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1970-71 , p.9. 
^^ SIPRI, Arms Trade with the Third Vlorld (Stockholm: Almqvist 
& Wikseli, 1971), p.749. It is also said that 'requests for 
the supply of these from the Indian side have been turned 
down'. 
HAL Annual Report 1969-70 , p.12. 
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(another company under the Ministry of Defence) for 
the indigenous development of avionics equipment was 
transferred to the Hyderabad Division.^^ 
Although in 1969-70, the engine factory at Koraput 
6 2 
'exceeded target of production', it too was faced with 
the problem of spare capacity, especially in the foundry 
and forge divisions. This problem persisted in the 
following years despite its having obtained orders for 
the supply of castings and forgings to the Heavy Vehicle 
Factory, Avadi and the Vehicles Factory, Jabalpur.^^ Hence 
it would appear that the MiG complex of the HAL did not 
make any significant contribution in value terms or in the 64 
manufacture of the MiG-21FL variant, 60 (or 63, according 
to another source)^^ of which were assembled from kits out 
of a total production run of around 190 aircraft which ended 
in 1974.^^ 
Meanwhile, an agreement for the manufacture of a 
modified version of the aircraft, the MiG-21M, had already 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1970-71, pp.11-12. 
ft 7 HAL Annual Report 1969-70, p.12. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1970-71, p.11. See also HAL Annual 
Report 1971-72, p.12. 
^^ 'FL' is the export designation for the versions built in 
quantity for the lAF by HAL including the MiG-2lPF (Fishbed-D), 
the MiG-21PF-SPS and the later MiG-21PFM (Fishbed-F). 
See Milavnews, February 1973, p.15.' 
^^ Air International, Vol.55, No.5, May 1982, p.211. 
^^ Milavnews, July 1973, p.14. 
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been signed in October 196 9 .^ "^  The MiG-2lM was a simplified 
version of the MiG-21MF which was already being manufactured 
in the Soviet Union. Apart from an internal cannon (the 
MiG-21M being equipped with two 2 3 mm cannon in an underbelly 
pack) and numerous other detailed changes,the MiG-21MF used 
titanium components in its powerplants to gain 220 lb more 
thrust and an improved low level speed performance. However, 
in the initial stages, the Indian authorities are said to 
have decided not to include the improved powerplant on 
grounds that the additional cost of retooling for titanium 
6 8 
components was not considered worthwhile. 
Under terms of the inter-governmental agreement, the 
Soviet Union agreed to transfer to India the licence and 
technical documentation for the manufacture of 'a certain 
number' (150) of aircraft on payment of a licence fee of 
Rs 50 million in five equal annual instalments (plus interest 
at 2 per cent on unpaid amounts). Terms, conditions and 
mode of payment for manufacture of aircraft beyond the 
specified numbers were to be determined separately. A 
good indicator of bureaucratic delays is the fact that the 
agreement was not assigned to HAL until nearly a year later, 6 9 in September 197 0. 
Fuhlio Accounts Committee (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report 
(Seventh Lok Sabha), para 1.2. 
^^ Milavnewsr October 1972, p.13. Also, International 
Defense Review, 2/1972, p.545. 
^^ Refer n.66. 
88 
The formal procedures notwithstanding, a contract 
for the supply of 30 aircraft in kit form had already been 
70 
concluded in July 1970 with the aircraft scheduled to be 
delivered to the lAF 1972-73 onwards.^^ In this case also, 
the economics of manufacture under licence vis-a-vis outright 
import from the Soviet Union were not examined. The 
rationale behind this omission, according to the Ministry 
of Defence, was that the MiG-21M manufacturing program was 
considered to be an extension of the manufacture of the 
MiG-21FL. The project was considered to be economically 
viable on two grounds. Firstly, it would require only 
installation of certain additional plant and machinery 
and, secondly, would provide sufficient work for the three 
divisions for another 10 years and thus help stabilise 72 
production and update technology. 
An estimate of the cost of manufacture of the MiG-21 
in India is, however, available. The initial unit cost 
of the MiG-21M - Rs 7.83 million (at 1971 prices) - was based 
on the unit cost of a fully imported aircraft while a 
revised unit cost of Rs 10.52 million was what it would cost 
to manufacture it from raw materials. This figure underwent 74 a further revision to Rs 11.5 million a few months later. 
PAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report, para 1.6. 
ibid. , para 1.5. 
72 
ibid., para 1.8. 
^^ ibid., para 1.21. 
^^ ibid., para 1.13. 
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Following approval by the Defence Committee of the 
Cabinet for the lAF to build up a force level of six 
squadrons of the MiG-21 tfP by 1976-77, two orders for 
48 and 102 aircraft were placed by Air Headquarters in 
75 
September 1971 and May 1972 respectively. Meanwhile 
there seem to have been some problems with the Soviet 
Union as the latter is reported to have demanded payments 
for licence fees in dollars instead of rupees as originally 
stipulated. These problems seem to have persisted 
for quite a long time as reports about a cutback in the 
planned procurement of the MiG-21M persisted from 1972 
to 1974 . The manufacturing program itself came under 
criticism and Western reports, quoting press sources in 
India, described it as a 'dubious success' giving the 
^ . • 78 following reasons: 
1. The MiG-21 itself was criticised on grounds of inferior 
performance, especially its radius of action. 
2. Inadequate numbers and excessive cost of indigenously 
manufactured aircraft. This was unofficially quoted 
(at 1973 prices) as being Rs 14.4 million or about 
twice the price of a direct import from the USSR. 
3. That even as late as 1972, more than 50% of the 
components of the Indian MiG-21s were imported from 
75 
76 
ibid., paras 1.3 and 1.5. 
SIPRI Yearbook 1972, p.363. 
See for example, Milavnews, August 1972, p.12; Milavnews, 
September 1974, p.14. 
78 Milavnews, November 1973, pp.14-15. 
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the Soviet Union i.e. the foreign exchange cost 
of the aircraft was the same as an aircraft bought 
off the shelf. In addition, the Soviet Union now 
required production licence fees to be paid in US 
dollars and was refusing to allow manufacturing 
rights for some of the most important and complex 
parts of the aircraft. 
4. The program was allegedly three years behind schedule. 
Other analysts, while making the same points also 
added that the MiG-21 manufacturing program would not 
provide any benefit to HAL in developing an indigenous 
design and development capability. On the contrary, 
they argued, it would enhance HAL's dependence on external 
T • 79 suppliers. 
Such criticisms would be valid given the halting 
nature of progress not only towards indigenisation and 
self sufficiency in manufacture but also the slow pace of 
delivery of the aircraft itself. This is further 
substantiated by the recommendations of the Internal 
Review Committee headed by Air Marshal O.P. Mehra, the 
8 0 
then Chairman of HAL. In order to meet targets of 
production, overhaul, repair and delivery, it was suggested 
that HAL should: 
Dennis Childs and Michael Kidron, 'India, the USSR 
and the MiG Project', Eoonomio and Politioal Weekly (Bombay), 
September 1973, pp.1721-1728. 
EAL Annual Report 1972-72, p.24. 
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1. Ensure prompt delivery of supplies from the 
Soviet Union and other suppliers. 
2. Improve communications with the government 
and arrange to speed up the process of 
implementation of decisions. 
These two steps were clearly very necessary as the 
first MiG-2lM, assembled at HAL, was delivered to the 
81 
lAF in December 19 72, over three years after the 
agreement for their manufacture under licence was signed. 
Meanwhile, HAL is reported to have changed its views 
regarding the powerplant for the MiG-2lM, deciding to 8 2 
opt for the R-11-S2S-300 or R-13 version for increased 
low level performance after assembling three of the 
RD-11-300 models in early 197 3. The switch over from 
powerplants for the MiG-2lFL is said to have been made 
in record time with assistance from more than 150 Soviet 
technicians and the Koraput plant was scheduled to 
concentrate entirely on engines for the MiG-2lM from o o 1974 onwards. Deliveries of this version, however, 
were rather slow in 1973-74 with a total of only a dozen 
84 
or so delivered by March 1974. HAL itself maintained 
that MiG production in 1973-74 was satisfactory but 8 5 admitted to 'some shortfalls in relation to the budget'. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1972-73, p.10. This followed the 
delivery of seven MiG-21MFs from the Soviet Union earlier 
that year. 
^^ Milavnews, April 1973, p.14. 
^^ Milavnews, February 1973, p.15. 
^^ Milavnews, November 1973, p.15. See also Dilip Hukerjee 
in Times of India, 29 October 1974. 
HAL Annual Report 1973-74, p.12. 
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Efforts at indigenisation were however kept up and 
in the same year a licence agreement for the manufacture 
of a range of accessories for the MiG-21M was signed.^^ 
These were to be manufactured at a new Accessories Factory 
to be set up at Lucknow, for which government approval 
8 7 
had already been received. 
In a reassessment by Air Headquarters in February 
1973, the requirement for MiG-21M was now estimated at 
about 308 aircraft instead of the original assessment 
of 150 because of problems of sustainability of force 
levels of some other types in lAF service. It was, 
therefore, decided to build a force level of 10 squadrons 
of MiG-21M by 1980-81 instead of the originally planned 
six squadrons. While these revised requirements were 
approved by the government in orders issued in November 
1974,^^ a protocol for the manufacture of an additional 89 
150 aircraft had already been signed in April 1973. 
An additional licence fee of Rs 22.5 million was to be 
paid on the same terms and rate of interest as before. 
The manufacturing program itself was proceeding 
rather slowly with a total of about 30 MiG-21Ms delivered 
by March 1975.^° Since these aircraft had been manufactured 
^^ Ministry of Defenoe Report 1973-74, p.63. 
^^ Refer n.86. 
^^ PAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report, para 1.12. 
^^ ibid., para 1.14. 
^^ ibid., para 1.16. 
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against the first two orders and by lAF's revised 
estimates, an additional 150 aircraft (over and above 
the 150 already on order) would be required from 1973-74 
91 
onwards, in April 1975. Air Headquarters proposed 
the outright purchase of about 9 0 aircraft over and above 
the total requirement assessed in February 1973. The 
main reason for such a step was the 'aging and obsolescence 
of a large number of aircraft and slippage in delivery' 92 of MiG-2lMs by HAL. 
The Ministry of Defence 'partly attributed' these 
delays to 'delay in supply of raw materials from the 
foreign supplier, unforeseen technical problems and 
9 3 
delay and shortcomings' at the HAL. These problems 
were apparently discussed during the visit, in February 
1975 of a Soviet military delegation. It was subsequently 
reported that, apart from selling Soviet equipment to 
India, agreement had been reached to expand the area of 94 
cooperation in the field of defence production. The 
results of this were soon forthcoming when, on July 1975, 
deliveries of some 18 items of equipment from the 
91 ibid., para 1.9. 
^^ Refer n.90. In early 1975 it was reported that work 
at MiG divisions (as well as the Bangalore Complex) had 
averaged less than 20 per cent of installed capacity. 
See Milavnews, February 1975, p.10. 
^^ FAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report, para 1.17. 
Milavnews, March 1975 , p.14. 
94 
Accessories Division at Lucknow, commenced about 10 
95 
months ahead of schedule. 
By the end of 1975, the Koraput division had begun 
the manufacture of complete R-13 turbojets for the MiG-21Ms 
from imported raw materials although there were reports 96 
of shortfalls in airframe production at Nasik. The 
first MiG-2lM built from raw materials was delivered to 
the lAF on 1 December 1975 and, having completed the 
production of the MiG-21FL variant, the MiG complex 97 
was concentrating entirely on the former. The airframe 
division also sought to sub-contract many airframe and 
tooling components to private industry near Nasik as 
part of an integrated plan to concentrate only on 
specialist items requiring particular expertise or 
facilities. 
q c 
Milavnews, July 1975, p.12. These included wheels, 
hydraulic components, fuel pumps, pressure regulators, 
brakes, ejection seats and navigation instruments. 
Although this division had been licence manufacturing 
spares from France and UK, emphasis shifted to MiG-21 
components because of the large number of aircraft in 
service with the lAF. 
^^ Milavnews, October 1975, p.15. Meanwhile, reports 
that the lAF might take up a Rolls Royce offer to re-
engine MiG-21s with Syey engines were discounted in 
India because it was considered that despite the advantages 
of improved performance and extended operational life, the 
investment made in the Koraput factory was too great to be 
discarded. Also, the cost and time scale of such a 
modification would be prohibitive. See International 
Defense Review 2/1976, p.308. 
Times of India, 2 December 1975 . Also Milavnews, 
December 1975, p.17. 
^^ Milavnews, January 1976, p.14. 
95 
Delays in the MiG-2lM delivery schedule as well 
as the inability of HAL to develop the Mkll version of 
the indigenously designed HF-24 Marut made it essential 
for the lAF to further review its long term requirements 
(up to 1987-88) for this type. In July 1975, it was 
decided that the total requirement of MiG-21Ms would be 
around 5 35 units. But, within two months i.e. September 
99 
1975 this had been scaled down to about 162 aircraft. 
The reason for this was that although the Soviet 
Union had offered the latest MiG variant, the MiG-21 bis 
in January 1975 for manufacture in India, the lAF had 
apparently not evaluated the aircraft to ascertain 
whether it fulfilled requirements. This was done only 
in August 1975 as a result of which requirements were 
changed and finalised a month later. A delegation 
comprising officials from the Ministry of Defence and 
HAL visited the Soviet Union in October, 1975, and, 
as a result, preliminary cost details and budget estimates 
for manufacturing the MiG-21 bis were submitted to the 
Government in November 1975. Licence agreement for its 
manufacture was eventually signed nearly a year later in 
October 1976, and orders for the number of aircraft to 
be actually manufactured were issued in December 1976 .^ *^ ^ 
^^ FAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report, para 1.23. 
ibid., paras 1.22 and 1.23. 
ibid., para 1.26. 
96 
A preliminary project report was submitted by HAL 
102 
in September 1977 and assembly of the MiG-21 bis 
was scheduled to begin at Nasik around 1979 after 
completion of the required number of MiG-21Ms. Western 
sources reported that the lAF required about 150 MiG-21 bis, 
production of which was expected to continue till 1983-84. 
Changes from the MiG-21M included installation of the 
R.25 t u r b o j e t , t h e manufacture of which reportedly 
required an additional 1,500 personnel at the engine 104 
division at Koraput which already employed 3,800 workers, 
A detailed Project Report was to have been submitted by 
December 1978,^°^ but this could be achieved only by 
April 1980.^°^ Government approval for the investment 
of capital and deferred revenue expenditure was finally 
granted in February 1981^°"^ - the entire process from 
the time the contract was signed taking over four years. 
In the interim, a complicated set of bureaucratic 
manoeuvres in 1975 resulted in financial losses as well 
ibid. 
Milavnews, October 1976 , p.13. 
Milavnews, September 1976 , p. 12. 
^^^ This was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union 
would supply the relevant documents by March 1978. In 
fact, they were received only much later, in September 
1979 . 
^^^ VAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report, para 1.26. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.27. 
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as over supply of raw material and spares for MiG-2lM 
manufacture. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union 
had offered the MiG-21 bis for licence manufacture but 
this variant was not evaluated until August 1975. 
Meanwhile, in November 1974, the Ministry of Defence had 
already sanctioned the manufacture of an additional 
12 4 aircraft and a formal order was placed on HAL in 
February 19 75, deliveries being scheduled for the period 
TOR 
1978-79 to 1981-82.^"^° By September 1975, while HAL 
had placed orders valued at Rs 167.5 million for the 
supply of raw materials and parts on the Soviet Union, 
it had been decided to reduce requirements for the MiG-2lM 
to around 162 aircraft. This was due partly to direct 
import of MiGs from the Soviet Union and partly to the 
decision to manufacture the MiG-21 bis. But this did not 
prevent HAL from placing additional orders worth Rs 18.9 
million a month later - the agreement being actually 
signed on 25 October 1975. Attempts made a few days later 
as well as in May 1976 to curtail supplies were unsuccessful 
as the Soviet Union argued that 'the equipment had already 109 
been manufactured and partly supplied'. 
The manufacturing program of the MiG-2lM has not 
only been behind schedule but output has also been fairly 
low - approximately 9-10 aircraft per year as against 
a target capacity of 30 per year.^^^ Shortfalls in MiG 
ibid., para 1.48. 
109 
ibid., para 1.52. 
^^^ Milavnews, December 1978, p.14. 
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manufacture in 1975-76 and 1977-78 were reported to 
have been attributed to 'organisational deficiencies' 
and labour problems respectively, by the Minister of 
State for Defence Production, Sher Singh.^^^ Attempts 
at further indigenisation of the MiGs has been a constantly 
112 
feature and in 1976-77 new plans were formulated. 
A year later, in 1978, it was announced that the first 
phase (already underway) would be completed in four 
years, that a 'time bound' program had been drawn up 
for indigenisation of high value items.^^^ In October 
1978, a Soviet technical mission headed by the Deputy 
Minister of Aviation Industry, I.S. Silayev, visited 
India to discuss the entire question of collaboration 
in aircraft production. 
The Soviet team was reported to have promised to 
accelerate the indigenisation of the MiG program from 
the then existing level of 75 per cent. The Soviets 
were also said to have discussed with the Indian team 
led by the Defence Production Secretary, M. Menezes, 
the possible Soviet import of MiG spares manufactured 
by HAL and agreements relating to transfer of technology 
and supply of raw materials. Although the Soviet delegation 
was reported to be 'receptive' to the idea of offset 
^^^ Milavnews, August 1978, p.10. Also HAL Annual Report 
1977-78, p.5. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1276-77, p.7. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1977-78, p.6. 
^^^ Milavnews, October 1978, p.14. 
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purchases from HAL for its own MiG manufacturing program, 
nothing substantial seems to have been achieved as 'other 
aspects' of the MiG program were to be 'further explored' 
by a Soviet technical team scheduled to make a follow up 
visit a few weeks later.^^^ 
Along with the low output of the MiG-21M, in 1978 
HAL also began the assembly of the MiG-21 bis from 
imported kits, although full scale production was not 
expected to begin till the completion of the MiG-21MF 
manufacturing program, sometime in 1980-81.^^^ The 
question of transfer of technology was again discussed 
when an Indian delegation, headed by the Defence Secretary, 
J.A. Dave, visited Moscow in September-October 1979. 
The Soviet Union was said to view Indian defence production 
requirements with 'utmost sympathy' and the visiting 
delegation again discussed proposals for increasing 
the indigenous content of the output by MiG factories. 
Soviet sources were quoted as saying that India had 'a 
117 
fair chance' of acquiring the latest in MiG technology. 
By early 1980, there were reports that the government 
was finalising arrangements to procure the MiG-2 3MF as 
a replacement for its MiG-21FLs and MiG-21Ms for air 
^^^ Milavnews, November 1978, p.17. Also Hindu (International 
Edition), 28 October 1978. 
^^^ Milavnews, December 1978, p.14. Introduction_of the 
MiG-21 bis program is also said to have resulted in 
abandonment of earlier lAF plans to develop the HF-24 Marut 
into HF-25. 
117 Milavnews, November 1979 , p.17. 
100 
defence roles and the MiG-23BN to re-equip the HF-24 
118 
and Su-7 squadrons for ground support tasks, and that 
deliveries of an initial quantity of each variant from 
the Soviet Union would be followed by large scale 
production by HAL after the MiG-21 bis was phased out 119 
of production by 1982-83. This would have been a 
very optimistic assessment of HAL's manufacturing 
capabilities since it had barely begun to manufacture 
the MiG-21 bis with its uprated R.25 engines and the 
last MiG-21MF was not scheduled for completion till late 120 1981 or early 1982. 
The transition from manufacturing the MiG-21MF to 
the Mig-21 bis turned out to be a fairly complicated 
procedure given the excess materials ordered for the 
former aircraft. Although the licence fee of Rs 22.5 
million paid for the manufacture of the additional 150 
MiG-21MFs was subsequently adjusted towards the licence 
121 
fee payable for the manufacture of the MiG-21 bis, 
the value of excess materials was assessed in July 1977 
at Rs 167.3 million. It was not possible for HAL during 
the period 1976-79 to ascertain whether any of the excess 
supplies could be used in its MiG-21 bis manufacturing 
^^^ The MiG-23BN is generally similar to the MiG-23BN in 
service with the Warsaw Pact, but has no Air Intercept 
Radar. 
^^^ Milavnews, January 1980, p.14. 
Milavnews, February 1980, p.13. 
^^^ PAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report, para 1.15. 
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program, since detailed documentation for this aircraft 
122 had not been received. This exercise was finally 
carried out in 198 0 when it was concluded that the degree 
123 
of commonality between the two variants was as follows: 
Parts: 39 per cent 
Forgings and Castings: 44 per cent 
Ready made equipment: 7 3 per cent 
There was no commonality in the material pertaining to 
the systems division (Hyderabad) for which material worth 
Rs 5.74 million had been acquired. As regards the Aircraft 
division, supplies worth Rs 162 million had been received 
by June 1980, of which material costing Rs 18.9 million 
could be utilised for the manufacture of the 12 remaining 
MiG-21MFs. While the Soviet Union had agreed to cancel 124 orders for supplies worth about Rs 5.2 million and 
efforts were being made for a further reduction of orders 
12 5 worth Rs 5.9 million, HAL, by its own reckoning, had 
been saddled with totally surplus material valued at about 
1 9 ft Rs 148.24 million. Earlier, the Soviet Union had 
^^^ Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Unii 
Government (Defence Services) ^  1978-79, para 37. 
^^^ Refer n.l21, para 1.34. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.35. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.38. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.34A. 
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assured HAL that the excess materials procured could be 
used for manufacturing the MiG-21 bis and overhaul of 
127 
the MiG-2lM/MFs. 
These assurances seem to have been only partly true. 
In evidence before the Puhlio Aooounts Committee of 
Parliament in 1981, a representative of the Ministry of 
Defence stated that an estimated Rs 118.9 million worth 
of supplies could be utilised in the manufacture of the 
MiG-21 bis, overhaul purposes and fabrication of spares 128 
leaving a net surplus of only Rs 29.3 million. However, 
on further questioning it, it was conceded that HAL was 
indeed considering the manufacture of an additional batch 
of 70 MiG-21Ms and this order, along with requirements 
for repair and overhaul, would'absorb a great deal of 12 9 the items procured'. 
Aircraft production itself had not stabilised even 
as late as 1970-80 when it was admitted that the MiG 
complex had earned a lower net profit 'because of lesser 
130 
delivery and cost overruns in respect of certain projects'. 
The order for a further 70 MiG-21Ms does not seem to 
have materialised either, as the last of the MiG-21MF 
was reported to have been completed on 11 November 19 81. 
HAL is now said to be concentrating entirely on the MiG-21 
bis, 150 of which are on order. Production is now reported 
Refer n.l22. 
^^^ PAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Report, para 1.34A. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.38. 
HAL Annual Report 1979-80, p.71. 
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to be at the rate of 2.5 to 3 aircraft per month which 
would imply that all the aircraft on order would be 
delivered by 1984.^^^ This, if true, would mean that 
HAL has been able to increase its rate of production to 
almost thrice that obtaining in the late 1970s. 
Meanwhile, uncertainty existed about the eventual 
manufacture of the MiG-23 and its R.29 engine as a follow 
on to the MiG-21 bis program. Agreement reached in 1979 
for MiG-2 3 procurement was reported to have been scaled 
down in 1980, and acquisition of 80 MiG-23MFs in kit form 
from mid-19 80s was shelved pending a comparative evaluation 
of this aircraft and the French Mirage 2000. Procurement 
of 85 MiG-23BNs, however, was advanced given the urgent 
necessity to re-equip the Su-7 and HF-24 squadrons. 
132 
Originally scheduled to be supplied from mid-1982 onwards, 
the first batch was acquired in December 1980-January 1981, 
and reports indicated that indigenous production might not 
be undertaken given the replacement schedule. The aircraft 
were supplied in crates and simply 'bolted together' on 
. , 133 arrival. 
Recent indications are that agreement has been 
reached to licence manufacture the MiG-27 Flogger-J tactical 
strike fighter rather than the MiG-23BN as originally 
^^^ Aiv International, Vol.22, No.5, May 1982, p.211. 
^^^ Milavnews, November 1980, p.17. 
^^^ Milavnews, March 1981, p.7. 
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planned. An estimated 150 aircraft of this type would 
be manufactured after completion of the MiG-21 bis 
134 program. 
Overall, during its first decade the MiG-21 
manufacturing program has not been very successful, which 
is not at all unusual considering the HF-24 and the HJT-16 
experience. But, while the latter two aircraft were 
attempts at indigenous development, the MiG-21 manufacture 
was undertaken in collaboration with the Soviet Union. 
Evidence would suggest that the Soviet Union at least 
initially was not very forthcoming in providing India 
with detailed data, technical drawings and information. 
This, combined with the cumbersome bureaucratic processes 
of the Ministry of Defence and HAL, and lack of technical 
expertise in the early years has been responsible for 
constant slippages in the manufacturing schedule. 
Electronics equipment in the Indian-manufactured 
MiGs would appear to have been predominantly Soviet supplied 
with very little indigenous content - the main reason 
why activities at the Hyderabad division were considerably 
diversified after the initial years. They would also 
seem to have been simplified versions of what actually 
equips Soviet MiGs or else not up to lAF requirements. 
This contention is borne out by the fact that lAF 
technicians, in cooperation with HAL, are reported to 
have successfully integrated Swedish Electronic Warfare (EW) 
^^^ Refer n.l31. 
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equipment with the avionics of the indigenous 
Later reports also mention equipment such as Inertial 
Navigation Systems and Nav/Attack systems from Fervanti 
and Marooni (UK) installed in lAF MiGs.^^^ Decision is 
also reported to have been taken to replace the not very 
successful AA-3 missiles with the more contemporary 
Matra Magic missile (France) of which several successful 
launchings are said to have been conducted.^^^ 
As against an estimated capacity of 30 aircraft 
per year, output during the 19 70s has varied between 9 and 
138 
15 aircraft per year. Recent reports that the current 
annual production rate of the MiG-21 bis is around 30-35 1 O Q 
aircraft would mean either increased rate of assembly 
or that the production process has finally stabilised, 
some 15 years after it began. The latter could possibly 
be the case since it has been reported that in keeping 
with the drive for local production, the MiG-21M wing 
has been modified for use on the MiG-21 bis - the reverse 
engineering reducing cost and complexity. The earlier 
cost-plus-ten per cent pricing policy which had been 
^^^ These include AR-75 3 Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) 
and Pod mounted jammers manufactured by Scatt (Sweden) 
and Reconnaissance Pods from Bofors. See International 
Countermeausves Handbook, 1977-78 (Palo Alto, California), 
p.198. 
^^^ Flight International, 6 September 1980, p.957. 
Air International, Vol.22, No.2, February 1982, p.55. 
^^^ Flight International, 18 March 1978, p.756. 
^^^ Air International, Vol.22, No.5, May 1982, p.211. 
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criticised both by the lAF and Parliament has also been 
changed. Aircraft costs are now said to be fixed annually, 
14 0 
with a small reserve for overruns. 
The cost of production of the Indian MiG-21s itself is 
only an approximation because the Soviet Union does not provide 
itemised prices for materials supplied by it and these are 
accounted for on an estimated basis. Consequently '... the 
value of inventory of USSR materials is provisional, subject 141 
to adjustment at the end of the project'. Another factor 
that contributes to lowering of HAL's manufacturing costs is 
that the interest on deferred credit and licence fees is 
reimbursed by the Government of India and is not included 
as expenses by HAL.^'^^ in spite of these indirect subsidies, 
the cost of production of the Indian MiG-21s is, according 
to a Ministry of Defence source, at least 15-20 per cent 143 
higher than the cost of a fully imported axrcraft. 
Although it has been admitted that the lower net profits 
by the MiG complex in 19 79-80, for example, were due to 
'lesser delivery and cost over-runs in respect of certain 
projects', the main reason would seem to be the lower 
Flight International, 19 January 1980, p.142. 
^^^ Notes forming part of Accounts. HAL Annual Report, 
1978-79, p.66. 
^^^ Accounting Policies. HAL Annual Report 1979-80, p.35. 
^^^ Information given by a senior Ministry of Defence^official. 
The source was, however, quick to point out that the 'finish' 
of the indigenously manufactured aircraft was far superior to 
those manufactured in the Soviet Union. [Interview with 
Dr D.N. Prasad, Joint Secretary, Department of Defence 
Production on 9 February 1981 at the Ministry of Defence, 
South Block, New Delhi.] 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1979-80, p.71. 
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productivity rate as well as volume of manufacture. 
When the project was being conceived, it was envisaged 
that the Koraput Division should be planned in a manner 
that would make it conducive to substantial expansion in 
the long term. The same would have been the case with 
the Nasik and Hyderabad Divisions. 
In practice, what has actually happened is that 
while the Hyderabad Division diversified its activities 
soon after production began, the Koraput and Nasik 
divisions have worked well below capacity. Consequently, 
although the divisions would have a potential for expansion, 
it would seem improbable. It has been reported that a 
decision was taken in 1981 to licence manufacture the 
MiG-27 Flogger-J tactical strike aircraft rather than 
145 
the MiG-23BN as previously planned. By mid-1983, a 
large part of the tooling equipment and machinery for 
the production of the MiG-27 had arrived in India and 
the first Indian assembled aircraft was expected to roll 
out by mid-1984.^^^ 
Another factor that could perhaps be held responsible 
for the low volume of production is the quick succession 
of variants of the MiG-21 that have been introduced on 
the production line even before the manufacture of the 
existing model had stabilised. For example, agreement 
^^^ Air International, Vol.22, No.5, May 1982, p.211. 
^^^ Indian Express, 1 June 1983. 
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to manufacture the MiG-21M was signed in October 1969 
when the MiG-21FL production was still confined mostly 
to assembly from kits. Later, agreement for the licence 
manufacture of the MiG-21 bis was signed in August 1976 -
about the time that HAL was making initial deliveries of 
the MiG-21M built from detailed assemblies and raw 
materials. But, it can also be argued that this would 
have only a marginal effect since both the MiG-21FL and M 
variants completed their planned production runs of about 
196 and 160 aircraft respectively. The only effect 
that the induction of new variants would have had would 
be in terms of diversion of manpower to assembly of the 
latest version. This by itself would be beneficial in 
the long run in terms of acquisition of manufacturing 
skills. 
Thus, it would seem that two major factors have 
contributed to the uneven progress of the MiG-21 
manufacturing program. The first, and probably more 
significant, one has been that of problems with the 
collaborator i.e. the Soviet Union. Although the 
government has never officially admitted any difficulties 
in securing supplies from the Soviet Union, it has, as 
already discussed, had to face numerous delays in supply 
of both raw materials and documentation. This has also 
been the case in the creation of overhaul facilities 
and execution of overhaul work. In 1972-73, it was 
admitted that overhaul work at Nasik could not be 
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undertaken because of 'non-receipt' of materials from 
147 
the Soviet Union. In November 1974, the Minister of 
State for Defence Production, Ram Niwas Mirdha, insisted 
in Parliament that 'no difficulty is being faced in 
securing supplies from USSR for overhaul tasks' but 148 
admitted to 'cases of delays in receipt of supplies'. 
A few days earlier, he had spoken of the 'steadily rising' 
output of MiGs being overhauled in India but also mentioned 
that aircraft, including some assembled in India had had 
to be sent to the Soviet Union for overhaul in order to 149 
clear backlogs. 
This situation could not have substantially changed 
in the later half of the 1970s as an increasing number 
of MiGs would have become due for major overhaul. In 
1977-78, the Koraput division was facing the familiar 
problem of shortage of spares from the Soviet Union causing 
shortfalls in overhaul work.^^° The slow pace of 
indigenisation also ensured a continuous reliance on the 
Soviet Union.^^^ It is only in recent years that there 
HAL Annual Report 1972-73, p.10. 
^^^ Lok Sabha DebatesXLVl (Twelfth Session, Fifth Series), 
28 November 1974, Column 97. 
^^^ ibid., XLV, 15 November 1974, Col.169. 
HAL Annual Report 1977-78 , p.5. 
^^^ For example, although in 1978-79 the Nasik division 
purchased raw materials and stores worth only Rs 0.65 million 
and Rs 1.25 million, from Ancillary and Small Scale 
industries respectively, this amounted to 25-6 and 49.1^ of 
total purchases from indigenous sources. Refer Report on 
Industrial dispersal: National Committee on Development of 
Backward Areas (Government of India, New Delhi, October 1980), 
Table 8.3, p.54. 
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has been any substantial progress with regard to domestic 
152 
manufacture of spares. This would appear to have come 
at a time when the MiG-21 is no longer being manufactured 
in the Soviet Union and parts for the aircraft would be 
increasingly difficult to acquire either from the Soviet 
Union or from other East European countries. 
Another significant problem encountered in the MiG 
manufacturing program has been the management of HAL. 
In evidence before the Public Accounts Committee of 
Parliament, the Ministry of Defence stated that apart 
from the delays in receipt of documentation, tooling 
and material from the Soviet Union 'there was a need 
to strenghen the production planning and management 
information system ... and improve the quality of managerial 
,153 supervision . 
Also, there have not been any visible spin off 
benefits in the form of development of design or 
manufacturing capability based on the MiG experience, 
which has been a closed one. The prospects of the program 
introducing new technology and manufacturing processes 
do not appear very bright either, as all the newer processes 
and techniques would probably be introduced in manufacture 
of the later generation and more sophisticated Jaguar 
strike aircraft. 
^^^ In accordance with a five year plan finalised in May 
1977, out of a total of 2,769 items, 2,533 items had been 
indigenised by March 1982 . HAL Annual Report 1981-82 , p.11, 
^^^ PAC (1981-82) Sixty Sixth Re-port, para 1.20. 
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CHAPTER III 
INDO-FRENCH COOOPERATION: 
MANUFACTURE OF HELICOPTERS 
A. AL-III ALOUETTE 
In 1962, the Government of India signed a licence 
agreement with Sud Aviation (airframe) and Turbomeca 
(powerplant) of France for the manufacture of the SA-316 
Alouette III helicopter in India. Two teams were sent 
to France to undertake the necessary pre-planning work.^ 
The program drawn up by the Planning Team in consultation 
with Sud Aviation envisaged a gradual build-up of 
manufacturing capacity for the Al-III with the first 
batch to be constructed from imported major assemblies, 
sub-assemblies and details. The time-frame for production 
2 was estimated as follows: 
1. Testing of initial fly-away helicopters: 2 months 
2. Assembly from major components: 5 months. 
3. Construction from sub-assemblies: 7 months. 
4. Manufacture from details: 9 months. 
5. Finally, after a 'certain stage', manufacture 
from raw materials i.e. details, sub-assemblies 
and major components would be made at HAL's 
Bangalore Division. 
^ HAL Annual Report 1962-63, p.12. 
^ Committee on Puhlia Undertakings (1967-68): Eighth 
Report (Fourth Lok Sabha), para 99. 
112 
By 1965-66, progressive manufacture from wholly 
imported components was underway and a limited number 
of Al-IIIs had been delivered to the lAF.^ Subsequent 
stages of the program, however, soon fell behind schedule. 
There were considerable delays in the fabrication of 
structure assembly jigs because considerable difficulty 
was encountered in getting the jigs made at Bangalore to 
conform to the precise specifications provided in the 
4 
drawings from Sud Aviation. Further problems arose 
from the fact that certain drawings were in French while 
others were received late. But the principal reason 
for delays was the limitations of the Tool Department 
itself, 'which was unable to cope with many demands made 
on it, especially by the HF-24 and the HJT-16 projects'.^ 
The Planning Team, after studying the time cycle 
for large scale manufacture followed by Sud Aviation, 
had recommended a longer time cycle for initial manufacture 
from raw materials at the Bangalore Division. Management 
at the Bangalore Division on the other hand reduced the 
time cycle by one-third - a move which was later conceded 
to have been 'arbitrary'.^ The offshoot of this action 
was that an outside consultant had to be brought in to 
review the program. 
^ HAL Annual Report 1965-66, p.14. 
^ CPU (1967-68): Eighth Report, para 100. 
^ ibid., para 106. 
^ ibid., para 102. 
113 
The consultant was of the view that it was not 
possibly to manufacture the Al-III from raw materials 
in the time cycle finalised by the management, and that 
a more realistic estimate would be a very much longer 
time cycle in the initial stages which could later be 
reduced. After a detailed study of the Bangalore 
Division's workshops, it was concluded that the 
manufacturing time cycle could be reduced in the initial 
stages, but only with the help of Sud Aviation engineers 
and technicians and with the outright purchase of certain 
components which the Division would not be able to 
manufacture for some time to come."^  
Even this review of the program did not help organise 
the manufacturing schedule as further complications arose 
at the time of ordering supplies. HAL had placed indents 
on the Director General, India Supply Mission (ISM), 
London. But, the ISM was unable to locate the sources 
of supply for many items of raw materials and brought out 
equipment. It was only then that the Bangalore Division 
g 
decided to place direct orders on suppliers. Because 
of the delays in procurement, even the delivery programs 
of the manufacture of certain items of machinery from 
raw materials, had to be revised. There were further 
delays as the delivery of raw materials was 'below 
ibid., para 108. 
g ibid., para 103. 
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expectations' and, as late as 1967, for certain items 
9 
even firm supply contracts had not been executed. 
Thus, by 1968 production of the Al-III was mostly 
confined to major assembly work although manufacture of 
smaller components had begun. A trial order for certain 
spare parts was received from Sud Aviation^'^ and in 
1969 it was announced that spares worth Rs 60,000 had 
been exported.^^ In 1970 a trial order for 15 Al-III 
airframes was executed and another trial order valued 
at Rs 65,000 for the supply of a small number of fuel 
pumps and diffuser assemblies for the Artouste engine 
was received.^^ 
It was also in 1970-71 that manufacture of the Al-III 
from raw materials began. This would appear to have been 
on a limited scale since indigenously manufactured blades 
were scheduled to be fitted in Al-IIIs which were to be 
delivered from 1972-73 onwards. Also, the engine factory 
was still attempting to overcome problems associated with 
the manufacture of reduction gears for the Artouste 
powerplant.^^ Some progress was however made in the 
9 
ibid., para 104. 
EAL Annual Report 1967-68, p.8. 
^^ HAL ANnual Re-port 1968-69 , p.10 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1970-71, p.9. 
^^ ibid., p.8. 
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indigenisation of raw materials as eight different types 
of Aluminium and Magnesium alloys began to be locally 
14 produced. 
By February 1975, a total of 219 Al-IIIs had been 
ordered of which 147 had reportedly been delivered, 
including three to civil users.^^ An armed version 
carrying four AS.llB Air-to-Surface wire guided missiles, 
known as Chetak, was also developed and preliminary 
firing trials had been successfully carried out by 
1976-77.^^ Some 40 AL-III Chetak were eventually built 
for use by helicopter anti-tank units. 
Although 193 Al-IIIs had been manufactured by 1977, 
workload at the Helicopter Complex at Bangalore declined 
18 
as HAL asked the Ministry of Defence for further orders. 
An unspecified number of helicopters were apparently 
ordered and their manufacture scheduled to continue at 
least till 1980-81.^^ It would appear that the requirement 
for the Al-III had been fulfilled with 260 having been 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1971-72 , p.9. 
^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1975-76, p.103. 
^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 19 76-77, p.82. 
William Green et.al. (ed) , The Indian Air Force and 
its Aircraft (London: Ducimus Books, 1982) , p.61. 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1977-78, p.6. 
^^ Milavnews, December 1978, p.13. 
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manufactured by 1982.^^ Nonetheless manufacture of the 
helicopter was still continuing albeit on a limited 
scale since the Helicopter Division was reportedly 
21 
functioning at 40 per cent capacity utilisation. 
In late 1982, it was also reported that the Soviet Union 
was to acquire eight Al-IIIs and the sale of six Al-IIIs 22 to Liberia was under negotiation. 
Aiv International, Vol.24, No.l, January 1983, p.3. 
^^ S. Sapru in Indian Express, 28 June 1982. 
^^ Refer n.20. 
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B. SA-315B LAMA/CHEETAH 
Design of the Sud Aviation (France) SA-315B Lama 
began in late 1969 initially to meet a requirement 
announced by the lAF for a high-altitude helicopter. 
Basically, the SA-315B combined features of the Alouette 
Al-II and III, having the airframe (with some reinforcement) 
of the former and dynamic components, including the Artouste 
powerplant and rotor system of the latter. A prototype 
was flown for the first time on 17 March 1969 and French 
23 certification was granted on 30 September 1970. 
It was also in September 197 0 that the Government 
^ 24 
of India transferred to HAL two agreements with Aerospatiale: 
1. The manufacture of the SA-315B Lama (renamed 
Cheetah) under licence. 
2. Cooperation in the design and development 
of an Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) as a 
successor to the Cheetah and the Chetak. 
Although the Cheetah was to be initially assembled at 
the Helicopter Division of HAL's Bangalore complex, its 
manufacture was later scheduled to be taken up at a new 
Helicopter Factory which was to be established with a 25 capital expenditure of Rs 34.4 million. 
^^ Jane's All the World's Airaraft 1971-72, p.42. 
During demonstration flights in the Himalayas in 1969, 
the SA-315 carrying a crew of two and 308 lb (140 kg) 
fuel made the highest landings and takeoffs ever recorded, 
at a height of 24 ,600 ft (7 ,500 m) . 
^^ HAL Annual Reyort 1970-71, p.12. 
25 ibid. 
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The overall program reportedly called for the 
completion of 140 helicopters of which the first 40 
were to be completed from components and sub-assemblies 
imported from France. The remaining 100 were to be 
built from raw materials and the delivery of these was 
O C^ 
scheduled to begin in 1976. The first Indian-assembled 
Cheetah flew for the first time on 6 October 1973 and 
27 
by early 1974, six had been delivered to the lAF. 
Although a 'serious setback' in the Bangalore Complex 
Engine Division affected the performance of the Helicopter 2 8 
Division in 1973-74, it would appear that in subsequent 
years, production stabilised and deliveries continued 
as scheduled. 
In 1975, it was reportedly decided that all fixed 
wing liaison aircraft operated by the Indian Army were 
to be replaced by helicopters. As a consequence, its 
inventory of 63 HAOP-27 Krishak high wing light planes 
now began to be supplemented by the locally built SA-315B 
Cheetah.^^ Production of the helicopter from raw 
materials began in 1976-77 and by late 1977 about 16 were 
scheduled for completion, making a total of over 50 
helicopters that had been assembled/manufactured till 
^ 30 that time. 
^^ Jane's All the ]^orld's Aircraft 1973-74 , p.103. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1974-75 , p.105. 
^^ HAL Annual Reyort 1973-74, p.12. 
^^ Milavnews, January 1975, p.15. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1977-78, p.83. 
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By early 1981, a total of 133 helicopters had 
reportedly been delivered^^ and production of the Cheetah 
was continuing well into 1982. But, this would appear 
to have been on a limited scale since the helicopter 
divis ion was said to have been working at 40 per cent of 
32 its installed capacity. 
^^ Jane's All the VJorld's Aircraft 1981-82 , p.89. 
^^ S. Sapru in Indian Express, 28 June 1982. 
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C. THE ADVANCED LIGHT HELICOPTER (ALH) 
In September 1970, the Government of India concluded 
a 10-year collaboration agreement with Aerospatiale 
(France) for the design, development and production of 
a helicopter to meet the requirements of the Indian armed 
forces in the 1980s. Assigned to HAL the same month, 
the agreement provided for the training of Indian personnel 
for which a payment of US $750,000 (Rs 5.459 million) was 
to be made in 10 annual instalments and a further US $20,000 
per year for any extension beyond 10 years, if any.^^ 
Under the terms of the agreement, Aerospatiale was to 
provide the following services to HAL: 
1. Assistance in creation and development of 
a design base for the ALH. 
2. Assistance in the field of personnel training 
in France as well as by sending Aerospatiale 
engineers and pilots to India. Training was 
to be imparted up to a maximum of 26 man months 
and 6 0 man hours of developmental flying and 
included design, testing and maintenance fields 
as well as incorporation of 'specific techniques' 
in the selected design. 
Unless mentioned otherwise, details about the attempt 
to design and develop the ALH have been derived from 
Report of the Com-ptrollev and Auditor General: 1974-75. 
Union Government (Defence Services), para 8; and Report 
of the Comptroller and Auditor General: 1979-80. Union 
Government (Defence Services) , para 6. 
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3. Provide not only facilities to Indian technical 
personnel but also access to all design, flight 
development and technical data required for 
the program. 
Based on a feasibility study conducted jointly 
by Aerospatiale and HAL, Air Headquarters issued an 
Air Staff Requirement (ASR) in May 1971. A year later, 
in April 1972, HAL sought Government approval to a 
detailed project report and cost estimates for setting up 
34 
of the required development facilities. No action was 
taken on the project report for the next two years and in 
July 1974, the ASR of 1971 was modified on the basis 
of the report of an Inter-Services Team which was submitted 
in March 1974. While the project still awaited Governmental 
approval, the capital cost of establishing design 
facilities, estimated in 1972 at Rs 88 million (foreign 
exchange: Rs 41 million), was revised in 1974 to Rs 113 
million (foreign exchange: Rs 65 million) and again to 
Rs 136.9 million (foreign exchange: Rs 78.5 million) in 
August 1975. 
Also, by the end of 1974, while 116 man months of 
training had been availed of, other services envisaged 
in the agreement remained 'largely' unutilised in absence 
of a final decision on the project. Meanwhile, as agreed 
^^ HAL Annual Report 1971-72 , p.9. 
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Rs4.418 million in foreign exchange had been paid to 
/ 
Aerospatiale in addition to Rs 2.621 million (foreign 
exchange Rs 0.46 million) spent by HAL on training 
its personnel. 
Lack of any decision on the project came under 
severe criticism in a Report of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General in 1974-75. It was only after this 
that the Ministry of Defence conceded (January 1976) 
that the delay in sanction was due to budgetary 
constraints. When the project was finally sanctioned 
by the Government in February 1976, the cost had 
increased from Rs 230.4 million (1972) to Rs 273.6 
million for development and from Rs 88 million to 
Rs 136.9 million for establishing the design facilities. 
Also, due to the delay in sanctioning the project, the 
first prototype was not expected to fly until 1981-82 
instead of 1978-79, and production was to commence 
in 1984-85 i.e. four years beyond the period of the 
collaboration agreement, which expired in September 1980 35 
According to Western sources the ALH was to be 
powered by a single Turbomeca Astazou XX engine and 
would apparently resemble the Alouette with a semi-
monocoque fuselage housing a crew of two and up to 
five passengers but with a 4-bladed semi-rigid main 
rotor. Two versions were to be developed - one for 
^^ Milavnews , January 1977, p.13. 
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the Army and the lAF with landing skids and a naval 
variant with a non-retractable tricycle undercarriage 
and provision for folding blades and Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) equipment. 
However, in April 1977 before any significant 
progress could be made on the project. Air Headquarters 
proposed to replace the single-engine design by a twin-
engine configuration. The proposal, reiterated in 
August 1977, was said to be based on the experience 
gained by the lAF during the 1971 operations in 
Bangladesh, and that of various countries involved 
in the Middle East War of 1973. This was clearly a 
case of late realisation and inefficiency in decision-
making since the original ASR had been 'modified' in 
March 1974 without any reference to a change from a 
single-engine to a twin-engined design. 
In any case, a revised ASR (draft) was issued 
by Air Headquarters in February 1978. In April 1978, 
HAL stated that the revised specifications would cause 
a delay of about 15-18 months in the development schedule 
and that prototype flight testing and manufacture would 
be possible by 1984 and 1987 respectively. Further, 
it would require continued assistance from Aerospatiale 
whose helicopters were equipped with engines manufactured 
by Turbomeca. 
Further complications arose when a Technical Group 
constituted in May 19 7 8 recommended two alternative 
engines manufactured by Rolls Royce (UK) and Pratt and 
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Whitney (Canada). The Technical Group also assessed 
that the design change would result in a redundancy 
of stores worth Rs 5.4 million, further increase the 
cost of development by Rs 6 0 million and entail a 
delay of 15-18 months in the final induction of the 
helicopter. A proposal to change the scope of the 
project at a revised cost of Rs 359.7 million-Rs 375 
million (an increase of Rs 86.1 million-Rs 101.4 million) 
was submitted to the Government in October 1978. The 
question whether HAL should extend its agreement with 
Aerospatiale or negotiate with 'other firms' was left 
open. This rather ambiguous proposal was approved 
by the Government in January 197 9. 
This decision clearly reopened the entire question 
of collaboration in the design and development of the 
airframe as well as the choice of a powerplant. 
Nearly two years later, by November 1980, neither had 
the collaboration agreement with Aerospatiale been 
extended nor had a suitable engine been selected. The 
only activity that had taken place was that HAL was 
'holding discussions with some firms in this regard'. 
In the meanwhile, HAL had incurred a capital expenditure 
of Rs 38.4 million on buildings, machinery and equipment 
and a development expenditure of Rs 44.9 million up to 
June 1980. Thus, nearly a decade after the collaboration 
agreement for the design and development of the ALH 
was signed, the project had made virtually no progress. 
On the other hand, cost estimates had escalated very 
sharply as is shown below: 
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Design 
Facilities 
Development 
Unit Cost of 
Manufacture 
1972 
Total (FE) 
88.0 (41.0) 
3.5 
1976 
(Million Rupees) 
Total (FE) 
136.9 (78.5) 
230.4 (61.0) 273.6 (87.3) 
4.5 
1979 
Total (FE) 
375.0 (126.1 
to to 
395.7 140.0) 
7.0 (3.5 
to to 
8.0 4.2) 
Also, the change to twin engine configuration rendered 
an expenditure of Rs 5.4 million. Of this, a sum of 
Rs 3.693 million and Rs 0.533 million had been spent on 
helicopter and engine installation design - work which 
would be of dubious value since the entire design concept 
had been revised. Also, the only concrete result of 
all these years of work was the construction of test 
specimens, a wooden mockup and two wind tunnel models 
at a total cost of Rs 1.204 million.^^ 
The project once again was severely criticised 
by the Comptvoller and Auditor General in 1979-80 in 
reply to which the Ministry of Defence gave the following 
reasons (November 1980) justifying the progress (or lack 
^^ Puhlia Aooounts Committee (1981-82) Seventy Sixth Report 
(Seventh Lok Sabha) , para 1.40. 
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of it) in the design and development of the ALH: 
1. When the collaboration agreement was 
signed in 1970, the concept of the 
role of the helicopter was still 
evolving and changes in the ASR had 
to be made to provide for the desired 
capability in the changing operational 
environment. 
2. Considerable expertise in the field 
of helicopter design and development 
had been acquired and this would be 
utilised in future development work. 
3. The final decision regarding selection 
of a powerplant and collaboration with 
foreign manufacturer 'would be taken 
shortly and a modern technology 
helicopter would be sucfessfully designed 
and developed in about 7 years' time'. 
By now a number of major western companies were 
competing to collaborate in the ALH project. For 
the powerplant in the twin engine configuration there 
were Rolls Royce (UK), Pratt and Whitney (Canada) and 
Turbomeca (France) while Aerospatiale and Messerchmitt-
Boelkow-Blohm (FRG) were contenders for collaboration 
in airframe design. A six-member delegation led by 
A.B. Malik, Secretary of the Department of Defence 
/ 
Production visited the establishments of Aerospatiale 
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and MBB in May 1981 and reportedly recommended 
design collaboration with either of the two companies! 
No decision regarding the choice of the powerplant 
was made but both Aerospatiale and MBB were required 
to suggest three different designs incorporating Rolls 
Royce, Pratt and Whitney and Turbomeca engines 
37 
respectively. Both companies reportedly submitted 
in June/July 1981 their proposals which were then 
said to have been under consideration by a 'high-level 
team'.^^ 
The entire issue of collaboration was still 
unresolved even by 1983 and there was no official 
indication as to when a decision would finally be made. 
Summarising, although the program for the 
manufacture of the Al-III was finalised in collaboration 
with (the then) Sud Aviation of France, not much 
attention was paid to the limitations of HAL to 
manufacture the helicopter. These included lack of 
trained personnel as well as shortcomings in the tool 
fabrication department. To add to the problems, the 
management of HAL made arbitrary changes in the 
manufacturing schedule, which had already been finalised 
on a very optimistic basis. 
^^ Prabhu Chawla in India Today, 16-30 June 1981. 
3 8 Jagan Chawla in Indian Express, 14 May 1982. 
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This is because the original plan provided for 
HAL to start manufacture of the Al-III from raw 
materials within two years from the time assembly 
of the helicopters began. This time frame was reduced 
even further by HAL and the resulting situation was 
rectified only when an outside consultant advised that 
the time required to manufacture the helicopter from 
raw materials would be even longer than that visualised 
in the original project report. Even the revised 
schedule could not be adhered to because of organisational 
limitations and bureaucratic inefficiency within HAL and 
the Ministry of Defence. As late as 1967, five years 
after the licence agreement had been signed not only 
had contracts not been awarded for the supply of 
certain materials required for manufacture of the Al-III 
but, in some cases it had not been possible even to 
identify the suppliers for some items. 
Thus, it was only in the early 1970s, nearly a 
decade after assembly began, that the manufacture of 
the Al-III from raw materials got underway. It would 
appear that production had finally stabilised by the 
mid-1970s and has continued since then without any 
serious problems. 
Manufacture of the SA-315B, on the other hand, 
did not encounter any significant problems for two 
reasons: 
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1. It was essentially a derivative of the 
Al-II representing technology developed 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Also, 
by the time manufacture of this helicopter 
was taken up, HAL had already acquired a 
certain amount of experience in manufacturing 
the Al-III. 
2. It was powered by the Artouste, the same 
engine used in the Al-III. Consequently, 
HAL did not have to encounter the difficulties 
usually associated with the absorption of 
new technology. 
As a result, the various stages in the manufacture of 
the Cheetah proceeded according to schedule. 
According to original plans, the manufacture 
of both the Al-III Chetak and the SA-315B Cheetah was 
scheduled to continue till 1980-81 after which it was 
intended to manufacture the ALH to fulfil lAF and Army 
requirements for the 1980s and beyond. But, since the 
ALH project did not make any significant progress, 
manufacture of the two helicopters was still continuing 
in 1982 - albeit on a very limited scale apparently 
due to lack of orders. 
The agreement for collaboration in the design of 
the ALH was fairly comprehensive. It not only provided 
for access to design and other technical data but also 
included provisions for the training of HAL personnel 
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in helicopter design - an indication of the fact that 
although HAL had been manufacturing the Al-III, its 
capacity for designing helicopters was non-existent. 
Another interesting aspect of the attempt to design 
and develop the ALH is that although the agreement 
was signed in September 1970, an ASR was not issued 
by Air Headquarters until nearly nine months later, 
in May 1972. Thus, it would appear that the broad 
parameters for the ALH were not based on any ASR as 
is the usual practice. On the other hand, the ASR 
was formulated after Aerospatiale and HAL had given 
an indication about the type of single engined 
helicopter that was to be designed. 
The project came to a virtual standstill soon 
after. Although the project report and cost estimates 
were submitted to the Government for approval in April 
1972, no action was taken for the next four years. 
In the meanwhile the ASR was 'modified' in March 1974 
as a result of the report of an Inter-Services Team. 
Officially, the delay was attributed to financial 
constraints. But, this would not appear to be the 
only reason considering the fact that the total amount 
involved in 1972 was Rs 318.4 million, which had gone 
up to Rs 410.5 million by 1976. Also, the time lapse 
between the signing of the agreement, when presumably 
there were funds, and that of the submission of the 
project report was considerably less than two years. 
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It would thus be difficult to conceive of a situation 
in which the financial picture would change so 
considerably in so short a time span. In any case, 
the annual payments to Aerospatiale continued to be 
made as per the terms of the collaboration agreement. 
After it was finally sanctioned in February 1976, 
it took the project just over a year to become 
irrelevant for all practical purposes. This was 
because in April 1977, Air Headquarters decided that 
its requirements were for a twin engined helicopter 
instead of a single engined one as had been proposed 
earlier. A draft of a revised ASR incorporating a 
twin engined configuration was formally issued in 
February 1978 and subsequent years witnessed an 
increased interest by Western manufacturers not only 
in the context of design collaboration but also as 
potential suppliers of engines. 
Since then, over four years elapsed and the 
Ministry of Defence, instead of having decided on a 
suitable collaborator appeared to have been overcome 
by inactivity. No decision had been taken by late 
1983 although in the interim many Technical Groups 
and Expert Committees had been appointed to decide 
on the matter. Consequently, even if a decision on 
the choice of a collaborator was made in the near 
future, it would be only by the late 1980s that the 
first prototype could be expected to be flight tested. 
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It would thus be at least the early 1990s before 
the ALH would finally go into production - a decade 
later than the original schedule. In the meanwhile, 
it is difficult to visualise the future of HAL's 
Helicopter Complex except for an extended period of 
inactivity. This is not only because no domestic 
orders have been forthcoming but also since export 
markets for helicopters based on technology which is 
over 2 0 years old would appear to be virtually non-
existent . 
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CHAPTER IV 
INDIGENOUS VENTURES 
A. HF-24 MARUT 
Design and development of the HF-24 by the (then) 
Hindustan Aircraft Ltd, was approved by the Government 
of India in 1956.^ Design effort was taken up under 
2 
the direction of Dr Kurt Tank and a team of eighteen 
German engineers, three Indian senior design engineers 
and about twenty-two other Indian engineers with 
design experience.^ The time for development was 
initially estimated at four years and, according to 
the project report, the first prototype would be ready 
for flight trials by January 1960 and the second by 
July 1960.Developmental costs were estimated at 
Rs 10.9 million.^ 
Re-port of the Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India 1974-75. Union Government (Defenae Services), 
para 10. 
^ Former Technical Director of the Focke-Wulf 
organisation who designed the F.W. 190 fighter and 
the Kondor maritime bomber. 
^ The Indian compliment eventually increased to more 
than 100 engineers. Committee on Public Undertakings 
(1967-68): Eighth Report (Fourth Lok Sabha), para 78 
^ Public Accounts Committee (1977-78): Second Report 
(Sixth Lok Sabha), para 2.34. 
^ Refer n.l. 
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Initial plans called for the use of two Orpheus 
70 3 turbojet engines for the interim transonic Mkl 
version and a single Orpheus 12 turbojet for the 
definitive supersonic Mkll variant. The latter was 
being developed by Bristol Siddeley (UK) for the 
NATO competition, and its completion was subject to 
its acceptance by NATO countries.^ 
While the prototypes were under construction, 
slow speed handling characteristics of the design were 
studied by testing models at the wind tunnel of the 
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. An unpowered 
full scale wooden flying model of the HF-24 was flight 
tested for the first time on 21 March 1959."^ The 
first prototype made its first successful test flight 
g 
on 17 June 19 61, more than a year after it was 
originally scheduled. By 196 2, work on a second prototype 9 
for destruction tests had been completed and a third 
model (the second flying prototype) flew successfully 
for the first time on 4 October 1962.^^ 
^ SIPRI. Arms Trade with the Third l^orld (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), p.745. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1963-64 , p.75. 
^ HAL Annual Beport 1960-61, p.3. 
^ HAL Annual Report 1961-62, p.4. 
'^^HAL Annual Report 1962-63, p.7. 
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Plans for acquiring the Orpheus 12 powerplant 
menawhile, were facing difficulties. NATO interest 
in the development of the engine ended and Bristol 
Siddeley was now faced with the prospect of either 
financing development of the engine exclusively for 
the lAF or abandoning the project altogether. The 
company was initially reported to have asked for 
^ 1,500 ,000 to develop the engine for Indian 
requirements - an amount that was later said to have 
been substantially reduced - to £300,000.^^ Not only 
was this offer turned down but India reportedly showed 
no interest in an offer by a French firm, Snecma, of 
12 
the Atar 9 turbojet (used by the Mirage III and V) 
and decided to seek a powerplant of Soviet manufacture. 
A team of engineers was sent to the Soviet Union 
in the last week of July 1961, to evaluate the suitability 
of the centrifugal-flow Klimov VK-7 and the RD9-F axial 
flow turbojets which the Soviets had offered.^^ It 
was reported from Moscow on 8 August 1961 that the 
RD9-F engine was technically sound, but that the HF-24 
airframe, and to an extent the engine, would have to be 
^^ Times, 1 June 1962. 
^^ L o m e J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defence 
Policies, 1947-65 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1967), p.134. 
^^ CPU (1967-68), Eighth Report, para 242. 
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modified to permit installation. Accordingly, a 
contract for the purchase of six engines was signed 
on 18 August 1961.^"^ 
A Soviet technical team arrived in Bangalore on 
29 November 1961 to study the modifications required 
on the engine and airframe. Certain suggestions were 
made and HAL sought Soviet assistance to carry out the 
necessary modifications at the Bangalore factory itself^^ 
so that the engine could subsequently be taken up for 
manufacture. The Soviets informed HAL that licence 
agreement for manufacture of these engines would have to 
be concluded on the understanding that provision was 
made for the assistance of Soviet experts to carry out 
the necessary modifications. Nonetheless, the Soviet 
team made it clear that they saw no possibility of 
're-fixing' the engine in the manner suggested by Indian 
experts since, according to them it would amount to 
producing a new engine.^^ 
However, during the visit of another Indian team 
to the Soviet Union, the latter agreed to undertake 
the modification work by Soviet design engineers in the 
Soviet Union and not in India as had earlier been 
envisaged, but it was made clear that the Soviets could 
14 .. ibid. 
^^ ibid., para 243. 
^^ ibid., para 244. 
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not write into the agreement, any guarantee of performance 
beyond Mach and, that the production of the 
RD9-F was expected to cease by 1962. Since the Soviet 
Union had no requirement for the modified version, they 
wanted to know HAL requirements so that suitable 
arrangements could be made for their continued manufacture. 
As a result, even though the first six engines were yet 
to be modified and tried in the HF-24, another agreement 
was signed in July 19 62 for the supply of additional 
18 
engines and components. 
The interest in a Soviet powerplant for the HF-24 
also led to Indian interest in the MiG-21 aircraft, 
for which the Soviets offer£c[^ to help set up manufacturing 
facilities. Agreement to manufacture the MiG-21 in 
India was signed within a few weeks of the purchase of 19 
the additional engines. This, along with the fact 
that the RD9-F was no longer being manufactured apparently 
led to a decline in interest towards any development 
effort on it. Not much effort seems to have been put 
in towards the engine modification program because a 
year later, in September 196 3, the Soviet Union was 
again requested to develop the RD9-F to Mach 2 capability. 
The Soviets replied that this was not possible and the 
maximum speed that could be achieved was Mach 1.4-1.6 
ibid. 
^^ ibid., para 245. 
19 This aspect is discussed in the Chapter on MiGs. 
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20 and possibly Mach 1.7. It was only after the Soviet 
Union itself had expressed its inability to develop 
the powerplant to the standard demanded by HAL, that 
the latter accepted the fact that given the existing 
resources and technical knowhow, it would not be possible 
to develop the RD9-F in India either. Meanwhile, 
Rs 23.9 million had already been spent on this futile 
21 exercise, and the agreement with the Soviet Union 
22 
was foreclosed in February 1964. 
Search for an alternative engine, however, continued 
as India sought assistance from Britain and the United 23 
States. Representatives from Rolls Royce and experts 
from the USAF Research and Development Centre at Dayton, 
Ohio visited India in July 1964, to suggest ways to 
improve the performance and rate of production of the 
HF-24.^^ It was apparently concluded that the project 
would require substantial western expertise, tooling 
and finance to bring it to the planned performance 
2 S standards. Officially, it was stated that 'certain 
20 CPU (1967-68) Eighth Report, para 246. 
^^ ibid. 
^^ PAC (1977-78) Seoond Report, para 2.54. 
^^ L o m e J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security, refer n.l2, 
p.205 . 
^^ India, Ministry of Defence, Report 1964-65, p.40. 
^^ Times of India, 17 August 1964. 
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suggestions' made by the American team were being 
'taken into account' in overcoming developmental 
UT 26 
problems. 
By early 1963, while experiments with the Soviet 
engines were still being contemplated, it came to be 
known that Egypt too, was engaged in the development 
of a supersonic engine. Development of this engine, 
the E-300 turbojet, was proposed in three stages 
with the first scheduled for completion in 1965. 
Technical teams of the two countries exchanged visits, 
and based on the information provided by Egypt, it was 
decided to explore the possibility of incorporating the 
E-300 in the HF-24 airframe. Without waiting for the 
results of the first stage of development of the E-300, 
which would have been available within a few months, 
HAL sought and obtained approval of the Emergency 
Cormnittee of the Cabinet and a collaboration agreement 
was signed with Egypt in September 1964 .^ "^  
The hasty decision was later justified on grounds 
that not only there was 'no payment involved', but also 
that 'it was considered advantageous from a political 2 8 
angle to get into a relationship' with Egypt. An 
HF-24 IBX airframe was handed over to Egypt along with 
^^ Refer n.24. 
PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.55. 
2 8 ibid., para 2.59. 
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services and two Orpheus turbojets, the latter valued 
29 
at Rs 2.2 million. In all, the total expenditure 
amounted to about Rs 9.43 million. It was only when 
progress of the joint project was reviewed in 1968, 
that it was realised by HAL that the E-300 was designed 
for optimum performance at high altitudes, i.e. in an 
interceptor role, and was not the ideal powerplant for 
the HF-24 which was meant to be a ground attack aircraft. 
Moreover, it would have taken several years for 
development of the HF-24 fitted with the E-300, which 
itself was in the process of being developed, and, by 
the time such an aircraft came into squadron services, 
the design would be outdated. The collaboration agreement 
was formerly foreclosed in 1968,^^ after four years of 
futile effort. Thus ended HAL's search, at least for 
the 1960s, to find a suitable powerplant for the HF-24 
Mkll supersonic aircraft, it having in the process 
acquired manufacturing rights for the supersonic MiG-21 
instead. 
The manufacturing program for the HF-2 4 Mkl Marut 
did not proceed according to schedule either. HAL's 
Bangalore division had had very little experience in 
production planning methods, development and tooling for 
2 9 
ibid., para 2.57. 
^^ ibid., para 2.62. 
^^ ibid., para 2.62. 
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indigenously designed aircraft before 1960. Prior 
to this it had mostly undertaken licence manufacturing 
programs for which data for production planning, process 
sheets and tool drawings used to be provided by the 
licensor. With the HF-24 project, HAL committed itself 
to manufacturing the required number of aircraft in the 
late 1950s without sufficient information or experience 
to enable reliable production plans to be prepared. 
When the first order for 18 pre-production HF-24 Mkl 
Marut aircraft was accepted by HAL, even prototype 
tooling had not been completed, and final assembly of 
the first prototype had just begun, in 1960, when the 
32 
second order was placed. 
A production engineering department for the HF-24 
was finally established in November 1960. Requirements 
for planning staff were met mainly by recruiting diploma 
holders in engineering who had no previous experience.^^ 
The other source usually utilised for obtaining methods 
engineers, i.e. the shops, did not exist since there 
were hardly any academically qualified personnel in the 
shops. Hence, changes required for production could not 
be indicated when drawings were being prepared. It was 
quite some time after the flight of the first prototype 
before the methods engineering personnel could make 
^^ CPU (1967-68): Eight Report, para 82. 
^^ ibid. 
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worthwhile recommendations for drawing changes to 
facilitate production. A similar situation existed 
in the tool design department. The result was that 
tools fabricated according to the drawings frequently 
encountered snags at the proving stage and were not 
available for production until they had been modified.^^ 
Average man hours for the manufacture of the 18 
pre-production aircraft were assumed to be 110,000 
whereas 900,000 man hours were required for construction 
of the two flying prototypes alone. Three million man 
hours had been seen as the requirement for the full-
range of production tooling, whereas 1.1 million man 
hours had been expended for limited prototype tooling 
alone. Excluding the latter, seven million man hours 
had been devoted to production tooling by 1967.^^ As 
a consequence, there were frequent delays in delivery 
schedules and revision of production targets and 
developmental costs. 
The time for development was initially estimated 
at four years, and the cost at Rs 10.9 million. The 
cost of development was revised to Rs 14.4 million in 
1959, Rs 45 million in 1961, Rs 55.6 million in 1965, 
Rs 70 million in 1967 and an additional expenditure 
of Rs 7 million was authorised in March 1973. By March 
34 .. ibid. 
35 .. ibid. 
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1975, Rs 81.2 million had actually been spent.^^ As 
against an estimated time for development of four years 
in 1956, the first prototype was flown in 1961. The 
first of 18 pre-production Maruts (HF-24 Mkl) flew in 
37 March 1963 and a token delivery of two aircraft was 
3 R 
made to the lAF on 10 May 1964. By 1967, 12 more 
pre-production aircraft had been handed over to the 
lAF, with the remaining four being used for test and 
development purposes. The latter included one aircraft, 39 
designated HF-24 MkIA for trials in 1966 with an 
afterburner fitted to its Orpheus 703, the first phase 
of design and development of which had been completed 
by 1965 ."^ ^ First flight of the series production Marut, 41 
ordered in 1960 for delivery by 1964, could take 
place only on 15 November 1967^^^ and the aircraft was 
finally inducted into squadron service with the lAF in 
1968 . 
^^ PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.28. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1973-74 , p. 745 . 
Report 1964-65, p.56. 
^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1975-76, p.101. 
Report 1964-65, p.67. 
^^ PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.29. 
Refer n. 37 . 
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Development of the reheat variant of the Orpheus 
703 was a direct consequence of the non-availability 
of a more powerful engine for the proposed HF-24 Mkll. 
Trials in 1960-61 with the first prototype had made it 
clear that the Orpheus 703 powered HF-24 Mkl fell 
considerably short of operational requirements then in 
force. Interest had then been generated by the Soviet 
RD9-F engines. At the same time, in July 1962, the 
Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the Defence 
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) finalised 
a feasibility study of the reheat variant of the Orpheus 
703 and the development project was sanctioned in January 
43 
1963. Cost of the project was initially estimated 
at Rs 1.4 million for building one 'demonstrator 
engineering system', and the variant was conceived as 
a temporary engine and thereby improving the performance 
of the HF-24 Mkl. Installation of the Orpheus 703 
reheat engine as an interim solution was approved by 44 
the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet in April 1964. 
In February 1965, a Technical Study Group, headed 
by Air Commodore Moolgavakar reported that although the 
reheat engine would meet the then existing operational 
requirements, it would have 'some deficiency in the 
radius of action'. The Study Group nonetheless, accepted 
^^ PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.63. 
44 ibid. 
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45 the reheat variant as 'the only expeditious solution', 
and in July 1965, a decision was tkaen that the HF-24 
46 MkIR 'be proceeded with on a priority basis'. However, 
in March 1966, it was realised that the performance of 
47 
the HF-24 MkIA, (the initial developmental version), 
was inferior even to the HF—24 Mkl in dry climb and 
cruise due to problems of base drag although the reheat 
system, as designed by GTRE was stated to have 'met 
the full specifications in respect of thrust, specific 48 
fuel consumption, etc.' 
Formal 150 hours of developmental testing on the 
Orpheus 703 with its 170C°K reheat system was completed 
by May 1967, four years after development began. The 
main reason for subsequent delays was that flight trials 
with only one prototype aircraft covering the entire 
range of developmental work on both airframe and engine 
was a time consuming process. In order to accelerate 
developmental work, a second prototype was built in late 
1969. It crashed in January 1970 after only nine flights, 
resulting in the death of HAL's Chief Test Pilot. 
Developmental work on the original prototype, however, 
continued 'although at a somewhat reduced tempo'. 
Flight testing of the reheat engine were completed by 
45 ibid. 
^^ ibid., para 2.63. 
HF-24 MkIA after development was referred to as MklR. 
^^ Refer n.46. 
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October 1970, and in June 1971, Air Headquarters 
accepted the HF-2 4 MkIR with the Orpheus 703 reheat 
o 49 
(1700 K) engine. 
Although initial flight testing of the Orpheus 703 
reheat engine had been completed, by 1970-71,^^ type 
approval testing was completed 'provisionally' in 
December 1971,^^ when two more engines of this standard 
52 
were delivered to HAL for further flight trials. It 
is clear that, at this stage, the lAF had accepted the 
aircraft even before the reheat engine had been accorded 
provisional type certification although the 'Requirement 
Standard I of 1973' was not issued until January 1972. 
The Orpheus reheat engine is said to have met this 
standard.^^ Cost of development of the reheat variant, 
initially estimated at Rs 1.4 million in 1963 was revised 
many times, the final revised cost being Rs 7.85 million 
in 1974. Total outlay on the project amounted to 
Rs 20.2 million^"^ but this amount included the development 
of 11 reheat systems instead of one as origianlly planned, 
as well as the cost of engines (on loan from HAL and to 
be returned) and the establishment costs of GTRE.^^ 
^^ PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.68. 
Report 1970-71, p.72. 
^^ Refer n.49, para 2.70. 
^^ Report 1971-72, p.106. 
^^ PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.63. 
^^ ibid., para 2.70. 
^^ ibid., para 2.71. 
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Thus, the allocation of the project to the GTRE 
instead of HAL had more to do with bureaucratic 
politics of the DRDO and the Ministry of Defence rather 
than the facilities available at the GTRE. When the 
task of developing the reheat system was assigned to 
it, GTRE was utilising the workshop^^ and testbed 
facilities (for development testing of engines) of HAL. 
The latter also provided manufacturing facilities and 
such specialised facilities as process shop, automatic 
welding equipment, standards rooms and laboratories.^^ 
More than 60 HF-24 Mkl Maruts had been manufactured 
by August 1972. By this time development work on the 
GTRE reheat system for the Orpheus 703 had been largely 
completed except for a full exploration of the after-
burning envelope. Thrust augmentation was reported 
to be restricted to about 25 per cent because of 
compressor limitations, but the system gave an 'all 
around improvement in performance apart from a 50 nautical 
5 8 
mile reduction in radius of action'. While the 
Orpheus 703 reheat (1700°K) engine was considered to 
be the most obvious choice for powering the HF-24 Mkll, 
some consideration was also reported to have been given 
to the development of the aircraft with Rolls Royce/ 
/ . 59 Turbomeca Adour turbofan engines. 
^^ ibid., para 2.64. 
^^ ibid., para 2.72. 
5 8 
Milavnews ^ September 1972, p.16. 
59 Milavnews ^ August 1972, p.14. 
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It was also in 1972 that a HAL Review Committee 
under the then Chairman, Air Marshal O.P. Mehra, 
'redefined' corporate objectives which now included:^^ 
(i) Design and development of HF-24 
Mkll within 5 years from 'go'. 
(ii) Advanced Technology Aircraft (ATA): 
(a) design and develop a prototype 
of the ATA within 10 years. 
(b) design and develop avionics within 
6-8 years. (c) design and obtain 
type certification of engine within 
10 years. (d) design and develop 
aircraft systems including equipment 
and accessories within 10 yeras. 
While the Review Committee made no reference to 
the proposed HSS-7 3 or Marut Mklll variant, a more 
radical development had been proposed for this aircraft. 
It was unofficially reported by Western sources that 
a Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Bolhm (MBB) team of scientists 
led by Dr Kurt Tank^^ had, by early 197 3, completed 
design studies of re-engining the Marut with two Rolls 
Royce/Turbo Union RB.199 advanced turbofans to give it 
a Mach 2 performance. Extensive re-design was said to 
be necessary to accommodate the two RB.l^Qs including 
revised intakes, a completely new rear fuselage and the 
resultant aircraft was expected to have a low-altitude 
62 
radius of action of about 350 nautxcal miles. 
60 HAL Annual Report 1972-72, p.24, Annexure I. 
^^ Dr Tank and his team of German engineers had left India 
in 1967 and the HF-24 project had been the responsibility 
of an all Indian team led by S.C. Das. See Jane's All 
the World's Aircraft 1975-76, p.15. 
62 ibid. Also Milavnews, March 1973, p.15 
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In 197 3, Air Headquarters formulated a long-term 
re-equipment plan based on many assumptions, including 
(a) 'Deep strike' aircraft would be 
purchased in limited numbers and 
additional requirements would be 
met by the HF-24 Marut Mklll 
aircraft. 
(b) 'To ensure maximum economy' Marut 
Mkll, which would substantially be 
the same as Marut Mkl, would be 
inducted so that 'the existing 
assets' could be utilised and 
'improved versions produced'. 
(c) 'Induction of an Advanced Technology 
Combat Aircraft (ATCA) I had been 
proposed for the 1980s. Another 
aircraft ATCA II would be introduced 
as successor to Gnat Mkll and Marut 
Mkll.' 
At about the same time, in February 197 3, Air 
Headquarters suggested that HAL abandon the project for 
manufacturing the 'HF-24 Mkl with reheat engines' 
i.e. Mkll^^ on grounds of financial stringency. Instead, 
it was proposed that the Mkl aircraft already in service 
with the lAF be 'retromodified'.^^ By March 1973, HAL 
had submitted 'the time frame and cost implications of 
the Air Headquarters proposal as well as two additional 
^^ PAC (1981-82), Sixty Sixth Beport, para 19. 
^^ The Mkll version also incorporated fully powered 
and duplicated Dowty hydraulic controls without the 
manual reversion of the Mkl and production was scheduled 
to start in 1975-76. See Milavnews, September 1972, p.16 
^^ FAC (1977-78), -Second Report, para 2.77. 
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/ 
alternatives^^ envisaging development of variants', 
one by HAL and the other by GTRE.^"^ 
The result was that in May 1973, Air Headquarters 
'suggested' that the project (limited to retromodification) 
with the Orpheus 703 reheat engine be held in abeyance. 
fi Q Two reasons were given for this decision. 
1. Although Air Headquarters had 
accepted the development of HF-24 
Mkll (Orpheus 703 reheat version) 
as per their requirement standard 
I of 1972, 'lessons learnt from 
the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 
indicated the need for an aircraft 
having a longer range' than the one 
prescribed. There was no possibility 
of increasing the range of this 
variant. 
2. The alternative proposal submitted 
by HAL, involving development of 
the aircraft powered by 'another 
e n g i n e s e e m e d more attractive. 
It appeared that this variant could 
easily be developed and would meet 
the improved performance requirements. 
These were reported to be the installation of two 
Rolls Royce Adour turbofans (Mkll), uprated by about 
20 per cent to 8,400 lb. thrust or, a single 15,873 lb. 
Snecma Atar 09K-50 turbojet. See Milavnews, April 1973, 
p.13. 
PAC (1977-78), Second Report, para 2.79. 
^^ ibid., para 2.80. 
^^ This would have been either the Snecma Atar 09K-50 
turbojet or the Adour GTX-G which was based on project 
design work carried out between Rolls Royce and GTRE, 
Bangalore. The GTX-G design was an uprated version of the 
reheated Adour MkSll (8^,400 lb thrust) incorporating a 
GTRE designed LP compressor and a RB.199 type reheat system 
developing a thrust of 11,450 lbs. See P.H. Young, 'Some 
Themes on Rolls Royce Military Engine Technology'. Paper 
presented at the British Aviation Seminar and Exhibition, 
1981, New Delhi, 17-19 March 1981. 
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Almost simultaneously, the APEX Planning Group (the 
highest decision making body) of the Ministry of Defence, 
accepted the Air Headquarters proposal (of February 1973) 
for retromodification of the Mkl aircraft, allocating 
Rs 104 million for development and Rs 594 million for 
retromodification. Formal government approval was also 
given immediately. This series of decisions was taken 
during the same month when Air Headquarters had requested 
that its earlier proposal be held in abeyance, i.e. May 
1973."^° It was only in July 1973 , that the proposal to 
modify the HF-24 with the alternative engines was 
considered at a meeting convened by the Minister for 
Defence Production. The prevailing view at this 
meeting was that development of the HF-24 with the 
Orpheus 70 3 reheat engine, with a view to retromodifying 
the aircraft, should continue. The Department of Defence 
72 Production subsequently justified this decision, stating 
... if the project had not been 
pursued, Government would have been 
open to criticism for not continuing 
and preserving the development of 
(the) reheat system ... a view was 
also taken that the expenditure 
incurred should be regarded as on 
'competence building' ... 
The lAF reiterated its requirement for an increased 
radius of action and, in September 1973, also made it 
clear that it should be possible to com.plete the 
70 FAC (1977-78), Second Report, para 2.81. 
^^ ibid., para 2.82. 
FAC (1978-79), Ninety Sixth Eeport, para 1.8. 
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development of the (alternative-GTX) engine on a time 
frame so that the Mkll version of the aircraft could 
be inducted into service by 1978-79. While the original 
program of manufacture of a large number of HF-24 Mklls 
(with Orpheus 703 reheat engine) had been reduced, in 
May 1973, to retromodification of a small number of 
aircraft, it was now realised that the design and 
development of the 'alternative engine' proposed by HAL 
'was not as simple as it appeared'. Also HAL lacked 
the resources required to complete the project within 
73 an acceptable time frame of about five years. This 
argument was also relevant to the ultimate cancellation 
of the retromodification program for the following 
74 reasons: 
1. The reheat system development cost 
was about Rs 65 million compared to 
Rs 25 million added on to the engine 
proposed by HAL and about Rs 56 million 
added on to the engine proposed by 
GTRE (the GTX-G). The difference in 
costs was due to the cost of modifying 
the airframe - installation of the 
Orpheus 70 3 reheat system requiring 
a fairly substantial amount of 
engineering work. 
2. It was realised that, given the overall 
financial situation, the APEX Committee 
would permit the allocation of about 
Rs 100 million only. This amount was 
enough for retromodification of 'a 
number' of HF-24 aircraft 'then held' 
by the Air Force. 
ibid. 
74 
PAC (1977-78), Second Eeport, para 2.89. 
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3. The time required for implementation 
of one of the alternatives was as 
follows: 
(a) engine proposed by HAL: 'about 
5 years'. 
(b) engine proposed by GTRE: 'about 
5 years and a few months'. 
(c) Orpheus 703 reheat variant: 
'about 4 years and 9 months or so'. 
It is thus quite clear that the change in lAF requirements 
regarding increased radius of action notwithstanding, 
HAL was not in a position to deliver the Mkll Orpheus 703 
reheat version in the time frame desired by lAF. As 
far as the retromodification program was concerned, the 
Department of Defence Production conceded that 'if we 
waited for any of these schemes, the number of aircraft 
held by the Air Force would have come down'."^^ 
By this time, i.e. late 1973, type certification 
o 
tests on the Orpheus 703R-1700 K reheat system had 
been completed and tests with the Orpheus 703R-2000°K 
reheat system were in progress. In other words, HAL 
had still not achieved its objective of a 36 per cent 
increase in thrust for the Orpheus 703 to give it around 
6,600 lb thrust. The 27 per cent or so then attained 
was insufficient to give the HF-24 Mkll its design 
performance of Mach 1.3-1.5."^^ It must be pointed out 
ibid. 
Report 1973-74 , p.91. 
Milavnews, April 1973 , p.13. 
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however, that the Orpheus 703R-2000 K reheat project 
was not taken up as a direct requirement for aircraft 
installation and was not specifically related to 
development of the HF-24 Mkll. This was sanctioned 
by the Aeronautics R&D Board in March 1972 and 
The aim was to study the feasibility 
of incorporating a high degree reheat 
system and actual engine as is 
required in high technology engines. 
The task envisaged ... was to design 
and develop the system upto 
demonstrator stage to establish 
technical feasibility.^8 
At about the same time, the Technical Committee in 
its draft report (December 1973) recommended that the 
two new engine 'variants' be taken up for development. 
But bureaucratic opinion favouring incorporation of 
the reheat system was very strong and in February 1974, 
the Aeronautics R&D Board asked the Technical Committee 
to 'submit its report taking into account the final type 
79 
approval since accorded to the reheat engine'. 
This was clearly not acceptable to the lAF and, 
on 3 August 1974, Air Headquarters repeated its earlier 
assertions (July/September 1973) and observed: 
(a) the HF-24 fitted with the Orpheus-703 
reheat engine would not satisfy 
operational requirements; 
PAC (1977-78) Seoond Eeport, para 2.100. A total 
amount of Rs 3.5 million was sanctioned up to February 1976 
Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India 
1974-75. Union Government (Defence Services), para 10. 
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(b) the alternative proposals for 
engine development (with high 
costs and gestation periods) 
were not justified in the context 
of the then limited requirement of 
retromodification. 
Considering these factors, it was recommended that the 
retromodification program should be given up.^^ A 
month later, in September 1974, Air Headquarters 
recommended that further efforts to develop an improved 
version of the HF-24 be abandoned. (Regardless of this, 
however, formal government orders 'closing' the project 
to develop the Mkll version had not been issued by the 
O 1 
Ministry of Defence even as late as 1977-78.) Meanwhile, 
the Technical Committee, in its final report submitted 
in December 1974, reiterated its earlier recommendation 
(December 1973) that the proposed development of the 
engine 'variants' by GTRE and HAL, at a cost of Rs 40 
million and Rs 9.3 million respectively, be approved 
and 'suitable monitoring committees be set up to review 8 2 
the progress of the projects'. 
Some attempts were also said to have been made 
to seek Soviet assistance in the development of the 
successor aircraft as well as to explore the possibility 
of acquiring Soviet alternatives for the proposed Deep 
PAC (1977-78), Second Report, para 2.88. 
81 -u'^ ibid. 
o 9 
Refer n.79. 
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Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) requirement.^^ 
Interestingly enough, at the Annual General Meeting of 
the HAL in 1974, the then Chairman, M.M. Sen, is said 
to have 'agreed with some questioners ... that the 
advent of the MiG-21 might have relegated the HF-24 
8 4 to the background'. 
Total expenditure on the development of the HF-24 
and further development of the engine variants amounted 
8 5 
to Rs 214.6 million by the end of March 1975. Despite 
the various attempts by HAL and various committees 
of the Ministry of Defence, no further orders (beyond 
the 18 pre-production and 107 production HF-24s initially 
ordered) were forthcoming from the lAF and manufacture Q C 
of the HF-24 Marut Mkl finally ended in 1976-77. 
The production models of the HF-24 Mkl themselves 
had various shortcomings in both performance and safety. 
As a consequence, a sum of Rs 10.2 million was sanctioned 
by the government in July 1976 to 'carry out essential 
improvements and modifications in the Marut fleet' then o 7 in service. By March 1978, about Rs 7 million had 
8 3 Milavnews, September 1974, p.15. 
O A 
Milavnews, October 1974, p.14. 
^^ Refer n.79. 
^^ Milavnews, May 1975, p.14 and S. Sapru in Indian 
Express, 28 June 1982. 
PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.90. 
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been spent on improvements and modifications although 
spinning trials had not been carried out. Although 
the 'gains of this development effort' were officially 
stated in the 'field of safety, better flight panel, 
instrumentation display, better fuel capacity, better 
aircraft handling etc.', it is the list of various 
'tasks attended to' that actually brings out the crude 
nature of the original development effort. These 
• n J ^ 88 included: 
1. Modification of Trim Circuit and 
reduction of sensitivity of the 
aileron trim tab. 
2. Fixing of integral fuel tank leaks, 
installation of wing fuel transfer 
indicator and trials with 150 gallon 
drop tanks. 
3. Installation of SFENA Artificial 
Horizon and SPIN Gyro Compass. 
4. Firing trials with 430 mm Aden cannons. 
The entire modification program was scheduled for 
O Q 
completion by 1979-80. But its effectiveness with 
regard to the deployment and operational capability of 
the HF-24 was considerably reduced by the fact that in 
1980, it was decided to replace the aircraft by MiG-23BN 
(Flogger) imported from the Soviet Union. The first of 
Department of Defence Production D.M. No.48/42/10/78/D 
dated 20 June 1978, reproduced in PAC (1978-79) Ninety Sixth 
Report, pp.35-36. 
89 -u-^ ibid. 
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the MiG-2 3BNs arrived in India in mid-December 1980 
and by mid-1981, two squadrons (Nos.lO and 230) had 
already converted from HF-24 to the MiG-23BN, with a 
third (and last) squadron scheduled for conversion by 
1982.5° 
Development of HF-24 Mkl Trainer; 
According to the time schedule indicated by HAL 
in August 1963, development of the trainer version of 
the HF-24 Mkl would take three to four years assuming 
91 
'no serious difficulties' were encountered. The 
project was formally approved in May 1964, and involved 
an estimated expenditure of Rs 7.8 million, revised to 
Rs 37 million in May 1971. Actual expenditure on the 
project amounted to Rs 32.7 million and the first 
prototype made its first flight in 1970, more than two 
92 93 years behind schedule. An order for 25 HF-24 Mkl-Ts 
was placed in November 1970 with the aircraft scheduled 
94 
for delivery from January 1972 onwards. 
However, various problems were encountered both 
during the development and manufacturing stages and 
the first production HF-24 Mkl-T was delivered to the 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1981-82, p.90. 
^^ PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.35. 
92 
ibid., para 2.30. 
^^ S. Sapru in Indian Express, 28 June 1982. 
PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.30. 
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95 lAF in March 1975. Two further orders for an 
unspecified number of trainer aircraft were placed in 
September 1971 and July 1972. But, in 1974, when the 
lAF recommended the cancellation of the retromodification 
program for the HF-24 Mkl, it was decided that, as a 
consequence, the additional number of trainer versions 
were not required and that the two orders should be 
cancelled. This was done nearly two years later, on 
96 24 March 1976. The result was that materials. Tooling 
and Development expenditure worth Rs 36.4 million were 
97 
declared redundant. This included materials worth 
Rs 17.7 million (the balance being Tooling and Development 
cost) of which, it was subsequently realised, materials 
valued at Rs 2.8 million could be utilised in other 
pro:]ects. 
In other words, while the total outlay on the 
development of the HF-24 Mkl and Mkl trainer was 
estimated at Rs 114 million in March 1975, the loss 
sustained because of the inability of the aircraft to 
ineet service specifications amounted to Rs 33.6 million. 
Also a further amount of Rs 10.2 million had to be 
sanctioned in 1976 to incorporate modifications in the 
ibid. 
^^ ibid., para 2.40. 
9 7 
ibid., para 2.41. 
^^ PAC (1978-79) Ninety Sixth Report, para 1.5. 
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existing fleet. But, this was not the only expenditure 
incurred by HAL on the ill-fated project. A substantial 
amount of money was spent on the development of 
different types of airframes to suit the reheat engine 
as well as other engines under consideration. The 
actual expenditure on different projects undertaken 
99 by HAL is as follows: 
(Million Rupees) 
Expenditure as 
on 31/3/76 
HF-24 MkIA 9.902 
HF-24 Mkll-Old 0.817 
HF-24 Mkll-New 2.966 
HF-24 iMklB 1.962 
HF-2 4 iMklBX 9.429 
HF-24 MkIR 31.258 
HF-24 Mkll/Adour 0.112 
HF-24 TS-16 0.052 
Total 56.498 
This is not to say that the project had not been 
subject to a critical evaluation at any stage. In 
1969, when initial deliveries of the aircraft were 
underway and the trainer version was still in the 
* 
prototype stage, the Aeronautical Committee appointed 
by the government reviewed the HF-24 project and 
99 PAC (1977-78) Second Reportpara 2.46. 
The Committee was headed by Mr C. Subramaniam, a former 
Cabinet Minister. Details of membership of the Committee 
were not released. 
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... assessed that in the aircraft 
and its variants there existed an 
aircraft with promise and that the 
basic design should be stretched 
to full capacity and the matter 
pursued vigorously during the next 
two-three years.100 
A further attempt to monitor the HF-24 project was 
made by the Aeronautics Committee in February 19 71, 
when (in keeping with its earlier recommendation of 
'vigorously' pursuing the program for 2-3 years), it 
constituted the Aeronautics Research and Development 
Board. The task before this Board was to make a 
detailed examination of every major development project 
before it was approved by the government as well as to 
review their progress from time to time.^'^^ After an 
evaluation of the progress of the HF-24 project, the 
Study Group subjected the former to very severe 
102 criticisms. Major observations included: 
1. The magnitude of work had not been 
properly appreciated nor had the 
elements of material and labour costs 
been reasonably allowed for while 
preparing the initial estimates. 
2. The Indian design staff lacked 
experience to make any effective 
contribution in the earlier years. 
While this was a serious handicap, no 
allowance had been made in the estimates 
of cost and time. 
100 ibid., para 2 .105. 
Department of Defence Production O.M.F. No.48/12/16/78/D 
(HAL/MDN) dated 20 June 1978 reproduced in PAC (1978-79) 
Ninety-Sixth Report, pp.46-47. 
PAC (1977-78) Seoond Report, para 2.106. 
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3. The government not only failed to 
critically examine the project reports 
submitted by HAL in 1957 and 1960, 
but also did not monitor the progress 
in the development of the HF-24. 
4. The management organisation in HAL for 
the project was inadequate. 
5. The organisation in the Ministry of 
Defence responsible for monitoring 
development projects was inadequate. 
6. The methodology followed; manufacture 
of a small number of prototypes followed 
by a comparatively large number of pre-
production aircraft had given 
unsatisfactory results. The experience 
of aircraft manufacture in UK, France 
and USA proved that the alternative 
of production of a larger number of 
prototypes followed by regular manufacture 
would yield better results. 
7. The decision to relate the development 
of the HF-24 to the 'successful 
completion of an engine under development 
abroad was not wise'. 
8. Throughout the history of development 
of the HF-24, policy changes regarding 
choice of the engine were made - each 
requiring considerable design effort. 
This diverted resources from the 
development of the HF-24 Mkl. Also, 
while engaged in developing the HF-24 
Mkl, HAL had been involved in building 
and supporting the flight development 
of several versions, including the 
HF-24 Mkl with airpass, HF-24 MkIA, 
HF-24 MklBX and HF-24 MklR. 
This criticism notwithstanding, it must be pointed 
out that, as mentioned earlier, it was its authors who 
had, in February 1974, asked the Technical Committee of 
the project to submit its report, keeping in view the 
fact that final type approval had been granted to the 
Orpheus 703 reheat system. In other words, despite 
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the fact that the entire exercise would have resulted 
in an aircraft not meeting the operational requirements 
of the lAF, attempts were made to generate bureaucratic 
pressure that would have resulted in the Mkll project 
being sanctioned. This act would, by itself, have been 
in direct contradiction with one of the major recommendations 
of the Aeronautics Committee. 
In its report submitted in 1969, the Committee had 
recommended the development of an advanced technology-
aircraft around a proven (and therefore obviously 
imported) engine along with the simultaneous development 
of an indigenous advanced technology engine. With 
regard to bombers, the Committee had made it quite 
clear that India's limited requirement did not justify 
their domestic manufacture . In other words, 
replacements for the aging Canberra's were to come from 
abroad. There are three points to be made in this 
context: 
1. While the lAF had not been very vocal 
about the suitability (or lack of it) 
the HF-24 Mkl in terms of its operational 
requirements, the proposed Mkll with 
the Orpheus 7 0 3 17bo°K reheat engine 
reduced the radius of action even further. 
Besides, it not only entailed substantial 
design changes to the airframe but even 
then, would have failed to provide the 
aircraft with a Mach 2 capability. 
Summary of the recommendations published in Times 
of India, 16 May 1969. 
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2. It was only when the lAF had reacted 
favourably towards a Mkll version 
fitted with an imported i.e. Adour 
engine, that it was conceded by HAL 
that it was not in a position to 
deliver the aircraft within the time 
frame required by the lAF. 
3. Finally, and perhaps an important 
reason for a decline in lAF interest 
in the HF-24 Mkll was the induction 
of the SU-7 and the MiG-21MF from 
the Soviet Union. The HF-24 was 
primarily intended for ground support 
requirements and the SU-7s had been 
used in the same role in the 1971 war. 
Additionally, acquisition of the MiG-21MF 
after the war provided the lAF with an 
increased close support capability. 
In evidence before the Puhlia Accounts Committee, a 
representative of the Air Force stated that this 
... injected in the HF-24 project some 
element of imponderables. We did not 
really anticipate before that we would 
at that point of time go in for these 
two aircraft which would do the same job 
as (the) HF-24 was d o i n g . 
Consequently, the project for the development of 
the HF-24 can hardly be called successful. From its 
very inception, the project,which was viewed as the 
forerunner of a program for the manufacture of 
indigenously developed combat aircraft, relied on 
foreign resources - both in terms of expertise and 
technology. While this was to be expected since India 
did not have an established aeronautical industry nor 
the requisite technical manpower, there is little 
104 PAC (1977-78) Second Report , para 2.78. 
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evidence to suggest that this handicap was taken into 
consideration. Production as well as cost estimates 
always tended to be optimistic, perhaps based on the 
experience of Western manufacturers, without realisation 
of the fact that HAL lacked not only manpower, but also 
a technological base and organisation. 
While the time for developing the HF-24 Mkl was 
initially estimated at four years, the first prototype 
did not make tis first flight until five years after 
development work began. Deliveries of the production 
version of the aircraft, scheduled to begin by the end 
of 196 3, were delayed by five years, actually beginning 
in 196 8 when the HF-24 was formally inducted into squadron 
service. Fatigue testing had to be undertaken to inorease 
the airframe life to 2,500 hours - representing 10 years 
of operational flying. Despite this, the aircraft was 
in operational service for about 12 years from the date 
of first deliveries, and about five years after production 
ended. In comparison, the Hunters, representing the 
same generation of aircraft, have been operational with 
the lAF for about 20 years. 
The trainer version of the aircraft required 
nearly six years of development effort. It made its 
first flight in 1970 and while deliveries were expected 
to begin by 1972, they were delayed by another three 
years. Consequently, when the HAL did finally begin to 
deliver the HF-24 MkIT to the lAF in 1975, it was at a 
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time when the production run of the Mkl itself was 
nearing completion. Hence, whether the trainer aircraft 
made any substantial contribution to I7VF conversion 
programs to the HF-24 becomes highly questionable. Also, 
as mentioned earlier, the nature of modification tasks 
undertaken by HAL on the HF-24 as well as the trainer 
version make it amply clear that the effectiveness 
of the aircraft under combat conditions would have been 
very limited, to say the least. 
As far as the Mkll version of the aircraft is 
concerned it never really materialised - not altogether 
surprising considering the manner in which HAL tried 
to develop it. The HF-24 airframe had been primarily 
designed to be powered by the Orpheus 703 turbojet, to 
be developed later into a Mkll version using the Bristol 
Siddeley Orpheus 12 turbojet then under development. 
Bristol Siddeley terminated its development plans for 
the latter partly as a result of unsuccessful negotiations 
with HAL directed at developing the engine exclusively 
for the Mkll version. HAL then decided to use a Soviet 
powerplant, the RD9F, which ended in a waste of time 
and resources as HAL tried to persuade the Soviet Union 
to modify the engine to provide a level of performance 
which the latter claimed was beyond its capacity. 
Even then, it is not certain whether the engine itself 
could have been accommodated in the existing airframe 
without design changes. 
167 
Yet another unsuccessful attempt was made in 
collaboration with Egypt and it was after three years 
that it was realised that the E-300 engine being 
developed by the latter was optimised for high level 
interception tasks rather than low level ground support 
duties. 
Parellel to these experiments the attempt by 
GTRE to develop a reheat system for the existing Orpheus 
703 powerplant, while understandable in terms of 
requirements, seems to have become more of a status 
symbol in later years, i.e. the 1970s. Considering 
the fact that the first prototype powered by the reheat 
variant crashed on its tenth flight as early as January 
1970, further development efforts can only be understood 
in the context of what the Ministry of Defence referred 
to as 'competence building'. But this was not the 
opinion that prevailed at the Ministry of Defence, HAL 
and GTRE. While GTRE secured final type approval for 
the reheat variant only in December 197 3, Air Headquarters 
was persuaded of the operational capability of the 
aircraft as early as June 1971 - six months before the 
engine was accorded yvovisional type approval. It thus 
seems likely that the 'Requirement Standard I of 1972' 
issued by Air Headquarters in January 1972, was based 
on theoretical data on the performance of the aircraft 
rather than extensive flight trials. 
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The Aeronautics Committee (196 9) had recommended 
that every effort be made to ensure that the aircraft 
with the reheat engine became available by early 197 3, 
and its 'further improved version' by 1975-76 at the 
latest'.^^^ It was only in August 1974 that the HAL 
and GTRE were able to provide a time frame for the 
manufacture of aircraft powered by the reheat variant, 
the Adour engine and a third alternative. The estimated 
period of five years that was suggested would hardly 
have been satisfactory to the lAF, in the context of 
their re-equipment programs. Moreover, not only did 
the Adour and the other alternative engine options 
involve a smaller financial outlay, but the aircraft 
performance with either of these engines was closer 
to lAF requirements than that available by using the 
reheat engine. 
Thus, the sole motivating factor behind the HAL's 
inclination to favour the reheat engine was one of 
prestige in that it involved an 'indigenously' designed 
airframe and powerplant. For example, in 1974-75, 
the Ministry of Defence stated that studies on 'improving' 
the performance of the HF-24 (Mkl) were continuing 
and that this would 'call for a good deal of development 
effort and consideration is being given to the problems 
i n v o l v e d ' I n 1977-78, it was admitted that HAL 
^^^ PAC (1977-78) Second Report, para 2.11 
Re-port 2974-75 , p.71. 
169 
had faced some technical problems regarding HF-24 
engines which had been successfully overcome. The 
same year, in evidence before the Fublia Aocounts 
Committee, the Ministry of Defence had praised the HF-24 
as being a 'good weapon platform', having 'good structural 
integrity' besides having 'growth potential'. 
While still trying to resolve the problems 
associated with the HF-24, HAL also attempted to provide 
an indigenous alternative to the DPSA requirement 
of the lAF. As mentioned earlier, a design study was 
carried out for the proposed aircraft (designated HF-73) 
by Dr Kurt Tank in the early 1970s. This proposal seems 
to have been given up in later years, but was replaced 
by a less ambitious program for the development of a 
successor to the HF-24. In August 1977, the government 
sanctioned an extended feasibility study for the 
development of an aircraft designated the HF-25, 
108 
intended for a tactical air support role. 
Apparently based on the HF-24 design, it was to 
be equipped with a laser range-finder, a large electronics 109 
bay and completely re-designed air intakes. Once 
again the problem was one of finding a suitable powerplant, 
According to a Western source citing Indian press reports. 
^^^ Report 1977-78, p.61. 
HAL Annual 1977-78, p.6. 
^^^ International Defense Review, 4/1978, p.490. 
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in 1978, the Soviet Union had offered the 16,535 lb 
Tumansky R-25 engine, derived from the MiG-21 bis for 
the HF-25 project which was then scheduled for production 
by the inid-1980s.^^^ Introduction of the MiG-21 bis 
into the lAF and its manufacture by HAL, according to 
the same source, resulted in an abandonment of the plans 
for development of the HF-25.^^^ Thus ended the long 
drawn attempt by HAL to indigenously design and develop 
a combat aircraft for the lAF. 
Milavnews, October 1978, p.14. 
^^^ Milavnews, December 1978, p.14. 
171 
B. HJT-16 KIRAN 
Design and development of a jet trainer, the 
HJT-16 Kiran according to lAF specifications was 
approved by the government in November 195 9. A month 
later, in December 1959, the Ministry of Defence 
sanctioned the development of two prototypes and one 
shell for flight trials and structural tests at an 
estimated cost of Rs 2.7 million (including Rs 0.8 million 
in foreign exchange). The prototypes were expected to 
be ready for flight trials by December 1962 and June 
112 
1963 respectively. Conflicting priorities, however, 
caused substantial delays right from the inception of 
this project. This was the first attempt at design and 
development of a jet aircraft by a team of Indian design 
engineers under V.M. Ghatage assisted by Raj Mahindra 
who was the senior design engineer for the project. 
By 1961-62, development of the aircraft was already six 
months behind the original schedule since only 60 per 
cent of the design work had been completed.^^^ Reasons 114 for this delay included: 
1. Non availability of design personnel 
and machine capacity in the shops. 
^^^ Report of the Comptroller and Auditor GeneraL: 1975-76. 
Union Government (Defence Services), para 6, p.6. Hereafter 
referred to as C and AG Report: 1975-75. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1961-62, p.5. 
^^^ C and AG Report: 1975-76, para 6, p.6. 
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2. Pre-occupation of shop capacity with 
the production of other aircraft, 
namely the Folland Gnat and the HF-24. 
3. High priority given to the design and 
development of the HF-24. 
As a consequence, the first prototype did not 
make its first flight until 4 September 1964,^^^ while 
the second prototype flew for the first time only in 
August 1965^^^ - about two years behind schedule. The 
delay in flight trials however did not prevent HAL from 
taking measures to manufacture the aircraft as early 
as 1963-64 or the Ministry of Defence from placing 
an order for the manufacture of 24 pre-production 
a i r c r a f t . B y 1965-66 flight testing and development 
of the aircraft were continuing along with the 
118 'manufacture of pre-production aircraft' with 
119 
deliveries planned for 1966-67. But, due to further 
delays in development of the HJT-16, the first of the 
pre-production aircraft could be delivered to the lAF 
only by March 1968 and seven more were manufactured by 120 December 196 9 - an average of four aircraft per year. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1964-65, p.79. According 
to the Ministry of Defence, Report 1964-65, pp.41, 56, the 
first prototype flew in October 1964, while it made its 
'first inaugural flight' in December 1964. 
^^^ C & AG Report: 1975-76 , p.6. 
HAL Annual Report 1963-64 , p.4. 
^^^ HAL Annual Report 1965-66, p,24, 
^^^ Report 1965-66, p,46. 
C & AG Report: 1975-76 , p.7. 
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Deliveries against the initial contracts for the supply 
of 24 pre-production (August 196 3) and 36 series 
121 
production (April 1965) aircraft thus took nearly 
nine years and were completed by March 1974, by which 
time it was claimed that production was finally 
stabilised. Meanwhile, two further orders for the 
HJT-16 had been placed on HAL in March 1968 and September 122 
1970 respectively. There was thus a substantial 
cumulative shortfall in aircraft deliveries by 1974. 
The HJT-16 itself had been designed with a view 
to powering the initial production run of 60 aircraft 
by the (then) Bristol Siddeley Viper 11 turbojet 
developing 2,500 lb thrust, later models being powered 12 3 by the indigenous HJE-2500. A decision to design 
and develop a powerplant (the HJE-2500) was taken in 
124 February 1960 after rejecting an earlier proposal to 
use a derated version of the Orpheus engine on grounds 
125 
that it would be too powerful for the aircraft. 
The project for the development of the HJE-2500 
powerplant was a result of the Board of Directors of the 
1 71 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1969-70, p.107. 
122 C & AG Report: 1975-76, p.7. 
^^^ Public Accounts Committee (1977-78), Second Report 
(Sixth Lok Sabha), para 1.21. 
124 ibid., para 1.8. 
125 ibid., para 1.42. 
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HAL convincing the government, i.e. the Ministry of 
Defence, about the viability of the program. Air 
Headquarters on the other hand, had a non-committal 
attitude regarding the project right from the planning 
stage. According to a note prepared for the Committee 
of Directors' Meeting held on 13 February 1960, Air 
Headquarters had informed HAL that 
... they have no comments at this 
stage except to suggest that the 
delivery schedule of this engine should 
be speeded up ... so that there is no 
delay in the production of the Basic 
Jet Trainer ... also added that since 
Government have approved the development... 
(of the HJT-16) ... proposals regarding 
the development of the engine should be 
sent to the Government d i r e c t . 1 2 6 
Since Air Headquarters had underlined the necessity of 
speeding up development of the engine to avoid delay in 
the manufacture of the HJT-16, HAL decided to commence 
design work 'in anticipation of the approval of the 
127 Government of India'. In a subsequent letter to the 
Ministry of Defence, the then Managing Director of HAL 
, 128 justified this decision on two grounds: 
1. An engine of this thrust range was 
required for the HJT-16. 
2. The design and prototype manufacture 
of this engine would establish a 
design and development team in India 
to meet future needs. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.9. 
127 _ ibid. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.10 
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As a result, when the HJE-2500 development project was 
sanctioned, the cost for development of four prototypes 
was estimated at Rs 3.5 million including a foreign 
exchange component of Rs 1.7 million. This estimate also 
included an expenditure of Rs 0.6 million on flight 
development tests and the project was scheduled for 
129 
completion in three years. Accordingly, the Board 
of Directors of HAL sanctioned Rs 0.5 million in December 
1962.12° 
Given the low financial estimate for the development 
of the HJE-2500 as well as the meagre amounts involved 
in the first two sanctions by HAL, it is quite clear 
that the company had no idea about the effort involved 
in the design and development of a new engine. This was 
subsequently admitted by the Secretary, Department of 
Defence Production during evidence before the Puhlio 
Accounts Committee. The following reasons were advanced 
for the 'sketchiness' of the initial estimates:^^^ 
1. HAL had not understood the development 
processes involved in the HJE-2500. 
Estimates for man-hours required for 
engine fabrication were based on 'the 
best guesses' of the process involved. 
2. Since the Gas Turbine Research 
Estabilishment (GTRE) of the DRDO was 
in its early stages of establishment, 
it was not possible to cross-check the 
estimates provided by HAL. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.9. 
ibid., para 1.8. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.11. 
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Also, not only did the engineers at HAL lack practical 
experience in engine design, but HAL itself lacked 
basic facilities. Although 'certain test facilities' 
were available, it was only at this stage that HAL had 
132 
established an engine factory at Bangalore to 
manufacture variants of the Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 
engines for the Gnat and HF-24 aircraft. The design 
scheme for the HJE-2500 had thus come from an organisation 
which itself had only theoretical knowledge about aircraft 
engines. But this did not deter HAL from undertaking 
the project since it was operating on the 'philosophy' 
of 'learn as you go'. While the failure to obtain the 
necessary test facilities and other equipment was 
attributed to the meagre grant of Rs 0.5 million in 
1960^^^ thexe is no evidence available to show that HAL 
asked the government for additional funds during the 134 
first four years of the project, i.e. between 1960-64. 
In fact, it has been admitted that 'the Government did 
not take a conscious decision to proceed rapidly in this 
d i r e c t i o n ' A l s o , that there was no monitoring of 
the progress of the project during 1960-72 apart from 136 occasional reviews. 
132 
ibid., para 1.12. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.14. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.17. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.13. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.14. 
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However, as a result of inter-organisational politics, 
the project did come to the notice of the DRDO of the 
Ministry of Defence in August 1964. The reason behind 
this was not the progress made on the project, or the 
lack of it. But, the point in question was whether HAL 
was entitled to work on the project. According to the 
Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence, such long 
range development projects involving 'higher contemporary 
levels of competence should initially be handled at 
GTRE'.^^"^ The fact that until 1963, the only work done 
at GTRE was related to a 'certain number of individual 
components' and the first major engine project was the 
138 
development of the reheat system for the HF-2 4, did 
nothing to add substance to the Scientific Advisor's 
request that HAL should incur no further expenditure 
on the development of the engine till the matter was 
re-considered by its Board of Directors. HAL did not 
react favourably to this proposal and, in September 1964, 
made a representation to the Department of Defence 
Production that it be allowed to carry on with the HJE-2500 139 project for the following reasons: 
1. In countries like the UK and USA, 
design and development of aircraft/ 
aeroengines were entrusted to 
manufacturing companies and not 
^^^ ibid., para 1.15. 
13 8 
ibid., para 1.13. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.15. 
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handled by R & D Organisations. 
The latter carried out theoretical 
analysis to assist the Air Force 
in formulating Operational 
Requirements or undertook wind 
tunnel testing of models and 
evaluated the performance of 
components. 
2. Research organisations, including 
GTRE, did not have design personnel, 
machinery or equipment for the 
manufacturing of components and test 
equipment. Without such facilities, 
it was not possible to manufacture 
prototypes nor was it worthwhile to 
establish duplicate facilities. 
3. HAL, on the other hand, had a design 
group with a separate prototype shop 
which could also be supplemented by 
the available spare capacity in other 
manufacturing shops. 
4. According to the existing schedule for 
the manufacture of the HJT-16 and the 
HJE-2500, there was a requirement for 
only 50 additional Viper 11 engines. 
The balance could be met by the HAL 
built HJE-2500 which would also have the 
additional advantage of locally 
manufactured spares. 
GTRE's lack of facilities as well as HAL's insistence 
that it could provide the powerplant in a satisfactory 
time frame ensured continuation of its work on the HJE-2500 
development. At the same time, although there were no 
firm proposals to manufacture the Viper 11 under licence, 
'the matter was not pursued, presumably, consequent 
to the reversal of the earlier decision to suspend further 
140 expenditure by HAL on HJE-25 00 . 
ibid. , para 1.18. 
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The episode had no effect on HAL's efforts to 
develop the engine since a firm decision on the issue 
was taken in a matter of weeks. Nevertheless, compared 
to the original (1960) time frame of three years for 
the development of four prototype engines, the first 
prototype was test run only in September 1966, and even 
141 
then, its performance did not satisfy specifications. 
In the meanwhile, development of the HJT-16 Kiran 
airframe itself had been considerably delayed with the 
first aircraft being delivered only by 1967-68, very 
few delivered till 1970-71. But this delay in airframe 
development in no way helped dovetail the engine and 
airframe manufacturing programs. As admitted by the 
Department of Defence Production, given the required 
facilities, HAL could have developed the engine between 
1960 and 1967, 'but that would have required a type of 
effort which HAL was not in a position to mount at that 
point of time'. The reason was HAL's philosophy of 
engine development itself. According to standard practice, 
components are first developed, tested and then assembled. 
HAL assembled the engine, put it to test and when it 142 
did not come up to expectations, reversed the process. 
The result was an inordinately prolonged development 
cycle. HAL'S approach to engine design was severely 
^^^ ibid., para 1.17. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.19. 
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criticised by a team of Rolls Royce engineers who 
called it 'an example of how engine development should 
not be undertaken' - an observation which was later 
endorsed by the Aeronautics Committee in April 
It was only by July 1967, that HAL could provide 
a tentative time frame by which the HJE-2500 would be 
available. It was also realised that the engine could 
be used in approximately 54 HJT-16 Kiran. In addition 
approximately 40 per cent of the reserve engines i.e. 20, 
could be supplied - making a total requirement of about 
75 engines. The balance of the requirement would have to 
be met by the import of Viper 11 engines since the 
HJE-2500 would not be available before May 1971. 
Accordingly, the Board of Directors of HAL was asked 
to approve the manufacture of six prototypes at an 
estimated (revised) expenditure of Rs 14.5 million with 
144 
a foreign exchange complement of Rs 1.5 million. 
These estimates were subsequently scaled down to include 
the development of only four prototypes and in October 
1967, HAL asked the government for a development grant 
of Rs 10 million including Rs 1.2 million in foreign 
exchange. By this time it was also realised that 
only about 50 engines would 'ultimately be required'. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.34, 
^^^ ibid., para 1.21, 
^^^ ibid., para 1.20, 
, 146 
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On this basis, it was calculated that amortisation of 
tooling and development costs alone would be about 
Rs 325,000 per engine which would make the entire 
proposal uneconomical. Consequently, it was decided 
that the project be 'considered as an educational project'. 
Even the requirement of 5 0 engines soon turned out 
to be theoretical. While considering the request for 
the development grant of Rs 10 million, the government 
concluded in February 1968, that by the time the HJE-2500 
had entered the manufacturing stage, the entire requirement 
of engines for the HJT-16 would have been met through 
imports. In these circumstances, it was officially 
decided to treat the development of the HJE-2500 as 
an educational venture. Apart from this decision, 
no action was taken regarding the request for funds by 
HAL. Over a year later, in April 1969, the project again 
claimed official attention when the Aeronautics Committee 
recommended that it be pursued to completion as a 
development project regardless of its end use. The history 
of the development of the HJE-2500, commented the Committee, 
was a good lesson for the future. But, it nonetheless 
recommended further development on grounds that the 
experience in competent development and manufacture would 
considerably help the 'major engine project', i.e. the 
^^^ ibid., para 1.21. 
ibid., para 1.23. 
182 
Orpheus 703 reheat engine, which it had recommended. 
Referring to the two design and development establishments 
viz. that of the HAL and the GTRE which was a part of 
1 4 R DRDO, the Committee maintained: 
The existence of two separate teams 
was an impediment to the sanction of 
the expenditure; acceptance of our 
recommendation for the merger of the 
two teams should remove this impediment. 
As is discussed below, no decision on either of 
the two recommendations of the Aeronautics Committee 
was taken for the next three years. In the interim in 
May 1970, HAL submitted another revised proposal for 
the development of the HJE-2500. Development costs for 
the engine were now estimated at Rs 15 million with Rs 4 
million in foreign exchange. Compared to the 1967 time 
frame it was now admitted that a further 62 months of 
development activity was required. In other words, the 
engine would not be available before July 1975. Factors 
responsible for the changes in financial estimates 
included rise in labour costs, increase in prices of 
'bought out items' and raw materials besides increase in 
the estimated cost of fabrication of castings and forgings 
the latter based on the expenditure gained in the 
149 manufacture of Orpheus engines. 
The new time schedule of 6 2 months was based on 
the difficulties encountered during the initial test bed 
^^^ ibid., para 1.24. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.26. 
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running of the first prototype. After nearly four years 
of testing, u^to 1970, 'it had not been possible to run 
the engine at the desired speed'. It was now accepted 
that there were serious problems involved in developing 
major components (such as the turbine, combustion 
chamber accessories) on the engine itself as originally 
planned. It was then deci^de to test and develop these 
components individually on separate test facilities.^^^ 
Since it had now been officially decided to classify 
the HJE-2500 project as an educational exercise, decision 
regarding further funding took over three years from 
the time of the Aeronautics Committee's recommendations 
in April 1969. In June 1972, it was decided to sanction 
the amount requested by HAL. According to the Secretary, 
Department of Defence Production, the delay ... 
... was apparently due only to discussions 
with the Ministry of Finance and others 
as to where the funds would come from . . . 
The question was whether it should be from 
the Aeronautics Research and Development 
Board. Ultimately Government sanctioned 
[the funds] from its own sources and not 
from the board. 
As regards the second recommendation of the Aeronautics 
Committee about amalgamation of the engine design 
departments of HAL and GTRE, the proposal was eventually 
rejected despite its 'acceptance in principle'. The 
DRDO disclaimed any responsibility regarding the delay 
ibid., para 1.27. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.28. 
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in development of the HJE-25 00 on grounds that the 
project had been handled entirely by HAL. In July/August 
1972, it was decided by the Ministry of Defence that 
there was 'general agreement' on the respective roles 
of HAL and GTRE. In order to give 'practical definition' 
to this agreement, a work schedule for 1972-73 was drawn 
152 
up to ensure co-ordination between the two agencies. 
During subsequent years, the engine project was 
consistently downgraded in priority. The Aeronautics 
Research and Development Board (ARDB), set up on the 
recommendations of the Aeronautics Committee had approved 153 
the HJE-2500 project at its meeting on 8 January 1972. 
In May 1972, the ARDB set up a Technical Committee to 
assess various projects for propulsion systems including 
the HJE-2500. But, in its report submitted in December 
1974, the Committee did not deal with the project at all, 154 for two reasons: 
1. Consideration of the alternative 
power-plants for the HF-24 was of 
immediate importance at that time. 
2. It was not possible to complete the 
proceedings within the stipulated 
time frame 'because of the pre-
occupation of the Chairman of the 
Committee in his very many 
responsibilities as well as that of 
the members. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.25 
^^^ ibid., para 1.32 
^^^ ibid., para 1.33 
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Final testing of the HJE-2500 was conducted in 
155 
April-May 1974, nearly eight years after the first 
test-run. Since the HJT-16 manufacturing program had 
experienced considerable slippages, in July 1974, HAL 
decided to actively pursue the development program of 
the HJE-2500. Soon afterwards, a Monitoring Committee 
including the Director of Development and Design (HAL) 
probed into development manufacturing aspects of the 
program and made the following observations:^^^ 
1. An estimated 91,000 man hours per 
annum were required for the manufacture 
of prototype engines. There was no 
capacity available in the prototype 
shop of the Egnine Design Department 
and the Engine Division lacked spare 
capacity to undertake the work. 
2. A new fuel system was acquired for the 
engine. Although Lucas Aerospace Ltd 
and Dowty Fuel Systems Ltd (both of UK) 
had shown some interest in the matter, 
the expenditure quoted for development 
work was too high. 
3. Weight of the existing prototype was 
20 per cent higher than specifications. 
Any reduction in weight involved 34 
components which would require considerable 
time and effort. 
4. There was no commercial value in the 
project since it could not be produced 
in time for the HJT-16 Kiran which was 
going to be further developed as an 
armed version requiring an engine of 
greater thrust. 
HAL subsequently had little choice but to accept 
the recommendations of the Monitoring Committee to foreclose 
^^^ ibid., para 1.36. 
^^^ ibid., para 1.35. 
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the project specially when it was made clear that 
production models would not be available before 1980. 
This was done in April 1975, barely nine months after 
the decision to actively pursue the project. Government 
sanction, for foreclosure of the project, was received 
15 months later, in July 1976. Total expenditure on 
1 S7 
the HJE-25 0 0 amounted to Rs 8.2 million. 
A direct consequence of this unsuccessful attempt 
at developing a powerplant for the HJT-16 was that the 
question of licence manufacture of the Viper 11 turbojet 
was never seriously consc^ '^ered. The entire requirement 
for engines was met by imports at a total cost of 
Rs 111.2 million, at a unit cost which escalated from 
£17,936 (1966) to £33,700 (1971) and/42,614 (subject 158 
to escalation) in 1976. 
Manufacture of the HJT-16 itself, as mentioned 
earlier, had fallen considerably behind schedule because 
of development problems and slippages in production. 
This also affected the unit cost of aircraft. Against 
initial orders, this was estimated at Rs 1.27 million 
(foreign exchange Rs 550,000) in August 1963, and at 
Rs 1.047 million (f.e. Rs 603,000) in April 1965. 
Unit cost (including profit) was estimated at Rs 2.81 
million (f.e. Rs 789,000) while the cost of those 
157 .. ibid. 
158 ibid. 
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aircraft which were ordered in 1968-70 rose sharply 
to Rs 3.181 million (f.e. Rs 1.093 million). This 
estimate underwent yet another revision and the actual 
unit cost that was finally sanctioned in July 1967 
15 9 
amounted to Rs 4.013 million (f.e. Rs 1.439 million). 
A second effect of the substantial shortfall in 
HJT-16 deliveries in the early 1970s was that the lAF 
began to explore overseas markets to replace the Howard 
and Vampire T.55 trainers. By late 1974 unofficial 
reports stated that the Indian defence ministry was 
showing interest in placing an order with Czechoslovakia 
for about 100 Aero L-39 turbofan powered trainers.^^^ 
By this time production.is said to have stabilised at 
about 25 aircraft per year and attempts were being 
made to accelerate it so as to meet lAF's new training 
requirements which needed about 130 HJT-16 Kirans -
almost double the quantity delivered till that time.^^^ 
This situation arose about three years after a 
review of requirements by Air Headquarters in October 
1971, when it had been planned that the total requirement 
of trainer aircraft would be met from indigenous 
production. But production slippages (mainly prior to 
(1973-74) made a fresh review necessary. This exercise 
159 ibid. 
Milavnews, September 1974, p.15. 
^^^ Milavnews, January 1975, p.14. 
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was completed by Air Headquarters in February 1974 and 
it revealed a much larger requirement which justified 
a substantial import of additional aircraft. As HAL 
could not fulfill this additional requirement in the 
time frame required by Air Headquarters, in September 
1974, the Ministry of Defence approved the import of 
a 'substantial' number of aircraft (estimated cost 
Rs 137 million) for delivery between September 1975 
1 fi ? 
and March 1976. Accordingly, about 50 Polish 
WSK-Mielec TS-11 Iskra-100 jet trainer aircraft equipped 
with a 7.62 mm nose cannon and four underwing hard points 
were ordered and deliveries completed by 1976.^^^ 
Meanwhile, two months after the Air Headquarter's 
review of its requirements and five months before the 
Ministry of Defence's approval for import of aircraft, 
in April 1974, on 'anticipation' that Rs 5 million for 
expansion of facilities to double the stabilised rate 
of production. Given the past experience in creating 
manufacturing facilities for this aircraft as well as 
the urgency of the lAF requirements, this move was 
clearly unwarranted and short-sighted. Because as it 
turned out, after the imports from Poland, even the then 
existing manufacturing facilities of HAL (i.e. prior to 
^^^ C & AG Report: 1975-76, para 6, p.10. 
Milavnews, May 1975, p.14, also Jane's All the World's 
Aircraft, 1977-78, p.151. 
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expansion) were not likely to be utilised for the 
manufacture of the HJT-16 Kiran. Apparently, bureaucratic 
oversight was not only responsible for the initial 
sanction but also could not prevent the expansion from 
taking place since three years later in April 1977, the 
Ministry of Defence stated that the 'additional capacity 
set up would be, depending on requirements, used for 
164 
the manufacture of other jet aircraft. 
By early 1975, approximately 75 HJT-16 Kiran jet 
trainers had been delivered out of a total lAF/Indian 
Navy (IN) requirement of 180 aircraft.^^^ The 68th and 
subsequent Kirans had undergone slight modification 
and incorporated a single hard point beneath each wing 
for external stores^^^ so that the aircraft could also, 
to a limited extent, be used for weapons training. But 
these modifications, it would appear were not given final 
clearance after flight trials and testing till late 1977. 
This is because the 119th and subsequent aircraft were 
designated HJT-16 MkIA and six aircraft of this version 
are reported to have been manufactured by 1 January 1978, 
bringing the total number of aircraft manufactured by 
that date to 125.^^"^ Since then, production has continued 
^^^ C <S AG Re-port: 1975-76 , para 6, p.10. 
^^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1975-76, p.102. 
^^^ ibid., also Milavnews, January 1975 , p.14. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1978-79 , p.73. 
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at the rate of approximately 20 aircraft a year. By 
1 January 1981, a total of 180 Mkl/MklAs had been 
manufactured and production was reportedly being slowed 
down in 1981 in favour of the HJT-16 Kiran Mkll.^^® 
HJT-16 Kiran Mkll: 
A proposal to use a derated Orpheus 701 turbojet 
to power the HJT-16 was considered at the inception 
of the Kiran development project in July 1958, but 
was rejected on grounds that the engine would be too 
powerful for the aircraft. The proposal was examined 
once again in 1970^^^ at the initiative of the HAL 
Design Bureau but was once again turned down by Air 
Headquarters for two reasons: 
1. Incorporation of this power-plant 
would require extensive structural 
changes in the airframe. 
2. The delays and costs involved in 
such modifications were unacceptable 
to the lAF. 
The project was revived once again in 1975 when 
the lAF had mofified the design requirements for a 
trainer aircraft. It had also been decided to arm the 
HJT-16 Kiran for training and counter-insurgency tasks. 
Accordingly, the proposal was accepted by the Board of 
^^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1981-82, p.87. 
^^^ FAC (1977-78), Second Report, para 1.42. 
C & AG Report: 1975-76, para 6, pp.11-12. 
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Directors of HAL in August 1975. In December 1975, 
Ministry of Defence sanctioned development of the Mkll 
version at an estimated cost of Rs 20.8 million within 
a time frame of three years. The uprated Mkll was 
to be equipped with a derated Orpheus 701 turbojet 
(developing 3,500 lb thrust) and incorporate an improved 
hydraulic system, avionics and weapons carrying capability 
172 
with four underwing stations. Range, with two underwing 
drop tanks fitted as standard, would be the same as that 
of the Mkl but the new powerplant would give the Mkll an 
improved maximum speed, climb and mnaoeuvrability.^^^ 
The prototype HJT-16 Kiran Mkll flew for the first 174 
time on 30 July 1975 - two months ahead of schedule, 
but flight testing was suspended later that year following 
problems with the engine intakes. These problems were 
apparently resolved by early 1977 and flight trials 
resumed by January/February 1977.^"^^ By December 1978 , 
work on the Mkll had progressed to completion of its 
spinning trials^^^ and a second prototype was test flown 
for the first time in February 1979 .^ '^ '^  
PAC (1977-78), Seoond Report, para 1.42. 
Milavnews, October 1975 , p.16. 
^^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1977-78, p.80. 
HAL Annual Report 1976-77, p.6. 
David A. Brown, 'India's Aircraft Industry Grows' 
Aviation }^eek & Space Technology, 17 January 197/, p.lb. 
Also Milavnews, January 1977, p.12. 
Milavnews, December 1978, p.14. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1981-82 , p.88. 
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Soon after approval of the Mkll development project, 
in March 1976, the Ministry of Defence had sanctioned 
a sum of Rs 551 million for Air Headquarters to place 
178 orders for the aircraft. This however was not done 
despite HAL's request for orders in 1977-78, prompted 
179 
by the dwindling workload at the Bangalore Division. 
It was only in mid-1981, after the HJT-16 Kiran Mkll 
had completed its development flying, that an lAF order 
for 24 aircraft was announced. Deliveries are scheduled 18 0 for early 1983 and a total of 90 Mklls are expected 
181 
to be built for the lAF and Indian Navy. 
In all, the design, development and manufacturing 
program for the HJT-16 has not been very successful. 
There was a 3-7 year delay in initial delivery and 
completion of the first two orders for the aircraft. 
This was primarily attributed by HAL to lack of experience 
and of design personnel as a result of which the initial 
estimates tended to be highly unrealistic. At the same 
time, there seems to have been a remarkable degree of 
optimism, especially with regard to HAL's decision to 
develop a powerplant, the HJE-2500, for the HJT-16. The 
development of the engine itself took place on rather 
178 C & AG Report: 1975-76, para 6, p.12 
HAL Annual Report, p.6. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1981-82, p.88. 
^^^ David Vellupillai, 'Hindustan Aeronautics: India's 
Aerospace Giant', Flight International, 5 November 1980, 
p.1179. 
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unconventional lines, i.e. an attempt was made to 
develop the HJE-25 00 as a complete powerplant rather 
than the routine that is normally followed - that of 
developing components and then testing the complete engine. 
Also, HAL was not able to decide whether to treat the 
project as being completely educational in nature or as 
one which would eventually come into operational use. 
Opinion on this question seemed to fluctuate from time to 
time for over eight years, until 1978, when it was formally 
decided that development of the HJE-25 00 was an educational 
project. 
One major effect of the lack of a clear policy was 
that the proposal for the licence manufacture of the Viper 11 
turbojet was never seriously considered. This would appear 
to have been in contradiction to the espoused policy of 
developing a trainer aircraft which would be indigenous 
to the extent possible. Further, the prolonged delay in 
development of the airframe for the HJT-16 resulted in the 
lAF having to extend the use of the Harvard trainers as 
the initial deliveries of the Kiran were used to replace 
182 
the Vampire T.55 trainers then in service. From the 
time of initial deliveries in 1968, more than five years 
are reported to have elapsed before the 50th aircraft came 
off the assembly line in late 1973.^^^ Subsequently, 
^^^ Milavnews, September 1972, p.16. 
^^^ Milavnews, January 1975, p.14. 
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because of accumulated shortfalls in deliveries of the 
HJT-16, the lAF was forced to seek replacement aircraft 
overseas. 
Operational availability of the HJT-16 Kiran Mkl, 
at least upto the mid-197-s, was far from satisfactory. 
Initially, the aircraft was expected to be utilised for 
40 hours per month, but in July 1973, this was scaled 
down to 30 hours per month. The actual availability of 
the aircraft for flying operations during the period 
184 1970-76 was as follows: 
Serviceability Utilisation 
(%) (Hours/Month) 
1970 43 15 
1971 36 10 
1972 50 12 
1973 34 19 
1974 49 23 
1975 45 24 
1976 41 20 
It is thus clear that the average serviceability of 
the HJT-16 over a period of seven years was about 45.6 per 
cent while the utilisation rate was about 17.6 hours per 
month, far below the revised expectations of the lAF. 
Many factors contributed to this low rate of availability. 
These included frequent modifications that had to be 
undertaken, lack of interchangeability of parts, shortfalls 
C & AG Report: 1975-76 , para 6, p.11. 
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and delays in supplies of spares and ground and test 
equipment. On the other hand, the average serviceability 
of the Polish Iskra trainers in their first year of 
service with the lAF in 1975-76 was about 73 per cent 
and their utilisation about 18 hours per month as against 
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the planned 30 hours per month. The lower rate of 
utilisation of the Iskras was, however, not because of 
technical reasons, but, because of reorganisation of the 
lAF training program which resulted in the intake of 
trainees being about half of what had been originally 
estimated. This reorganisation of the training program 
is also reported to have resulted in an unforeseen surplus 
of HJT-16 Kirans during 1977-78, so that some of them 186 were placed in storage. 
Apart from attempting to meet the requirements of 
the lAF, attempts were also made to seek export orders 
for the HJT-16, the aircraft having being displayed at 
187 the Farnborough Air Show as early as 1972. In 1977, 
it was reported that Indonesia was evaluating the 
18 8 
possibility of purchasing the aircraft but no orders 
resulted. In 1980, there were further reports that India 
had initiated negotiations with 'several countries' in 
ibid. 
Milavnews, August 1978, p.10. 
Milavnews, September 1972 , p.15. 
International defense Review, 5/1977, p.980 
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Africa and Latin America and negotiations were said to 
have been in the 'final stages' with at least one 
189 
African country. This again has not resulted in 
any firm orders although, according to Western sources, 
negotiations under way between India and Liberia in 1982 190 
could result in the sale of the HJT-16 to the latter. 
However, while the aircraft has eventually met the 
training requirements of the lAF, it would not seem 
to have worthwhile export potential. While the HAL might 
be able to provide the aircraft at a lower unit cost, 
than some of its competitors, given past experience, it 
would not be in a position to provide the necessary 
back-up support and servicing facilities in an as efficient 
and organised manner as its competitors from UK and France. 
^^^ Times of India, 5 May 1980. 
International Defense Review, 1/1982 , p.93 
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C. HPT-32 
In November 1965, Air Headquarters proposed the 
replacement of its primary trainer, the HT-2 (inducted 
into service in April 1953) by a new generation aircraft 
and suggested that HAL undertake a feasibility study for 
191 
its design and manufacture. A formal Air Staff 
Requirement (ASR) was issued in May 1969 and 10 months 
later, HAL submitted a feasibility report, envisaging 
the development of an improved version of the HT-2, 
equipped with a more powerful engine. Unit cost of the 
new generation primary trainer was then estimated at 
Rs 230,000 and the development process was expected to 
be completed over four years. 
In the meantime, the Aeronautics Committee had also 
studied the proposal for a new primary trainer. In its 
report submitted just over a month later, in April 1969, 
the Committee, while observing that the prospects of 
designing a piston engine basic trainer aircraft that 
would meet both civil aviation and lAF requirements were 
'not bright', recommended that the matter deserved a 
'careful study' before the HAL was allowed to develop a 
new aircraft. The reason behind this recommendation was 
that the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur had 
developed a two-seat basic trainer, the Revathi (Mkl) 
^^^ Unless mentioned otherwise, details about the background 
and manufacturing history of the HPT-32 have been derived 
from Re-port of the Comptroller and Auditor General: 1979-80 
Union Government (defence Services), para 7, pp.9-14. 
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intended for use by civil flying clubs. The aricraft 
flew for the first time on 13 January 1967, and had been 
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Type Certificated by January 1969, three months before 
the Aeronautics Committee submitted its report. 
As a result of the recommendation of the Aeronautics 
Committee,HAL's proposal was 'temporarily set aside' 
and the question of having a common basic trainer was 
taken up for consideration jointly by the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Civil Aviation. To complicate 
matters, in May 1969, barely a month after the Aeronautics 
Committee had submitted its report, HAL made 'certain 
changes' in its feasibility report. In the Director General, 
Civil Aviation (DGCA), which then requested Air Headquarters 
to give its specifications for the ab initio trainer - a 
request made on grounds that civil aviation already had 
a primary trainer which met its requirements. 
After updating the ASR of 19 6 8 to accommodate 
'contemporary changes in the pattern of pilot's training' 
Air Headquarters communicated their revised ASR to the 
DGCA in May 1971. The entire process, initiated by the 
recommendations of the Aeronautics Committee, thus took 
over two years. HAL, in keeping with the then prevailing 
opinion, informed Air Headquarters that, 'with a view 
to avoid duplication', it would undertake a feasibility 
study only if the results of evaluation of the Revathi 
(Mkl) were not acceptable to the lAF. At the same time, 
^^^ Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1969-70, p.105. 
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it should be emphasised, no joint feasibility study 
vis-a-vis the Revathi (Mkl) had been undertaken by the 
lAF and the DGCA. 
During this period, a Mkl version of the Revathi 
was under development by the DGCA. Modifications 
included metal wings and an increased fuel capacity and 
1 Q -3 
the aircraft flew for the first time on 20 May 1970. 
In November 1971, the DGCA was entrusted with a study 
of the feasibility of modifying the Revathi Mkll, to 
meet lAF requirements. In its report submitted a 
month later, in December 1971, the DGCA informed Air 
Headquarters that after providing for certain characteristics 
desired by the latter, the Revathi Mkll had been designed 
to 'meet more demanding requirements'. 
As a result, extensive flight tests were carried 
out by the Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment 
(ASTE) of the lAF between February and September 1972. 
Although the Revathi Mkll was subsequently Type Certificated 19 4 
on 31 October 1972, the lAF concluded that its 
performance fell short of the ASR and could not be 
improved without 'major' modifications. In response to 
the lAF recommendations, the DGCA informed the lAF in 
December 1972 that the required modifications and 
improvements could be carried out in about two years. 
^^^ Jane's All the World's Aivaraft, 1977-78, p.78. 
194 .. ibid. 
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A year later, in November 1973, the DGCA suggested 
that the lAF should consider inducting the Revathi Mkll 
in its existing form as it met 'most' of the requirements 
excepting that of cockpit layout and climb and cruise 
performance. In December 1973, the DGCA indicated that 
it had no plans to incorporate any of the major 
modifications suggested by the lAF. Minor modifications 
including the replacement of original wooden flaps and 
ailerons by metal components were however carried out 
and the modified Revathi Mkll resumed test flying in 
April 1974. 
The impasse between the lAF and the DGCA lasted 
for more than six months till July 1974 when a joint 
evaluation of the Revathi Mkll by the lAF in association 
with representatives of the DGCA was undertaken. This 
exercise again served to emphasise the difference of 
opinion about the aircraft that prevailed between the 
two organisations. The lAF repeated its earlier assertion 
that the aircraft in its 'current state of development' 
fell short of the ASR of 1971 in several respects. The 
DGCA on the other hand, insisted that it had the basic 
flying and performance qualities to be able to provide 
ah initio training both for lAF and civil aviation 
purposes. To strengthen its case for the Revathi Mkll, 
ibid. 
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the DGCA added that once the lAF took a decision in 
principle that the aircraft was acceptable, it would 
develop the prototype and equip the aircraft with the 
required instrumentation and cockpit layout. 
Consequently, nearly a decade after the lAF had 
initially communicated their requirement for a new 
trainer aircraft, the selection process was nowhere near 
completion. In fact, the decision making process 
seemed to have been brought to a standstill as a result 
of the exchanges between the lAF and the DGCA. In 
September 1974, HAL was once again given the task of 
examining the feasibility of the design, development and 
manufacture of a trainer aircraft as per the ASR of 1971. 
The aircraft was to be inducted into service from 1977-78 
onwards in order to avoid any disruption in pilot training 
196 
in the late 1970s. In October 1974, Air Headquarters 
formally recommended the rejection of the Revathi Mkll 
as it did not appear likely that the DGCA could carry 
out any significant improvements to its performance. 
At the same time. Western sources reported that the 
government had approved a licence production plan for 
a selected foreign aircraft. After rejecting the Revathi 
II, the lAF was said to be evaluating the main international 
^^^ This was because, as early as May 1973, HAL had informed 
the Ministry of Defence that the supply of spares for the 
HT-2 could continue only up to 1976-77. After this, 
retooling would be necessary and the progressive import 
of raw materials and rotables would pose a major problem. 
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primary trainers including the MBB Flamingo (Germany), 
Fuji FA-200 (Japan), NZAI CT-4 Airtrainer (New Zealand), 
SAAB/MFl-15 and -17 (Sweden) and the Scottish Aviation 
Bulldog (UK). The only demonstrator to have visited 
19 7 
India, however, was reported to have been the NZAI CT-4. 
But, funding problems persisted and by late 19 74, HAL 
was reported to have progressed with the design of a 
light two-seat military trainer as a HT-2 replacement. 
Designated HPT-32, the aircraft would be powered by a 
26 0 HP Lycoming engine and was said to have a target unit 19 8 
cost of Rs 600,000 (foreign exchange: Rs 76,000). 
According to the feasibility study submitted by HAL 
in April 1975, the design and development cost of the 
HPT-32 was estimated at Rs 1,608 million (foreign exchange: 
Rs 1.2 million) and the unit cost, exclusive of profit, 
about Rs 630,000 at 1974-75 price levels. By this time, 
Air Headquarters decided that it was necessary to incorporate 
'further improvements' to its ASR of 1971. A revised ASR 
was issued in February 1976, and at the same time, the 
Ministry of Defence sanctioned the development of the 
HPT-32 on the basis of the feasibility report submitted 
by HAL a year earlier. The first aircraft was scheduled 
to be manufactured and delivered in five years, i.e. by 
February 1981. Along with the design of the aircraft. 
Milavnews, July 1974, p.14. 
^^^ Milavnews, October 1974, p.14. 
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studies were also reported to have included the development 
of an indigenous piston engine, designated the HPE-4, 
intended both for the HPT-32 and the Basant agricultural 
199 
aircraft which was also under development. A 
prototype HPE-4 developing 400 HP had been test run by 
HAL for the first time in 1975.^°^ The first HPT-32 
prototype made its successful first flight on 6 January 201 
1977, three months ahead of schedule, but its 
performance would appear to have fallen far short of 
expectations. The grounds for this belief are that 
the second prototype was not flown until more than two 202 
years later, on 12 March 1979. Even before the flight 
testing of the second prototype in March 197 8, HAL 
insisted that deliveries of the HPT-32 could commence in 
1981 only if a production order was immediately placed. 
Air Headquarters on the other hand, indicated (May 1979) 
that if development of the aircraft was not accelerated, 
the only alternative would be to replace the HT-2s (by 
then being maintained only at high costs and accident 
risks) through import of a suitable aircraft. 
Phasing out of the HT-2 had now been re-scheduled 
and the trainer was to be in service till 1982 instead 
of 1977-78 as had earlier been planned. Air Headquarters 
again stressed (March 1979) upon the Ministry of Defence, 
^^^ Milavnews, October 1975, p.16. 
Milavnews, January 1977, p.13. 
^^^ Report 1977-78, p.62. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1981-82, p.89. 
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the need for induction of the HPT-32 by 1981-82 in 
order to avoid disrupting the pilots' training program. 
It was also clarified that in the absence of any guarantee 
about the performance of the HPT-32, no production orders 
could be placed on HAL. 
The second prototype of the HPT-32 had incorporated 
many modifications, including landing gear, canopy and 
wing tip changes. This and the third prototype were 
also said to have been the subject of a weight reduction 
203 program. The third prototype, an improved version, 
substantially lighter in weight and with aerodynamic 
204 
refinements was finally test flown on 31 July 1981, 
more than two years after the initial flight of the 
second prototype, and four and a half years after the 
first prototype. 
Although the HPT-32 had been developed at the 
Bangalore Complex of HAL, it was decided to transfer 
the manufacturing facilities for it to the Kanpur division 
because of the idle capacity available there. An initial 
batch of 24 HPT-32 primary trainers was finally ordered 
in mid-1981^^^ and service entry was reported to be 
scheduled for 1983-84. Eventual lAF procurements is 2 0 G 
expected to total 160 aircraft, capable of additional 
roles including reconnaissance and light strike/weapons 
training. 
Milavnews, December 1978, p.14. 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1981-82, p.89. 
Air International, Vol.21, No.2, August 1981, p.56. 
Air International, Vol.20, No.2, February 1981, p.84. 
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As a result of problems and delays encountered 
in the development of the aircraft, the estimated 
development cost of Rs 16.8 million (April 1975) was 
expected to increase to Rs 37.7 million (excluding 
profit). In March 1978, HAL had indicated a revised 
unit cost of the production models of the HPT-32 at 
about Rs 850,000-900,000 (at 1977 price levels) as 
against the 1974-75 estimated cost of Rs 640,000 and 
the original estimated unit cost of Rs 230,000 (1968). 
Thus, by the time the HPT-32 is inducted into 
service in 1983-84, it would have been more than 18 years 
since the lAF initially indicated its requirement for it. 
In the interim, the lAF had to satisfy its requirement 
for a primary trainer aircraft by extending its use of 
the HT-2 well beyond normal limits of economy and safety. 
The HT-2 was finally withdrawn in 19 82 and pending 
delivery of the HPT-32, the lAF is using an Interim 
Training Plan which provides all-through jet training 
207 on the HJT-16 Kiran. 
The initial delays were caused by the recommendation 
of the Aeronautics Committee (1969), as a consequence 
of which H A L ' S proposal to design and develop a suitable 
replacement aircraft was shelved and the lAF was required 
to evaluate the Revathi - an aircraft designed primarily 
to meet civil aviation requirements. This joint evaluation 
207 Aiv International, Vol.23, No.2, August 1982, p.102. 
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program, besides resulting in inter-departmental politics 
also proved time-consuming; it lasted for over five years. 
As a consequence, when HAL was once again required to 
carry out a feasibility study in 1975, not only had 
there been an escalation in development costs, but, in 
keeping with the changes in lAF training programs, the 
ASR itself had to be revised. This in turn caused further 
delays in the development of the HPT-32, with the HAL 
requesting and the lAF refusing to place any orders for 
production versions of the aircraft till the prototypes 
had been developed to required standards. Estimated cost 
of development of the aircraft also escalated from 
Rs 16.8 million (1975) to Rs 37.7 million (1979) as did 
the estimated unit cost, rising from Rs 640,000 (1975) 
to Rs 900,000 (1977). These again are estimates that 
were calculated 3-4 years before the third prototype 
of the HPT-32 completed its flight trials in mid-1981 
and would, in all probability, have to be revised again 
by the time the first production models are manufactured 
by the Kanpur division. 
It is thus a poor reflection on the decision making 
and coordination activities in the Ministry of Defence, 
the DGCA and HAL (the latter because of the inordinate 
delays experienced in the development program for the 
HPT-32). In fact, the powerplant for the aircraft, the 
HPE-4 which was said to have been test run for the first 
time in 1975/ is presumably still under development, as 
207 
none of the three prototypes flown so far has been 
equipped with it, even though it is reported that the 
production aircraft will use 
208 Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1981-82, p.89. 
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CHAPTER V 
LESSONS FROM THE PAST 
^ As mentioned at the outset, the decision to undertake 
indigenous manufacture of aircraft was the result of an 
effort to achieve self reliance and diversify sources of 
procurement. The first combat aircraft to be manufactured 
under licence was the Folland Gnat. Its light weight, 
simple design and high manoeuverability were the main 
factors in its favour. However, the decision to manufacture 
the Gnat would appear to have been a hasty one; the aircraft 
turned out to have serious problems of longitudinal 
instability. There is no evidence to suggest that in 
signing the licence agreement the Government of India 
stipulated inclusion of any clauses regarding further 
development work in order to improve the performance of 
the aircraft. In any case there were no serious hurdles 
in the process of setting up manufacturing facilities for 
the Gnat at HAL's factory at Bangalore. Inherent design 
deficiencies were the main factor behind the high accident 
rate of the aircraft while in operational service. During 
the first decade of its manufacture HAL lacked the design 
capability to improve its performance, and only in 1972 was 
HAL able to suggest some definite modifications that would 
improve the performance of the aircraft - which was now 
designated Gnat Mkll. These modifications by themselves 
were not of a substantial nature with one exception which 
proved beyond the R&D"capability of HAL and had to be 
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entrusted to its original manufacturers, Lucas Aerospace 
(UK), Later, Air Headquarters suggested a change in its 
operational role from an interceptor to a ground support 
aircraft and as a result the protoype incorporating the 
modifications and subsequent aircraft were designated 
Ajeet. 
The second aircraft to be produced in collaboration 
with a British manufacturer was the HS-748 - the only 
transport aircraft manufactured by HAL. The selection 
process and early manufacturing record of the HS-748 was 
certainly unique in many different aspects: 
1. The aircraft was selected for manufacture without 
any prior evaluation. 
2. In the selection process the government rejected 
the preference of the lAF and Indian Airlines for 
the proven Fokker F.27. At the same time, it also 
turned down an offer by Lockheed to design and 
develop a transport aircraft suited to Indian 
conditions, even thought the Lockheed offer included 
not only help in constructing manufacturing 
facilities in India but also assistance in seeking 
worldwide sales for the proposed aircraft. 
3. The process of decision making itself was probably 
one of the quickest ever undertaken by the Ministry 
of Defence. The entire process took only five weeks. 
4. In an apparent attempt to speed up the implementation 
of the project, RAL, as a potential manufacturer, 
was not consulted at all. 
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Thus, the selection of the HS-748 would appear to have 
been based entirely on 'political' considerations by the 
then Minister of Defence, Krishna Menon, rather than on 
technical considerations of the aircraft's suitability. 
The decision to manufacture the MiG-21 was preceded 
by a fair amount of controversy. The aircraft was favoured 
for its rugged and simple construction as also for the 
fact that the Soviet Union was willing to allow its 
manufacture under licence in India. 
Although Indian interest in the MiG-21 resulted in 
pressure from UK and the United States to buy Western 
aircraft, the decision to acquire and manufacture the 
MiG-21 was made for the following reasons: 
1. Although not so sophisticated as contemporary 
Western aircraft, it was credited with having 
a comparable performance. 
2. The Soviets were willing to accept payment in 
Indian Rupees. 
3. The Indian Ministry of Defence decided that 
given the level of existing technology in India, 
the MiG-21 would be easier to induct into 
service and to manufacture than the British 
Lightening. 
4. The Soviet offer was consistent with the then 
Defence Minister Krishna Menon's commitment 
towards creating a substantial defence production 
sector in India and diversifying arms acquisition 
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Thus, the decision to manufacture the MiG-21 would appear 
to have been made because of a combination of technical, 
economic and political reasons in its favour. 
On the other hand, the decision to manufacture the 
French Alouette Al-III under licence involved no such 
complicated factors. As the United States has traditionally 
not permitted manufacture of its equipment in third countries 
the only other possible sources of supply were the Soviet 
Union, France and the UK. Although India had acquired some 
Mi-4 helicopters from the Soviet Union from 1960 onwards, 
it declined an offer for their manufacture under licence 
on grounds that the numbers required by the lAF did not 
justify their manufacture in India. The two British 
helicopters, Westland's Wessex and Wasp were under 
development and were not expected to go into production 
till about 1962. Consequently, the only helicoper that 
was both in production and available for manufacture under 
licence was the Alouette Al-III, an agreement for which was 
signed in 1962. 
The next question that needs to be examined is the 
terms and conditions of the licence agreements that India 
concluded with manufacturers in various countries. Although 
it has not been Government policy to make this information 
available to the public, an analysis of the various 
manufacturing programs gives some insight into the quality 
and nature of the various agreements on the transfer of 
technology. For example, the agreement for the manufacture 
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of the Gnat was concluded in 1956, at a time when the 
aircraft was still under development. Thus it would not 
have been possible for the lAF or the Ministry of Defence 
to have any alternative but to rely on performance data 
provided by the manufacturer. In fact, since the 
acquisition of the Gnat was not based on any detailed ASR 
issued by the lAF but on a general requirement for a 
fighter, it could be argued that the lAF not only accepted 
the aircraft once it had been type-tested but also had 
no performance requirement which had to be fulfilled by 
the manufacturer. However, within these limitations, it 
would appear that the Gnat manufacturing program did not 
encounter any serious problems attributable to lack of 
cooperation with Folland Aircraft Ltd. 
The agreement with Hawker Siddeley to manufacture 
the HS-748 was concluded at an even earlier stage. As a 
consequence the licence agreement was extremely sketchy. 
The licence agreement for the manufacture of the HS-748 
was based entirely on the assumption that the aircraft 
would be granted a certificate of airworthiness and would 
enter production, and the agreement itself ensured a 
sufficient amount of initial orders to make it economically 
viable for Hawker Siddeley to set up a production line 
for the HS-748. On the Indian side no detailed plans or 
estimates could be formulated because of lack of information 
and, as a consequence, the project proceeded entirely on 
the basis of instructions issued by the supplier. 
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With regard to indigenous design and development 
of aircraft, the HF-24 was the first major project 
undertaken as a response to an Air Staff Requirement for 
a multi-role combat aircraft. At that time HAL not only 
lacked competent design engineers but also had neither 
R&D facilities nor prototype workshops. As a result the 
project was entrusted to Dr Kurt Tank and his team of 
West German engineers who had to initiate the setting-up 
of R&D facilities before they could begin any design work. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that the 'political' advantage 
in India designing its own fighter aircraft outweighed any 
technical arguments that could have been made against such 
an undertaking. This is because the project was expected 
to result in an aircraft of the same generation as the 
highly successful Hawker Hunter - an aircraft which the 
lAF purchased in substantial numbers. The only positive 
aspect to the whole exercise could have been in terms of 
HAL acquiring experience in designing combat aircraft. 
But then again it could be argued that this was an expensive 
if not extravagant way of gaining siich expertise, dependent 
as it was on foreign personnel. In any case, flight 
testing of the interim HF-24 Mkl began only 1-2 years behind 
schedule - a fairly impressive achievement by HAL standards. 
The definitive HF-24 Mkll variant was dependent on 
the successful development of the Orpheus 12, then being 
developed for the NATO competition. After it became clear 
that NATO would not be interested in this engine, the 
Government of India refused an offer by the manufacturers 
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to develop it to Indian requirement. This decision would 
appear to have been a short-sighted one, since subsequent 
efforts to use a Soviet powerplant were unsuccessful 
entirely for technical reasons. 
The HJT-16 Kiran jet trainer project was even more 
ambitious in nature. Not only was the development of this 
aircraft undertaken entirely by Indian design engineers but 
the intended program included development of both the 
airframe and a powerplant. Inevitably, development of 
this aircraft suffered delays. 
Development of the HPT-32 primary trainer suffered 
delays not because of lack of resources or competent design 
personnel but because of one of the longest inter-
departmental controversies in the history of the Indian 
aircraft industry. 
Although the project for the design and development 
of an Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) was not entirely 
indigenous, it nonetheless is a striking example of 
continued shortcomings in the planning process in the 
Ministry of Defence even in the 1970s. The collaboration 
agreement with SNIAS (France) was fairly comprehensive, 
but the design concept was not based on any detailed ASR 
issued by Air Headquarters. The 10 year design collaboration 
agreement resulted only in a substantial waste of time and 
resources, and it was only in July 1984 that the Ministry 
of Defence was able to finalise its choice for a collaborator 
on the ALH project. 
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With regard to the manufacturing programs, it is 
evident that HAL did not encounter any serious problems 
in the manufacture of Gnats. Initial difficulties were 
more due to problems with the aircraft itself rather than 
HAL'S inability to absorb manufacturing techniques and 
technology. The experience with the HS-748, however, 
was quite different. Mismanagement of the entire project 
during the early years was pointed out by a Special Committee 
appointed in 1962, which also recommended that the DHC-4 
Caribou should be manufactured instead of the HS-748. 
Nonetheless, bureaucratic pressure ensured not only 
continued manufacture of the HS-748, but coercion of 
Indian Airlines into ordering it. 
The MiG-21 manufacturing program also originated in 
a haphazard manner. When the project reached the execution 
stage, a supplementary agreement had to be concluded in 
order to ensure that the work could actually begin. Even 
then, both the project report and working details had to 
be compiled by Soviet experts and technicians and further 
complications arose when it was discovered that all the 
documentation was in Russian. 
The manufacturing program did not proceed smoothly 
either. In consequence, a substantial number of MiG-21s 
had to be imported directly from the Soviet Union. Later 
the decision to manufacture the MiG-21 bis instead of the 
MiG-21M resulted in redundancy of materials and parts 
worth about Rs 148 million. The manufacturing record of 
the MiG-21 thus stands out as an example of inefficiency 
and poor planning. 
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Production of the Alouette Al-III helicopters also 
encountered similar problems in the early stages. 
Manufacture of the SA-315B Cheetah, on the other hand, 
suffered no serious setbacks both because of the experience 
acquired in manufacturing the Al-III and because the two 
helicopters used the same powerplant. 
Manufacture of the HF-24 seems to have proceeded in 
conjunction with development activities to improve the 
performance of the aircraft, but the aircraft did not prove 
very successful, and attempts to improve its performance 
failed. 
The HJT-16 also had a very low production rate; 
during the first five years an average of only about 
10 per year was produced. This, coupled with a prolonged 
delay in development, resulted in the lAF having to import 
Iskra trainers from Poland. The quality of production 
versions of the HJT-16 also appears to have been substandard, 
at least till the mid-197Qs, resulting in a low rate of 
aircraft availability. As far as the HPT-12 primary 
trainer is concerned, although it finally entered production, 
deliveries of this aircraft have yet to begin, so it is not 
possible to comment on its manufacturing record. 
It can thus be observed that the manufacturing 
programs for the various aircraft were undertaken with an 
undue degree of optimism and without considering the 
actual limitations that HAL had to contend with. These 
included lack of suitably qualified personnel as well as 
appropriate tools and machinery. Quite often the advice 
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of overseas experts and consultants from the collaborators 
was disregarded for no obvious reasons - only to be followed 
after a substantial loss of time and money. 
Since neither HAL nor the Government of India releases 
any information about the cost of production of various 
aircraft, no definite conclusion can be reached as to 
whether these programs have been economically viable or 
have been sustained only as a result of government grants 
and subsidies. This is because till a few years ago, there 
was no system of a fixed selling price for aircraft 
manufactured for the lAF: all aircraft were supplied on 
a 'cost-plus' basis, meaning that the lAF paid HAL the 
actual cost of production, and a certain percentage of 
surcharge which represented HAL's profit margin. The reason 
for this arrangement was twofold. Firstly, production 
tended to stabilise only about 5-10 years after a particular 
aircraft had entered production. Secondly, HAL's accounting 
policies and procedures were relatively outdated and it 
normally took a few years of production before it could 
offer fixed quotations for any particular aircraft. Materials 
for the aircraft manufactured under licence were acquired 
under bulk contracts and the suppliers were under no obligation 
to provide itemised price lists. This situation appears to 
have changed over the last few years, as far as most suppliers 
are concerned, but purchases from the Soviet Union remain 
virtually unaffected by the new arrangements. 
Nonetheless, according to a study carried out in the 
early 1970s,^ the foreign exchange cost of production of 
^SIPRI. Arms Trade With the Third World, p.739. 
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the MiG-21 was 192.5 per cent of the imported cost of the 
aircraft. Estimates for the Gnat and Alouette were reckoned 
at 147.1 and 55 per cent respectively. It further went on 
to add that in the West typical labour costs varied from 
10-15 per cent of total production costs compared to 1-5 per 
cent in India. On the other hand the share of material 
costs in total production costs in India varied from 40-80 
per cent compared to 35-40 per cent in Western countries. 
This is not only because the import of parts tends to be 
more expensive than import of complete aircraft, but also 
due to the fact that other overheads including transport 
costs and customs duties increase prices further. Then, 
development and manufacture of specialised parts, like 
the Hobson actuator unit for the Ajeet, for example tend 
to be fairly expensive ventures because of the limited 
market for them. The subsidy provided to Indian Airlines 
by the Civil Aviation Department to purchase the HS-74 8 is 
another example. While the first batch of aircraft purchased 
by the airlines received a subsidy of Rs 1.35 million per 
aircraft (representing the difference between the unit cost 
of an imported aircraft and that manufactured by HAL), this 
was increased to Rs 3.91 million per aircraft for the second 
batch. In other words, the cost of manufacture of the 
HS-74 8 by HAL had increased from 13 per cent more than that 
of Hawker Siddeley to nearly 30 per cent. Later the extra 
costs involved in procuring modification kits for the 
Military Freighter variant would have increased costs even 
further. 
2iy 
Thus, there is enough circumstantial evidence to 
suggest that the costs of various aircraft manufactured in 
India have been substantially higher than those of imported 
units. While indigenisation would reduce this price 
differential, it should be noted that substantial 
indigenisation in almost all aircraft manufactured by HAL 
has been achieved only near the end of the production runs. 
Given the low production rates that have characterised 
aircraft manufacture at HAL, the benefits of indigenisation 
would appear to have been extremely marginal, if there have 
been any at all. 
Another factor that has contributed to high costs 
is the location of the various divisions of HAL. The 
engines and airframe/assembly factories in the MiG complex, 
for example, are located approximately 1,500 km apart from 
Koraput and Nasik respectively, while the Kanpur division, 
manufacturing the HS-748 and the HPT-32 is located about 
2,000 km from the Engine division at Bangalore. The 
accessories complex at Lucknow while only 80 km from 
Kanpur, is also about 2,000 km from the main centres of 
aircraft manufacture at Bangalore and Nasik. These locations 
were chosen not because the areas were industrially 
developed, but because they were categorised as industrially 
backward. While this was a good political gesture from 
the Government by way of appeasing the various States, 
it cannot in any way be justified on economic or technical 
grounds. Not only have basic facilities like roads and 
communications had to be created but there have also been 
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substantial difficulties in recruiting suitable trained 
manpower. This policy, however, has not been changed 
despite HAL's three decades of extensive manufacturing 
experience. The new electronics factory is going to be 
located at Korwa in Uttar Pradesh, in an industrially 
backward district. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SELF RELIANCE AND SELF SUFFICIENCY 
Based on past experience, the issues that need to be 
examined are whether the creation of an aircraft industry 
has had any beneficial effects on other sectors of Indian 
industry and whether it has contributed towards self-reliance 
and sufficiency. Viewed in terms of transfer of technology, 
there has been very little benefit, if any. The biggest 
single handicap in this regard has been the comparative 
backwardness of other industries. Unlike Western 
manufacturers, HAL has been relatively unsuccessful in its 
efforts to create ancillary and small scale industries. 
Apart from the lack of a sufficient technological base, 
the other problem has been that of a limited market. 
Manufacturers have been unwilling to invest in an industry 
with no export potential and where the only customer would 
be the HAL. As a result, by 1981-82 there were only 23 
ancillary units established at Bangalore, Hyderabad, Koraput 
and Nasik which supplied goods worth Rs 5.3 million, and 
purchases worth Rs 11.7 million were made from small scale 
industrial units in 1981-82;^ the total, Rs 17 million is 
extremely low considering that the total consumption of 
indigenously produced raw materials components and spare 
parts by HAL during the year was Rs 408.4 million 
approximately. 
'^HAL Annual Report 1981-82, p.15. 
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HAL has thus been faced with the problem of having to 
produce components which would normally be supplied by 
other manufacturers in Western countries. Not only has 
this entailed extra investment by HAL, thereby increasing 
costs, but has also resulted in dependence on foreign 
suppliers till such time as production commenced. One 
beneficial effect of this situation has been that HAL is 
now in a position to provide components and equipment 
required by other defence industries as well as civil users. 
It has been supplying radars and other equipment for the 
three services. 
Nonetheless, it would be seen that these efforts 
have been on a rather limited scale and some of them could 
also have been carried out by other Government-owned 
industries. This would suggest that HAL initiated work in 
some areas primarily because of idle capacity or bureaucratic 
empire building. A good example in this context is the 
latest efforts at 'diversification'. HAL is now engaged 
in R&D in the use of renewable sources of energy, primarily 
to utilise renewable biomass fuel. It can thus be said 
that although industrial backwardness has hampered HAL's 
efforts to transfer technology to other sectors of industry 
there has been some progress in this direction. 
The final question that needs to be examined is that 
of self reliance and self sufficiency. As explained in 
the beginning, Nehru's concept of national defence went 
beyong just the acquisition of arms - it included the 
capability to manufacture such equipment. This concept 
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was certainly justified during the Indo-Pakistan conflict 
of 1965 when the major suppliers, US and UK, placed a 
total embargo on the supplies of arms and spares to the 
sub-continent. A similar situation occurred during the 
1971 war when the US once again embargoed the supply of 
arms. The impact of the 1965 embargo was substantial since 
with the exception of some helicopters and about six MiG-21s 
the entire lAF inventory consisted of aircraft purchased 
from the West, but this situation had changed considerably 
in 1971 when the Soviet Union had emerged as the major arms 
supplier to India. But, even then there would have been 
considerable problems in the event of a Soviet embargo, 
since the MiG manufacturing program was still in its initial 
stages and India was totally dependent on the Soviet Union 
for spares and support equipment. 
Since then more than a decade has elapsed and HAL has 
made considerable progress in its indigenisation efforts, 
having set up repair and overhaul facilities for almost 
all the aircraft in lAF inventory. But, while the overt 
dependence on foreign suppliers has been reduced to a 
bare minimum, there has been virtually no change in the 
no so obvious dependence in terms of raw materials, 
components and spare parts. For example, approximately 80% 
of the total consumption of these items during 1979-81 was 
met through imports. Nonetheless, this dependence is not 
so acute since raw materials like special steels and alloys 
^HAL Annual Report 1980-91^ p.35. 
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could always be acquired from alternate sources in the 
event of a supplier refusing to meet contractual obligations. 
Also, in this context it would be relevant to note 
that while initial manufacturing costs of different types 
of aircraft may have been higher than the unit cost of 
imported types, their life cycle costs have probably been 
much lower. This is because, over the years, HAL has 
managed to create the facilities to overhaul virtually 
all types of aircraft in lAF inventory, and maintenance 
of aircraft domestically has resulted in savings in foreign 
exchange. Also, given the facilities as well as the 
trained manpower that now exist within the country, it 
would also be likely that this has had a favourable affect 
on the operational efficiency of the lAF. 
The other substantial and less visible benefits that 
have accrued because of the domestic manufacture of aircraft 
have been of a political nature. Apart from the prestige 
attached to the fact that an underdeveloped country like 
India is capable of meeting most of its air force 
requirements, it has also ensured a low key but sustained 
expansion of the lAF. For example, had India been importing 
all its requirements for combat aircraft from the West, 
it is a moot point whether the US would have been so 
reluctant to meet Pakistan's demands for more aircraft, 
the 1981 agreement for the supply of 40 F-16s notwithstanding 
Another aspect of this situation has been that acquisitions 
from the Soviet Union have not received so much publicity 
as they have invariably been part of larger arms agreements 
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involving the supply of equipment to the army and the navy 
1 T 3 as well. 
Another advantage of the licence agreements has been 
that they gave HAL the opportunity to acquire technology 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In this respect there 
has been no substantial difference in India's experience 
with the various collaborators, viz. UK, France and to an 
extent the Soviet Union. Both UK and France not only 
agreed to a complete transfer of technology but were also 
instrumental in helping HAL to create manufacturing 
facilities. Also, there is no evidence of any political 
concessions that India might have had to make as a price 
of such transfer. Although there is unconfirmed evidence 
that the Soviet Union did appear to be uncooperative, 
especially in the early 1970s, it did not have any adverse 
impact on the manufacturing program. In any case, by the 
early 19 80s the MiG complex appeared to have been doing 
very well as compared to other divisions. Also, the Soviet 
willingness to allow the manufacture of the MiG-21 bis 
and subsequently the MiG-27 makes it quite clear that 
Indo-Soviet cooperation in aircraft manufacture will 
continue well into the 1990s. 
However, while HAL has had no difficulties in acquiring 
foreign technology, the main problems the company has faced 
have been largely internal. Because of government protection 
and lack of competition within the domestic market there was 
For example, the decision to acquire the Jaguar and Mirage 2000 
aircraft attracted far ircre publicity both doriestically as v;ell as 
overseas than the induction of the MiG-23 and the MiG-25 into the lAF. 
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no incentive to attain cost effectiveness or strive towards 
specialisation. Limits to design improvement proposed by 
HAL were not generally determined by the lack of funds. 
;NTiile the system was slow in making decisions, there is 
evidence to suggest that the handicaps were technological. 
Only once was an attempt made to study the problems 
of the aircraft industry and to suggest guidelines for 
future action. This was done by the Subramaniam Committee 
on Aeronautics which submitted its report in 1969. Although 
the report itself has never been made public, the Committee, 
keeping in view the limitations of the industry, had made 
4 two recommendations: 
1. A new advanced technology aircraft to be 
built around a proven engine (obviously 
imported). 
2. Indigenous design and development of an 
advanced technology engine to be undertaken 
simultaneously, to replace the proven 
engine eventually. 
Three years later, a HAL Review Committee formulated even 
more ambitious 'corporate objectives' which included the 
development of the HF-24 Mkll within five years and an 
Advanced Technology Aircraft incorporating indigenously 
developed airframe, engine and avionics within 10 years. 
The only result of this activity was that in October 1978 
it was decided to acquire and licence-manufacture the 
^Times of India, 16 May 1969. 
^EAL Annual Report 1972-73, p.24, Annexure I. 
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Anglo-French Jaguar. HAL thus ended up manufacturing a 
proven aircraft instead of merely a proven engine. 
Another major R&D project which appears to be destined 
for eventual failure is the GTX - a locally designed 
demonstrator turbojet under development at the Gas Turbine 
Research Establishment at Bangalore. This engine has been 
under development for the last two decades during which 
radical developments in engine technology abroad have 
resulted in turbofan jet engines. Hence, the chances that 
it will be adopted would appear to be very slim indeed. 
A similar situation occurred with the project to 
design and develop the 7VLH. Although it had been decided 
as early as February 1978 to design a twin engine helicopter, 
no decision on a powerplant for it had been taken by late 
1984. 
In fact, apart from success in the indigenous 
development of minor items like radio altimeters, brake 
pads and engine components, HAL has had very little success 
in its R&D efforts. Figures for the last four years amply 
illustrate this situation: 
1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
^'Lpenditure 16,582,287 13,151,339 16,227,294 11,730,711 
Amortised 1,956,000 1,304,000 
R&D Expenditure 
Written off 11,974,351 - " 11,730,711 
Source: HAL Annual Repovts 1978-82 
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It can thus be seen that while a total sum of Rs 57.7 
million was spent on R&D during the 1978-82 period, an 
expenditure of approximately Rs 22.8 million was written off 
during the same time while only Rs 34.9 million would appear 
to have been put to any production use. At the same time 
by 1982, there was an amount of Rs 56.7 million^ in the R&D 
reserve, indicating that either HAL still lacked the 
infrastructure to undertake substantial research projects 
or that planning and coordination in this field were lacking. 
This becomes clear when the R&D expenditure of about Rs 11.7 
million in 1981-82 is compared to an expenditure of Rs 16.5 
million on travelling or Rs 12.5 million on foreign 
technicians' fees and expenses."^ 
Planning failure is apparent in HAL's manufacturing 
programs as well. Despite the ongoing MiG manufacture and 
the initiation of the phased manufacture of the Jaguar, the 
overall capacity utilisation of HAL in 1981-82 was only 70%. 
Value of production on the other hand was Rs 2,750 million -
g 
an increase of about 74% over the previous year. This 
increase, however, is quite misleading in that it is not 
entirely due to an increase in the output of aircraft. This 
became apparent when the composition of sales by HAL is 
analysed: 
^HAL Annual Report 1981-82, p.27. 
"^ ibid. , p. 38 . g 
ibid., p.10 . 
9 ibid., p.45 . 
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(Million Rupees) 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
Finished Goods 1,068 . 7 
(%) 
(70) 1,181 .6 
(%) 
(71) 1,323. 2 
(%) 
(58) 
Repair & Overhaul 245. 9 (16) 242 .1 (15) 527. 3 (23) 
Spares Supply 151. 4 (10) 149 .2 (9) 291. 1 (13) 
Development 41. 7 (2) 50 .5 (3) 78. 3 (4) 
Miscellaneous 46. 3 (2) 39 .0 (2) 46 . 5 (2) 
Total 1,554.9 (100) 1,662.4 (100) 2,266.4 (100) 
As the table shows, sales in the category of finished goods 
(predominantly aircraft) accounted for only 58 per cent of 
total sales in 1981-82 as compared to about 70 per cent 
for the two preceding years. This figure is bound to decline 
substantially in the next few years as various manufacturing 
programs come to an end. With the termination of the 
manufacture of Ajeet, the future of this program is also 
highly doubtful. While the Cheetah and Chetak helicopter 
manufacturing programs are likely to continue at least 
in the near future, they would do so at a much reduced 
scale since service requirements would appear to have 
been largely met. Even if an immediate decision was taken 
on the ALH project it would be at least 1990 before the 
development of the helicopter was completed and manufacture 
could be initiated. Hence, HAL might be forced to keep 
the helicopter assembly lines open if only in order to 
avoid retrenchment of -trained personnel who would be 
difficult to recruit at a much later date. 
2 30 
In this connection, it would perhaps be relevant to 
compare the Indian experience with that of another Third 
World country which, over a period of less than two decades, 
succeeded in establishing a fairly successful aircraft 
industry - Brazil. Founded in 1969 Embraer started with 
the design and development of a light transport aircraft -
the Bandeirante which first flew in August 1972 and 
deliveries to the Air Force began in February 1973. Over 
460 of this successful aircraft have been built so far. 
Meanwhile, in May 1970, an order was placed for the 
Aermacchi MB-326 GB trainer which came to be known in Brazil 
as the Xavante. The licence built aircraft first flew in 
September 1971 and deliveries of 182 aircraft were completed 
in February 19 83. In August 1974 an agreement was also 
signed with Piper Aircraft (US) for the licence assembly 
of various models of commercial aircraft. While the Xavante 
agreement involved little transfer of technology, an 
agreement in 1974 with the Northrop Corporation for the 
production of F-5E Tiger II vertical fins, wing and centre 
fuselage weapons pylons gave the company experience in 
honeycomb technology and bonded metal structures. 
However, Embraer possessed virtually no military 
aircraft design experience when it signed a development 
contract for the EMB-312 Tucano basic trainer on 6 December 
1979. The first Tucano was handed over to the air force 
in September 1983 when an agreement worth $181 million for 
^^Details of the industry are based on 'Embraer: The 
Brazilian Phenomenon', Air International, Vol.28, No.2, 
February 1985, Vol.28, No.2, pp. 66-73. 
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120 aircraft (+ 60 options) was signed with Egypt. This 
agreement has not only been sold to Honduras and Venezuela 
but a coproduction agreement has been reached with Short 
Brothers (UK) where the aircraft is short-listed for the 
RAF AST-412 requirement. 
Meanwhile Embraer also owns a 29.7% share, along with 
Aeritalia and Aermacchi for the design and development of 
the AMX Battlefield support and light attack aircraft and 
is responsible for the development testing and manufacture 
of wings, air intakes, horizontal stabilisers and fuel 
tanks. It is also involved in engineering for the aircraft 
electrical system, navigation system, avionics integration 
and some aerodynamic testing. In 19 84, the company signed 
an agreement with the Sikorsky Corporation (US) for the 
transfer of technology for the design and manufacture of 
composite material parts. 
The development of the Brazilian industry thus stands 
out in sharp contrast to that of India. It began with 
the development of a civilian aircraft and took on other 
projects in a systematic manner. The Xavante program did 
not involve any substantial transfer of technology but it 
did provide the company with manufacturing experience. 
Meanwhile, the company acquired advanced technology with 
its agreement with Northrop for the manufacture of F-5E 
parts. Apart from launching other transport aircraft the 
Tucano trainer was its only venture in the field of 
military aviation. Recognizing its limitation in the 
design and development of combat aircraft, its partnership 
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Aeritalia and A e r m a c c h i for the development of the AMX 
aircraft w i l l not only provide Embraer with experience in 
this field but also provide valuable design and manufacturing 
experience for planning the next generation of combat 
aircraft. 
On the o t h e r h a n d , HAL took on a series of manufacturing 
programs at a time when there was no available expertise in 
project planning and execution and there was an acute shortage 
of trained m a n p o w e r . A l s o , HAL has the singular distinction 
of initiating the manufacture of combat aircraft without 
any experience in the manufacture of civilian aircraft, 
a route not taken by any other manufacturer. V7hile 
Embraer's planning strategy can be viewed at two levels, 
i.e. manufacture of aircraft and acquisition of new 
technology and manufacturing techniques as exemplified by 
its agreements w i t h Northrop and Sikorsky for the manufacture 
of parts for e x p o r t , there is no evidence of any such 
integrated planning by H A L . 
While on the one h a n d , HAL has been having problems of 
idle capacity especially in the 1970s there is no evidence 
to suggest that HAL made any serious efforts to manufacture 
components for W e s t e r n m a n u f a c t u r e r s , the direct benefit of 
which w o u l d have been threefold. Not only would HAL have 
acquired access to advanced technology required for this 
purpose, it w o u l d also have increased its capacity 
utilisation and productivity besides earning foreign 
exchange - an important consideration given the country's 
chronic s h o r t a g e s . 
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THE FUTURE 
Consequently, HAL is at the crossroads. Its various 
manufacturing programs based on technology developed in the 
1950s and to some extent the 1960s are coming to an end. 
Due to lack of perspective planning, the company has not 
been able to utilise the benefits of advances in aviation 
technology. Hence, it was inevitable that if it was to 
continue to satisfy lAF and other service requirements it 
would have to undertake another round of complete transfer 
of technology - a situation reminiscent of the 1950s and 
early 1960s. This is now underway. 
Despite the poor track record of HAL's manufacturing 
activities in the past, it would appear that the 1980s 
might see a consolidation of its experience in aircraft 
manufacture and an improvement in its performance. The 
first indicator in this direction would be the Jaguar 
manufacturing program, an agreement for which was signed 
with British Aerospace on 21 October 1978.^ Valued at 
Rs 13,000 m (fe816 m) the contract provided for the outright 
purchase of 40 aircraft and the local assemJ^ly of 45 aircraft. 
The Jaguars were to be manufactured at a new assembly plant 
2 
set up at Bangalore at a cost of Rs 25 m (fe3 m) approximately. 
^ Flight International, 4 November 1978, p.1630. 
International Defense Review, 2/1980, p.279. 
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In order to save time, it was decided to purchase the 
tools and jigs directly from BAe, The initial HAL assembled 
Jaguars were to have an indigenous content of about 10 per 
cent, being equipped with HAL developed radio altimeter 
V/VHF communication and IFF systems^ and licence manufactured 
undercarriage, wheels and brakes, hydraulic system, air 
4 
condition fuel system, ejection seats in subsequent models. 
A subsequent agreement provided for the local manufacture 
of 31 additional aircraft.^ 
The first Indian assembled Jaguar flew on 31 March 
1982 as per schedule with a total of three scheduled for 
delivery by the end of 1982.^ Although by 1980 it seemed 
to have been accepted that the degree of indigenisation 
would be considerably less than that envisaged earlier, the 
indigenous content after the assembly/manufacture of the 
first 45 aircraft was likely to be about 30 to 40 per cent 
in the airframe but higher in the engine and equipment."^ 
By 1982 HAL was entering phase III of the Adour engine 
manufacture under which 20 per cent of the engine would be 
made from imported raw materials by 1984. The ultimate 
^ International Defense Review, 1/79, p.127. 
^ Hindu, 12 March 1982. 
^ Aiv International , Vol.23, No.6, December 1982 , p.260. 
Also, S tatesman, 19 October 1982 . 
^ Indian Express, 1 April 1982. Also Economic Times, 
8 March 1982. 
Interview with Alan Keys, Executive Director, British 
Aerospace, India, New Delhi, 7 February 1980. 
235 
goal of indigenisation by the final stage of the program 
g 
being about 80 per cent. A total of eight Jaguars were 
to be asseinbled in 1983 with another 15 scheduled for 9 
delivery in 1984. 
Although the Jaguar program will not match the MiG 
manufacturing program in terms of numbers, it is extremely 
significant to the HAL because it has introduced the company 
to modern manufacturing techniques such as the use of 
computer numerically controlled (CNC) machining, integral 
milling of skins and honeycomb bonding. New techniques 
are also being introduced at the Engine Division at Bangalore. 
{Manufacture of the Jaguar's Adour MkSll powerplant again 
requires CNC machining and use of titanium alloys. This 
upgrading does not apply only to airframe and engine 
manufacture. A new factory being set up at Korwa (in Uttar 
Pradesh) at a cost of more than fe20 million (Rs 305 m approx.) 
will manufacture the Jaguar's navigation and weapons aiming 
computers, head up displays and other electronics equipment 
under licence from Western manufacturers. Based on this, 
the company hopes to develop CRTs, head up and head down 
displays, optics and inertial navigation platforms for use 
in future projects. Also included for development are data 
recording and other digital electronic equipment and 
components requiring precision mechanical engineering. The 
g 
International Defense Review, 11/1982, p.1608. 
9 
Indian Express, 6 July- 1983. 
236 
company is also spending another $10 million (Rs 100 m approx.) 
on five major computer systems which will be used in computer-
aided design (CAD) work, programjning of CNC machines as 
well as production planning and inventory control. 
Consequently, given the progress with the Jaguar 
manufacturing program so far, it is reasonable to conclude 
that HAL has come a long way from the muddled, ad hoc 
arrangements that typified its activities in the 1960s and 
to an extent, the 1970s. Not only has the project been 
proceeding on schedule but the technology acquired is 
expected to make a substantial contribution to future 
projects. But one area where HAL has failed to make any 
significant progress is in the field of aircraft design. 
While HAL designed HPT-32 and HJT-16 Kiran Mkll are now in 
production, the fact remains that they are the efforts 
which date back to the 1960s. The ALH agreement with MBB 
will provide valuable experience to HAL engineers in the 
field of helicopter design since it involves collaboration 
right from the project definition phase. In the field of 
combat aircraft, although HAL has tinkered with various 
projects in the past, none of them actually materialised. 
It would appear that HAL has finally realised its limitations 
in this regard. Included in a 15 year corporate perspective 
For details of the new round of the transfer of Western 
technology to HAL, refer Chris Kjelgaard, 'HAL Spools Up' 
in Flight International, 18 December 1982. 
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plan drawn up by the HAL in 1980-81 are, apart from the 
ALH and a turbo-prop version of the HPT-32, a light combat 
aircraft (LCA).^^ 
The LCA project includes the design and developemnt 
of a high performance, multi-role combat aircraft that will 
meet the requirements of the lAF in the 1990s and beyond. 
A sum of Rs 5.5 billion has been sanctioned by the Government 
for the first stage of the project and Indian experts have 
held discussions with representatives of British Aerospace 
(UK), Dornier and MBB (FRG) and French aircraft manufacturers 
for possible collaboration in the program, the entire cost 
12 
of which will be borne by India. 
Thus, Indian planners have not only finally realised 
the futility of 'going it alone' but also seem to have 
accepted the fact that programs for design and development 
of modern aircraft involves a fairly substantial degree of 
interdependence. Althoug neither the ALH nor the LCA will 
be operational before the mid-1990s, the two programs will 
provide the HAL with valuable design experience of both 
helicopters and combat aircraft, an experience which it has 
lacked so far, with the singular exception of the'not-so-
successful HF-24. The 1980s will also witness a greater 
consolidation of manufacturing programs with the main 
^^ Hindu, 4 December 1981. 
12 S. Sapru in Indian Express, 8 December 1983. 
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manufacturing activities being confined to the MiGs, the 
Jaguar and the Light Transport Aircraft. With improved 
production planning manufacturing techniques and inventory 
control it seems very likely that during this decade, the 
Indain aircraft industry i.e. HAL will succeed in achieving 
Nehru's vision of self-reliance and self-sufficiency - a 
goal towards which substantial progress has already been 
made. 
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APPENDIX 
HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LIMITED (HAL), BANGALORE 
The Hindustan Aircraft Limited was established in 
December 1940 as a limited company owned jointly by th6 
Government of Mysore and Walchand Hirachand. The Government 
of India joined in as a shareholder by purchasing the entire 
interest of the latter in 1941. Its original program was 
the assembly of Harlow trainers (August 1941) and Curtiss 
Hawk fighters (July 19 4 2) , but during the Second World VJar 
the factory was transformed into a Repair/Overhaul Base and 
aircraft production was suspended. In 1948, the company took 
up the design and development of the Basic Trainer HT-2, 
completing it in 1953, and besides other projects, also 
undertook the assembly of Vampire Fighters and Prentice 
Trainers. In 1957, the manufacture under licence of Gnat 
fighters and Orpheus engines was taken up, and in 1959 that 
of Dart engines: for the HS-748 transport aircraft being 
manufactured by the Aircraft Manufacturing Depot at Kanpur 
(set up in 1959). 
In August 1953, Aeronautics India Limited, a public 
sector company, was formed to establish and manage the three 
factories for the manufacture of the MiG-21 aircraft. 
In an attempt to streamline the aircraft industry, Hindustan 
Aircraft and Aeronautics India were merged on 1 October 1964, 
and the new company redesignated as Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd 
(HAL) which also took over the Aircraft Manufacturing Depot, 
Kanpur. Also, the Railcoach Division of Hindustan Aircraft Ltd 
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was separated and transferred to the management of Bharat 
J 
Earth Movers Ltd. w.e.f. 1 January 1965. 
After a recent restructuring, KAL now consists of three 
complexes: 
1. Bangalore Coroplex: which comprises the Airframe and 
Aircraft Assembly Unit, Aeroengine Factory, Design 
Complex and the Helicopter Division. 
2. The KiG Complex: consisting of the Nasik, Koraput 
and Hyderabad Divisions. 
3. Accessories Complex: Lucknow and Hyderabad Divisions. 
Also, a new Avionics Factory is under construction at 
Korwa. 
Each of these complexes is headed by a separate Managing 
Director. Besides these, there is the Kanpur Divison which 
manufactures the HS-74 8 and HPT-32, under a General Manager 
who reports directly to the Chairman. 
Pursuant to an agreement signed in 1978, the Bangalore 
complex has also been involved in the assembly of British 
Aerospace Jaguar International corrODat aircraft. The first 
UK built airframe components for final assembly in India 
were delivered to HAL in 1981 and the first Indian assembled 
Jaguar flew on 31 March 19 82, and the second in June. A 
trainer version was completed ar the end of the year and 
the initial program for the assembly of 45 aircraft is 
expected to be completed by 1986. 
